IRANIAN PLANS FOR IRAQ AS U.S. FORCES DRAW DOWN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001104 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/I AND NEA/IR NSC STAFF FOR OLLIVANT AND MAGSAMEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER PINR PGOV MOPS ECON IR IZ SUBJECT: IRANIAN PLANS FOR IRAQ AS U.S. FORCES DRAW DOWN REF: A. WHITE HOUSE 853 ¶B. BAGHDAD 342 ¶C. BAGHDAD 762 ¶D. BAGHDAD 383 ¶E. BASRA 17 ¶F. BAGHDAD 1103 ¶G. BAGHDAD 289 Classified By: Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Patricia A. Butenis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The Iranian response to the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq, and Iraq's evolving relationship with Iran, will influence the climate for U.S. engagement with Iran on our range of interests. The Iranians may see the drawdown as an opportunity to strengthen their hand in Iraq, akin to the opportunities they perceived after the fall of Saddam in 2003. But they appear to have learned that their proxy violence and efforts to strong-arm Iraqi politicians generated more ill-will than influence. Iraqis are now pushing back against malign Iranian influence. The GOI cracked down on Iranian-backed militias and signed long-term partnership agreements with the United States last year, while this year Iraqi voters rewarded nationalist Iraqi politicians in the provincial elections. At the same time, Iraqis are buying Iranian products, accepting Iranian investments, and welcoming Iranian visitors. The political relationship between the countries is maturing, although still scratchy. ¶2. (S)(Summary continued) Iran in 2009 faces more constraints in Iraq than it did in 2003. We expect the Iranians will respond to the U.S. military drawdown under these new constraints with violence targeted more closely at the United States, more diplomatic outreach to Iraqi politicians, and continued focus on trade and investment. Consistent with ref A, our response must be targeted as well: a vigorous response to security challenges, regional diplomacy to help Iraq integrate with its neighbors and internationally, and increased assistance to Iraq to build its political and economic capacity to resist malign influence from Iran. END SUMMARY. -------------- New environment -------------- ¶3. (S) The Quds Force (QF) -- the external operations arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) -- has directed Iranian policy in Iraq since the fall of Saddam in 2003. The IRGC-QF used its leverage with Shi'a political parties such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) to influence evolving Iraqi domestic politics, while providing extensive logistical support and training to the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and other extremist groups. Tripartite discussions between the USG, GOI, and Iranian government in Baghdad in 2007 made no immediate breakthroughs toward reducing Iranian sponsorship of violence. ¶4. (S) The heavy-handed Iranian intervention backfired, however, when the violent and undisciplined JAM alienated many Iraqis, who also came to resent Iranian political interference. In 2007, SCIRI changed its name to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) to distance itself from its Iranian and revolutionary origins, while PM Maliki's Da'wa party has staked out a nationalist political position. With ISCI's backing, Maliki directed Iraqi security forces to challenge JAM control of Basra and Sadr City in 2008, succeeding with the extensive but quiet assistance of MNF-I. This success, along with growing popular distrust of Iran and Iranian influence, contributed to Da'wa's strong showing over ISCI in January 2009 provincial elections (ref B). Among other recent Iranian setbacks in Iraq, the GOI signed the Qother recent Iranian setbacks in Iraq, the GOI signed the Security Agreement and Strategic Framework Agreement with the USG despite Iranian objections. ¶5. (S) Dynamics other than the U.S. military drawdown will affect Iranian influence in Iraq in coming years. Iraqis will continue to accept legitimate Iranian investment and buy Iranian electricity and manufactured goods as Iraqi domestic production struggles to rebuild. Iranian agricultural produce will continue to fill Iraqi markets as Iraqi farmers recover from conflict, neglect, and a drought that has limited production. The number of Iranian pilgrims and tourists, already in the hundreds of thousands annually, will increase with improvements in Iraqi security and tourism infrastructure. As the Iraqi-Iranian bilateral relationship matures with its positive advances and disputes, the BAGHDAD 00001104 002 OF 003 governments will seek to deepen their cooperation on issues such as de-mining, petroleum development and border security, although disagreements over border demarcation and water rights will continue to cause friction (ref G). ¶6. (S) Just as Iraq will try to strengthen relations with its Arab neighbors and Turkey to balance Iranian influence, Iran will maintain regional influence through relations with Syria and domestic influence in Iraq through its TV broadcasts into Iraq and relations with Shia political parties, the Kurds, and in fact any Iraqis who will have them. Ultimately, Iraqi nationalism and self-reliance are the most effective long-term defenses against Iranian domination, and the degree and nature of Iranian influence in Iraq will be determined less by the level of U.S. military forces in Iraq than by the Iraqi political and economic capacity to balance Iranian influence and channel it into mutually beneficial areas. -------------- Drawdown -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) While it initially criticized the Security Agreement, intelligence reporting indicates that Iran is beginning to take advantage of the new constraints on U.S. military forces. Iranian officials have pressured the GOI to close the Mujahedin-e Khalq's Camp Ashraf since the GOI assumed security responsibility for it on January 1, as well as release IRGC-QF officers detained by MNF-I in January 2007 as MNF-I turns detainees over to the GOI. (Note: MNF-I and Embassy intend to hold the officers as long as legally possible. End note.) Even as Iran publicly emphasizes diplomatic and economic engagement in Iraq (ref C),the IRGC-QF continues to support violent extremist groups such as Kata'ib Hizbollah (KH),and Iran may have played a role in the recent movement of the extremist group Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) away from the political reconciliation process. MNF-I analysts expect extremists to continue to use increasingly deadly weapons supplied by Iran against U.S. forces this year as U.S. forces move outside the cities and present targets with little risk of collateral damage. MNF-I also expects extremists to respond to the drawdown with attacks on U.S. forces in an attempt to take credit for the U.S. departure. ¶8. (S) Likewise, the Iranian government will continue to publicly portray the drawdown as a victory for the Iraqi people and defeat for the United States, perhaps placing it in the context of other U.S. military disengagements such as Lebanon in 1984 and Somalia in 1993. After the Security Agreement was approved, Iranian officials portrayed it positively, emphasizing the stipulation that Iraq's territory will not be used to attack a neighbor and that U.S. forces would leave by the end of 2011. ¶9. (S) This public posturing may play on fears we've heard from Basra to Anbar to Kurdistan that the U.S. drawdown will create a vacuum that Iran will attempt to fill. But if Iran adopts too high a public profile, it risks further backlash because of nationalistic Iraqi pride as well as economic, political and cultural grievances. For example, a Shia member of the Council of Representatives warned us recently of the pernicious effects of Iran on Shia religious doctrine, seeking USG support for a media outlet for Iraqi Shi'a clerics who will resist Iranian theology (ref D). Contacts of REO Basra blame the rising price of housing on Iranian real estate; likewise, Iranian agriculture is blamed for undercutting local competition (ref E). The GOI is rejecting Qundercutting local competition (ref E). The GOI is rejecting Iranian claims to reinstate the 1975 Algiers Accord about the Shatt al-Arab, and it is blaming Iranian dams for sharply cutting water supplies reaching northeast. Maliki and his team do not trust the Iranians and their militia games -- Basra being a prime example, but also Sadr City and AAH. ¶10. (S) While some Iraqi fears of Iranian influence are exaggerated, IRGC-QF operatives do expect a more permissive operating environment as U.S. forces draw down (ref F). At the same time, the drawdown will remove some threats the Iranians perceive near the Iran-Iraq border. An Iranian Unmanned Arial Vehicle (UAV) shot down by U.S. forces in February was sent to scout two such targets: Camp Ashraf and a U.S. military base. In the absence of such perceived threats, and distracted by economic woes and internal discord, it is possible that Iran will become less preoccupied with security threats from Iraq. However, considering Iran's long history of confrontation with Iraq, its unease about enduring Iraqi-American cooperation, and its BAGHDAD 00001104 003 OF 003 delegation of Iraq policy to the belligerent anti-American IRGC-QF, Iran will likely continue to support extremists in Iraq, perhaps building extremist groups into a Lebanese Hezbollah-style political-military organization as a hedge against a resurgent Iraqi central government. -------------- New challenges, USG response -------------- ¶11. (S) We will continue to assist the Iraqi government in developing that capacity through political, diplomatic, economic, rule of law, and security cooperation as outlined in Embassy and MNF-I's Joint Campaign Plan and the Mission Strategic Plan. Among current initiatives: the Local Governance Program to strengthen local government administrative capacity and civic engagement; assistance for Iraqi farmers to develop the agricultural sector; training for the Central Bank's Money Laundering Unit to combat financial crime; engagement with Iraq's neighbors to strengthen its regional integration; and advice for Iraqi officials on an information strategy to respond to malign Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs. Success in these efforts requires a whole-of-government approach, and sufficient funding for non-military initiatives is vital. (Note: Ref F outlines a USG strategy for maintaining pressure on the IRGC-QF in Iraq as U.S. military forces draw down.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (S) The view of Iran from Iraq is shaped by complaints from Iraqi businessmen about Iranian competition, warnings from Iraqis on the street about Iranian expansionism, whispers from Iraqi politicians about Iranian influence, and the occasional sound of Iranian munitions whistling overhead. While none of these need necessarily affect the USG approach on engagement with Iran, Iran's response to the drawdown of U.S. military forces in Iraq will not improve the climate for talks. In fact, elements of the Iranian government opposed to engagement with America may use the instigation of violence in Iraq as a spoiler. However, the Iraqi government and Iraqi people are not as vulnerable as they were in 2003; they are increasingly willing and able to defend their own interests. Continued strengthening of the Iraqi-American partnership will improve their capacity to counter and balance Iranian influence, and keeping Iraq informed of our progress on engagement with Iran will allay concerns that Iraq's national interests are on the table. BUTENIS