NEW SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT: BUILDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001062

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: NEW SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT: BUILDING
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OR A SHOT ACROSS PM'S BOW?

Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for Reasons 1.4 (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Ayad Samarrai'e, leader of the Iraqi Islamic
Party (IIP) and Tawafuq coalition was elected speaker of the
Iraqi parliament by 153 votes on April 19, 2009, after a
four-month campaign. His election indicates there is a
strong cross-sectarian, cross-ethnic political alliance
involving some Shia, the Kurds and some of the Sunni Arab
parliamentarians. Efforts by the Prime Minister's Da'wa to
rebuild a unified Shia Islamist
alliance - so far - have been unfruitful. The Prime Minister
Nouri al Maliki now must be careful lest he trigger this same
Shia/Kurd/Sunni Arab alliance moving to withdraw confidence
from him in another majority vote. Samarrai'e pledged,
however, that he was not seeking such a step during his April
19 press conference. Samarrai'e also laid out an agenda for
the parliament that includes increasing its institutional
capacity and professionalizing the committees and staff,
something that is likely to challenge the Maliki's authority.
A very close Embassy contact known among the Shi'a and Kurds
as a bridge-builder and practical politician, we assess that
Samarrai'e's stated goal of institutional capacity building
to be serious.

Who Voted for Samarrai'e?
--------------


2. (C) Although the ballot was secret, Samarrai'e's 153
votes suggest several conclusions about who voted for him.
First, the Kurd/Sunni Arab Tawafuq bloc/Shia Islamist ISCI
party alliance, which has been the base for previous votes,
held. Based on the roll call, Tawafuq had 36 members
present, the Kurdish Alliance (KAL) had 47 MPs present and
ISCI had 23 (106 votes total). Several MPs told poloffs in
the days before the election that the Sadrists and Fadhila
had cut a deal with Tawafuq to support Samarrai'e, although
the details of such a deal are not yet forthcoming. Sadrists
had approximately 23 MPs present (counted among the United
Iraqi Alliance - UIA); Fadhila had 11 members present. If
all members supported Samarrai'e, his vote count rises to

139. We assess it as unlikely that all Fadhila and Sadrist
MPs supported Samarrai'e, but certainly most of them did.
Shi'a independents, some Iraqiyya and non-aligned members
would raise the vote total for Samarrai'e to 153 votes.


3. (C) The 49 abstentions were certainly from Da'wa and
Da'wa Tanzim (25),and probably from the Solidarity bloc led
by Qassim Daoud (10). Some portion of the independent Shi'a
(about 20, give or take) also cast blank ballots. Mustafa al
Hitti's votes almost certainly came from the National
Dialogue Council (NDC) led by Khalaf al Alyan, non-Tawafuq
Sunnis, and some Iraqiyya. Some non-Tawafuq Sunni Arab MPs
have been very negative about Samarrai'e's election. Over
dinner with poloffs April 19, former Speaker Mahmoud
Mashhadani called it awful, and Alyan told us that he hated
the IIP more than the Iranians since the Islamic Party now
has both of the big prize seats that Sunni Arabs have gained
in the national government (one of the two vice presidents,
Tariq al-Hashimi, is also from the Islamic Party). Tawafuq
will have to include bridge-building among their Sunnis Arab
counterparts also.

Implications for Maliki
--------------


4. (C) All our contacts in parliament made the point that
the Prime Minister was vehemently opposed to Samarrai'e.
According to many MPs, some of Maliki's opposition stems from
his fear that a Samarrai'e-led parliament would try to
withdraw confidence from the Maliki government, or that
Samarrai'e would challenge Maliki's authority. On the first
QSamarrai'e would challenge Maliki's authority. On the first
issue at a press conference following the vote, Sammarai'e,
in response to a question from the floor, said that
withdrawing confidence from the government had never been a
goal on his agenda. Whether true or not, Samarrai'e appeared
to offer an olive branch to Maliki. (Comment: knowing
Sammarai'e's temperament, it seems unlikely he would pursue a
vendetta against Maliki no matter how much some of his allies
might like that. If hard push comes to hard shove,
Sammarai'e would move towards such a vote but he is not
predisposed to doing so. End Comment.)


5. (C) On the second issue of challenging Maliki's executive
authority, Samarrai'e also stated at the press conference
that his agenda was to professionalize the parliament, its
committees and its staff, and to build the institutional
capacity. He specifically identified fiscal and financial
reforms, perhaps a reference to the recent budget battle.
Given that the parliamentary oversight of the government has
been, at best, desultory, any increase would challenge
Maliki's authority. Samarrai'e's also identified political
reform (probably a reference to a political parties law

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initiative floating around the parliament),constitutional
reform, and Article 140 issues.

6 (C) Samarrai'e has support for his institutional capacity
building program. Dhafer al-Ani, a key member of the Tawafuq
bloc, and ally of Deputy Prime Minister Rafe Eissawi, told
poloffs Samarai'e's election to had finally removed a
crippling distraction and would allow parliament to get back
to serious business. Moreover, Jalal al Din Saghir, a senior
leader in ISCI/Badr, told poloff following the election that
reassertion of Parliamentary authority should be preeminent.

Political Alliances and Maliki
--------------


7. (C) One of the immediate implications for the Prime
Minister is with his political alliances. Shi'a MPs told
poloffs that Maliki was dangling provincial governorships and
provincial council posts as overtures to ISCI, Sadrists, and
Fadhila to bring them back into the UIA fold. A Da'wa
official and an independent Shi'a told poloff that the UIA
would vote as a bloc, presumably against Samarrai'e -
something that clearly did not happen. And, the chief of
staff to Da'wa's parliamentary leader told poloff that
Fadhila had betrayed them, despite all their negotiations.
The 153 votes that Samarraie received suggests that Maliki
still has work to do on rebuilding his political coalition,
and not just with Fadhila.


8. (C) Despite the fluidity of Iraqi coalitions, there
appears to be at least one exception - the ISCI/Kurd/Tawafuq
alliance in the parliament. On most issues which pit the
parliament against the government, including the budget, this
triad has tended to vote as a bloc. Jalal al Din Saghir
(Badr) stated a position that complements Samarrai'e's agenda
laid out in the press conference, and echoed the new
speaker's desire to restore professionalism to the
parliament. The continued ISCI participation in the triad is
notable because Maliki had made multiple overtures to ISCI
leadership in the context of high-level provincial government
posts, overtures that appear to have been rebuffed. On the
other hand, as more controversial issues - especially Article
140 - come on the agenda, it remains to be seen how durable
this alliance is.

Biographical Information
--------------


9. (C) Samarrai'e was born in 1946 in Adhamiya District and
joined the Islamic Party in 1962 at the age of 16. He
graduated from the University of Baghdad with B.A in
Mechanical Engineering in 1970, and worked on a water
refinery project until 1980. After graduation, Samarrai'e's
political activism drew the scrutiny of the former regime,
and forced him into exile in Jordan for reasons of personal
safety. He lived and worked in Jordan from 1980-1986, in the
United Arab Emirates from 1986-1995. While in the UAE he
focused on his political activism. In 1995 Samarrai'e moved
to London, and while there, he was elected as Secretary
General of the IIP in 2001. With the fall of the Saddam
regime, Samarrai'e returned to Baghdad in 2003, and became
the Deputy Secretary General of the IIP. In 2005, Samarrai'e
was elected to parliament.


10. (C) Samarrai'e is a very close embassy contact and is
comfortable working with the Embassy. He is more of a
bridge-builder and a politician who seeks compromise, and has
been widely regarded by both Kurds and Shi'a as one of the
most practical politicians in Iraq. He was the lead Sunni
Arab negotiator during the autumn 2005 negotiations for the
Iraqi constitution and he earned a reputation as the most
serious politician among the Sunni Arabs. During the
Qserious politician among the Sunni Arabs. During the
provincial elections law debate in late 2008, Samarrai'e was
part of a small negotiating group hosted by the SRSG Stefan
di Mistura trying to develop compromise text on the law, and
he was creative in drafting proposals while also defending
Sunni Arab and IIP interests. NDI has worked with him in his
capacity as Chairman of the Financial Committee in parliament
on developing the budget and on his relationship with the
Finance Ministry, both roles he has taken very seriously.


11. (C) We assess that Samarrai'e is serious about building
the institutional capacity of the parliament, and has
expressed his enthusiasm for the International Compact on
Iraq which he sees as a way to develop resources to help
build Iraqi government institutions. Samarrai'e has admitted
to embassy officials that he recognizes the necessity of
expanding the mandate of the IIP beyond traditional Sunni
Arab groups, and bringing in Kurds and Shi'a, although this
is likely a medium or long term goal for the party.

Comment

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12. (C) It is still too early to see if Samarrai'e's
election is a desire to professionalize the parliament or a
shot across Maliki's bow. Most likely it is some of both.
The achievement of Samarrai'e's 153 votes, far in excess of
the required 138, is a statement in and of itself. There was
a round of applause when the vote count reached 138; there
was a louder round when the counting was completed and 153
announced. Perhaps even the Iraqis enjoy a bit of
schadenfreude. Da'wa and Solidarity were sidelined in this
debate as ISCI, Sadrists, and Fadhila threw their support
behind Samarrai'e. While the institutional capacity building
is a plausible and desirable goal, the primary issue that
unified these groups was probably their opposition to Maliki.
This may be a lesson to both the parliament and the
government for cooperation on future issues. On the other
hand, it is not clear that there is similar common ground on
issues such as Arab-Kurd relations, elections laws, and
constitutional reform.
BUTENIS