NEW SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT: BUILDING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 001062 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ SUBJECT: NEW SPEAKER OF THE PARLIAMENT: BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OR A SHOT ACROSS PM'S BOW? Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for Reasons 1.4 (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ayad Samarrai'e, leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and Tawafuq coalition was elected speaker of the Iraqi parliament by 153 votes on April 19, 2009, after a four-month campaign. His election indicates there is a strong cross-sectarian, cross-ethnic political alliance involving some Shia, the Kurds and some of the Sunni Arab parliamentarians. Efforts by the Prime Minister's Da'wa to rebuild a unified Shia Islamist alliance - so far - have been unfruitful. The Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki now must be careful lest he trigger this same Shia/Kurd/Sunni Arab alliance moving to withdraw confidence from him in another majority vote. Samarrai'e pledged, however, that he was not seeking such a step during his April 19 press conference. Samarrai'e also laid out an agenda for the parliament that includes increasing its institutional capacity and professionalizing the committees and staff, something that is likely to challenge the Maliki's authority. A very close Embassy contact known among the Shi'a and Kurds as a bridge-builder and practical politician, we assess that Samarrai'e's stated goal of institutional capacity building to be serious. Who Voted for Samarrai'e? -------------- ¶2. (C) Although the ballot was secret, Samarrai'e's 153 votes suggest several conclusions about who voted for him. First, the Kurd/Sunni Arab Tawafuq bloc/Shia Islamist ISCI party alliance, which has been the base for previous votes, held. Based on the roll call, Tawafuq had 36 members present, the Kurdish Alliance (KAL) had 47 MPs present and ISCI had 23 (106 votes total). Several MPs told poloffs in the days before the election that the Sadrists and Fadhila had cut a deal with Tawafuq to support Samarrai'e, although the details of such a deal are not yet forthcoming. Sadrists had approximately 23 MPs present (counted among the United Iraqi Alliance - UIA); Fadhila had 11 members present. If all members supported Samarrai'e, his vote count rises to ¶139. We assess it as unlikely that all Fadhila and Sadrist MPs supported Samarrai'e, but certainly most of them did. Shi'a independents, some Iraqiyya and non-aligned members would raise the vote total for Samarrai'e to 153 votes. ¶3. (C) The 49 abstentions were certainly from Da'wa and �00A;Da'wa Tanzim (25),and probably from the Solidarity bloc led by Qassim Daoud (10). Some portion of the independent Shi'a (about 20, give or take) also cast blank ballots. Mustafa al Hitti's votes almost certainly came from the National Dialogue Council (NDC) led by Khalaf al Alyan, non-Tawafuq Sunnis, and some Iraqiyya. Some non-Tawafuq Sunni Arab MPs have been very negative about Samarrai'e's election. Over dinner with poloffs April 19, former Speaker Mahmoud Mashhadani called it awful, and Alyan told us that he hated the IIP more than the Iranians since the Islamic Party now has both of the big prize seats that Sunni Arabs have gained in the national government (one of the two vice presidents, Tariq al-Hashimi, is also from the Islamic Party). Tawafuq will have to include bridge-building among their Sunnis Arab counterparts also. Implications for Maliki -------------- ¶4. (C) All our contacts in parliament made the point that the Prime Minister was vehemently opposed to Samarrai'e. According to many MPs, some of Maliki's opposition stems from his fear that a Samarrai'e-led parliament would try to withdraw confidence from the Maliki government, or that Samarrai'e would challenge Maliki's authority. On the first QSamarrai'e would challenge Maliki's authority. On the first issue at a press conference following the vote, Sammarai'e, in response to a question from the floor, said that withdrawing confidence from the government had never been a goal on his agenda. Whether true or not, Samarrai'e appeared to offer an olive branch to Maliki. (Comment: knowing Sammarai'e's temperament, it seems unlikely he would pursue a vendetta against Maliki no matter how much some of his allies might like that. If hard push comes to hard shove, Sammarai'e would move towards such a vote but he is not predisposed to doing so. End Comment.) ¶5. (C) On the second issue of challenging Maliki's executive authority, Samarrai'e also stated at the press conference that his agenda was to professionalize the parliament, its committees and its staff, and to build the institutional capacity. He specifically identified fiscal and financial reforms, perhaps a reference to the recent budget battle. Given that the parliamentary oversight of the government has been, at best, desultory, any increase would challenge Maliki's authority. Samarrai'e's also identified political reform (probably a reference to a political parties law BAGHDAD 00001062 002 OF 003 initiative floating around the parliament),constitutional reform, and Article 140 issues. 6 (C) Samarrai'e has support for his institutional capacity building program. Dhafer al-Ani, a key member of the Tawafuq bloc, and ally of Deputy Prime Minister Rafe Eissawi, told poloffs Samarai'e's election to had finally removed a crippling distraction and would allow parliament to get back to serious business. Moreover, Jalal al Din Saghir, a senior leader in ISCI/Badr, told poloff following the election that reassertion of Parliamentary authority should be preeminent. Political Alliances and Maliki -------------- ¶7. (C) One of the immediate implications for the Prime Minister is with his political alliances. Shi'a MPs told poloffs that Maliki was dangling provincial governorships and provincial council posts as overtures to ISCI, Sadrists, and Fadhila to bring them back into the UIA fold. A Da'wa official and an independent Shi'a told poloff that the UIA would vote as a bloc, presumably against Samarrai'e - something that clearly did not happen. And, the chief of staff to Da'wa's parliamentary leader told poloff that Fadhila had betrayed them, despite all their negotiations. The 153 votes that Samarraie received suggests that Maliki still has work to do on rebuilding his political coalition, and not just with Fadhila. ¶8. (C) Despite the fluidity of Iraqi coalitions, there appears to be at least one exception - the ISCI/Kurd/Tawafuq alliance in the parliament. On most issues which pit the parliament against the government, including the budget, this triad has tended to vote as a bloc. Jalal al Din Saghir (Badr) stated a position that complements Samarrai'e's agenda laid out in the press conference, and echoed the new speaker's desire to restore professionalism to the parliament. The continued ISCI participation in the triad is notable because Maliki had made multiple overtures to ISCI leadership in the context of high-level provincial government posts, overtures that appear to have been rebuffed. On the other hand, as more controversial issues - especially Article 140 - come on the agenda, it remains to be seen how durable this alliance is. Biographical Information -------------- ¶9. (C) Samarrai'e was born in 1946 in Adhamiya District and joined the Islamic Party in 1962 at the age of 16. He graduated from the University of Baghdad with B.A in Mechanical Engineering in 1970, and worked on a water refinery project until 1980. After graduation, Samarrai'e's political activism drew the scrutiny of the former regime, and forced him into exile in Jordan for reasons of personal safety. He lived and worked in Jordan from 1980-1986, in the United Arab Emirates from 1986-1995. While in the UAE he focused on his political activism. In 1995 Samarrai'e moved to London, and while there, he was elected as Secretary General of the IIP in 2001. With the fall of the Saddam regime, Samarrai'e returned to Baghdad in 2003, and became the Deputy Secretary General of the IIP. In 2005, Samarrai'e was elected to parliament. ¶10. (C) Samarrai'e is a very close embassy contact and is comfortable working with the Embassy. He is more of a bridge-builder and a politician who seeks compromise, and has been widely regarded by both Kurds and Shi'a as one of the most practical politicians in Iraq. He was the lead Sunni Arab negotiator during the autumn 2005 negotiations for the Iraqi constitution and he earned a reputation as the most serious politician among the Sunni Arabs. During the Qserious politician among the Sunni Arabs. During the provincial elections law debate in late 2008, Samarrai'e was part of a small negotiating group hosted by the SRSG Stefan di Mistura trying to develop compromise text on the law, and he was creative in drafting proposals while also defending Sunni Arab and IIP interests. NDI has worked with him in his capacity as Chairman of the Financial Committee in parliament on developing the budget and on his relationship with the Finance Ministry, both roles he has taken very seriously. ¶11. (C) We assess that Samarrai'e is serious about building the institutional capacity of the parliament, and has expressed his enthusiasm for the International Compact on Iraq which he sees as a way to develop resources to help build Iraqi government institutions. Samarrai'e has admitted to embassy officials that he recognizes the necessity of expanding the mandate of the IIP beyond traditional Sunni Arab groups, and bringing in Kurds and Shi'a, although this is likely a medium or long term goal for the party. Comment BAGHDAD 00001062 003 OF 003 -------------- ¶12. (C) It is still too early to see if Samarrai'e's election is a desire to professionalize the parliament or a shot across Maliki's bow. Most likely it is some of both. The achievement of Samarrai'e's 153 votes, far in excess of the required 138, is a statement in and of itself. There was a round of applause when the vote count reached 138; there was a louder round when the counting was completed and 153 announced. Perhaps even the Iraqis enjoy a bit of schadenfreude. Da'wa and Solidarity were sidelined in this debate as ISCI, Sadrists, and Fadhila threw their support behind Samarrai'e. While the institutional capacity building is a plausible and desirable goal, the primary issue that unified these groups was probably their opposition to Maliki. This may be a lesson to both the parliament and the government for cooperation on future issues. On the other hand, it is not clear that there is similar common ground on issues such as Arab-Kurd relations, elections laws, and constitutional reform. BUTENIS