Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BAGHDAD1157
2009-05-01 17:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

WHITHER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RUBAIE?

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ 
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VZCZCXRO2798
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1157 1211748
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK
P 011748Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2909
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001157 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: WHITHER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RUBAIE?

REF: BAGHDAD 585

Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001157 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: WHITHER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RUBAIE? REF: BAGHDAD 585 Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b). ¶1. (C) Over the past week, Baghdad has swirled with rumors over the current status of National Security Advisor Mowaffak al-Rubaie. According to media reports, confirmed by a member of Rubaie's staff, on April 23, Iraq's Council of Ministers (COM) took action to dissolve Iraq's National Security Council by revoking CPA 68 (which since April 2004 has provided the legal basis for the office). In response, Rubaie's office issued a press statement asserting that the COM alone cannot make this decision and revocation of legislation is the exclusive authority of the Council of Representatives (CoR) which has not yet taken up the issue. The COM decision, however, appears consistent with Article 44 of the FY 2009 Budget the CoR passed on March 5 (reftel) that defunds all extra-Constitutional and/or unlegislated organizations within the executive branch, including the NSC. ¶2. (C) In an April 29 meeting with PMIN, Deputy Prime Minister Rafe Essawi confirmed that the COM had taken the action reported in the press and that Rubaie would be dismissed. Providing a view into the COM action, Essawi said Rubaie's interference in Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior issues had amounted to bureaucratic over reach and had provided Rubaie's political enemies the ammunition they needed to finally move against him. ¶3. (C) Comment: From our attendance at Iraq's weekly National Security Council meetings, NSA Rubaie clearly maintains chilly relations with at least some colleagues, notably the Ministers of Interior and Defense. Rubaie's comments regularly provoke angry responses from both ministers, even when the subject matter appears relatively non-controversial. At the April 19 meeting, for example, Rubaie asked that the Iraqi chairs of Security Agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement Joint Committees send their meeting notes to the NSC, as he believed was required. The MOD angrily and loudly interrupted Rubaie, arguing that he was under no obligation to provide notes to the NSC and would do so directly to the PMO. At the April 22 meeting the Minister of Defense argued against Rubaie's suggestion regarding the relocation of MEK detainees from Camp Ashraf. MOD objected vociferously, arguing that the MOD had neither the money nor location to implement such a suggestion. The tone was heated. End Comment. ¶4. (C) At present, it is unclear what the next steps in this drama will be. In response to Rubaie's April 28 statement, the Iraqi Government spokesman on April 29 stated that the Cabinet had agreed to cancel CPA Order 68 and that a draft law would go to the parliament but in the meantime a Prime Ministerial decree would set up a ministerial committee for national security. CoR member Shatha al-Obosy (IIP/Tawafuq) told poloff in late April that there is draft legislation in the CoR's legal committee that would dissolve the NSC. Rubaie and his supporters have been lobbying the CoR heavily on the issue of the future of the NSC and claim he has obtained a considerable showing of support from CoR members (Rubaie's staff claim more than 130 members of the CoR support for continuing the NSC in some form). If this support exists, it may be linked to CoR unhappiness that Maliki appeared to be taking a decision to revoke a CPA order that only the CoR can take. Other CoR members seem to take a position against any reorganization actions by Maliki until he acts on promises (made most recently in relation to passage of the Security Agreement) to enact political reform. Qpassage of the Security Agreement) to enact political reform. Legislation also exists (one version drafted by Rubaie's staff) that would repeal the CPA order and establish a new, streamlined NSC apparatus. Whether the CoR will act to repeal CPA 68 or formally establish a national security architecture by passing Rubaie's proposed legislation remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that Rubaie -- the consummate political survivor -- will continue to mount a strong effort to stall and reverse any legal efforts to remove him. He even went to Najaf to see Ayatollah Sistani,according to press reports. Given Maliki's history of never firing anyone no matter what the grounds (particularly when politics get involved),we expect Rubaie will stay on in some capacity for the time-being -- either as the interim head of a much-reduced National Security office or as an advisor. HILL

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