BAGHDAD WANTS TO RENEGOTIATE BORDER WITH KUWAIT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001038 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ KU SUBJECT: BAGHDAD WANTS TO RENEGOTIATE BORDER WITH KUWAIT, SAYS MALIKI AIDE REF: A. BAGHDAD 00918 ¶B. 07 BAGHDAD 01539 ¶C. 08 BAGHDAD 00295 ¶D. BAGHDAD 00363 ¶E. BAGHDAD 00937 ¶F. KUWAIT 349 Classified By: PMIN Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The current Iraq-Kuwait border that the United Nations brokered after the Gulf War is problematic, according to Sadiq al-Rikabi, a senior advisor to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. In an April 15 meeting with PMIN, Rikabi said the UN Security Council-imposed border has taken away from Iraq valuable port and waterway access. Rikabi claimed the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA) calls on the U.S. to assist Iraq on these matters. PMIN told Rikabi that any UN Security Council action to change the border would be extremely difficult, and Iraqi refusal to accept the legitimacy of the existing border would hugely complicate Iraqi efforts to remove Chapter VII sanctions. He urged the PM's aide to think about how to establish better relations with Kuwait with even small gestures on issues like Kuwaiti persons missing and now thought buried in Iraq. End summary. Why Iraqi Rejects Its Border with Kuwait -------------- ¶2. (C) Sadiq al-Rikabi, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's senior political advisor, told PMIN on April 15 that the Iraqi Government does not accept the legitimacy of the current Iraq-Kuwait border. Rikabi argued that the border was imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) instead of being agreed upon through bilateral negotiation. (Rikabi argued that bilateral negotiation is the only legal method to settle borders.) According to GOI advisors, Rikabi said, the UN can only recognize established borders, not alter or create new border lines. (Note: UNSC Resolution 833 of 1993 accepts the demarcation decisions of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, a body established under UNSC Resolution 687 of 1991. Rikabi claimed there was no Iraqi representation on that commission. End note.) ¶3. (C) Rikabi said after the 1991 war, the UN altered the land and maritime border in Kuwait's favor. Iraq lost part of Umm Qasr Port, some Iraqi farmers were forced to abandon their lands, and Iraq lost some control over southern oil fields shared with Kuwait, Rikabi said. The sea border was drawn to rob Iraq of an outlet to the Gulf from Umm Qasr, Rikabi claimed. Iraq lost "not just a couple of border posts," Rikabi said, but a significant, and strategically important, area. Asks for U.S. Intercession -------------- ¶4. (C) Rikabi said he hopes the U.S. would intervene with Kuwait on Iraq's behalf to renegotiate the land and maritime borders. The U.S. "owes" the Iraqi this assistance, Rikabi said, because the Iraq-U.S. Security Agreement (SA) says the U.S. will help Iraq in resolving its Saddam-era international sanctions. (Note: Article 25 of the SA says "Iraq should return to the legal and international standing that it enjoyed prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990),that the United States shall use its best efforts to help Iraq take the steps necessary to achieve this by December 31, 2008." End note.) Rikabi said the Permanent Five members of the Security Council took advantage of Iraq's weakened position after the Kuwait War. (Rakaia even claimed that after the Kuwait war, Adwa opposition figure Nourish al-Malice called on the Kuwaiti Emir who allegedly said that the Kuwaitis didn't really care about the border adjustments but had taken the additional land when the Qborder adjustments but had taken the additional land when the U.S. and U.N. offered it.) Rakaia questioned whether the UNSC decision take under Chapter VII of the UN Charter "were applicable forever" and asked that they be reviewed with an aim of removing any remaining sanctions or impositions on Iraq. ¶5. (C) PMIN responded that altering UNSC resolutions and changing internationally recognized boundaries are extremely difficult tasks. He cautioned that Iraqi insistence on trying to change the border now would likely make it impossible for Iraq to end Chapter VII sanctions. He urged that the Prime Minister's office think carefully about its priority: was it to end Chapter VII sanctions or to change the border? PMIN added that no one in the U.S. Government perceived part of the American obligation in implementing the bilateral security agreement involved helping Iraq change its border with Kuwait. Rikabi replied that the GOI seeks dialogue BAGHDAD 00001038 002 OF 002 (including on remains of Kuwaiti citizens taken and killed in Iraq after 1990),but he called Kuwait's demand for the repatriation of all Kuwaiti remains from the 1990-1 war unrealistic (ref A). Saddam victimized the Iraqi people too, observed Rikabi, but the Iraqi government cannot even find all Iraqi victims. PMIN noted that the State Department is funding programs to help build an Iraqi forensics capability, and he urged that the Prime Minister's office to understand and support these programs. In addition he suggested Baghdad invite a Kuwaiti delegation to explain the challenges in discovering and identifying the remains of Saddam regime victims. Rikabi also said Iraq seeks a reduction in Iraq's war compensation obligations to Kuwait from 5 percent to 1 percent. PMIN replied that Iraq has a tough agenda with the Kuwaitis. Dispatching an ambassador to Kuwait would send a signal Iraq is serious about resolving issues with Kuwait, PMIN said. Baghdad Ignoring Tehran's Border Claims -------------- ¶6. (C) The GOI also has problems with its maritime boundary with Iran, Rikabi said, as Iraq rejects Tehran's interpretation of the 1975 Algiers Accord (ref B, C, D). (Saddam, he implied, was right in tearing up the agreement in 1980.) The Iranians are constantly pressuring the GOI to revalidate the Algiers Accord about the border, said Rikabi. The GOI will not concede to Tehran on this issue because doing so is against Iraqi's national interest, Rikabi said. However, the GOI does not want to blatantly say "no" or risk souring relations with Iran. Therefore, Rikabi said, the GOI is just not responding to Iran's entreaties. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Rikabi's outlook about the illegitimacy of the Iraq-Kuwait border probably reflects the thinking of PM Maliki and corresponds to what we have heard about Maliki's tense April 4 meeting in Doha with Kuwaiti Amir al-Sabah (ref D - F). After a year in which we have seen significant progress in strengthening Iraq's positive relations with its neighbors, the PM's emerging position on the Kuwait border issue is deeply troubling. Should the view expressed by Rikabi become the entrenched GOI position, it would greatly complicate our overall regional engagement strategy as well as Iraq's own efforts to emerge from Chapter VII. Neither Rikabi nor Maliki is an experienced international negotiator. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari has privately complained about the Prime Minister Office's handling of the Kuwait file -- seeing the PM taking extreme positions while sidelining the MFA. Maliki and his loyalists probably feel that they, fellow victims of Saddam's transgression, are being unfairly held responsible for Iraq's pervious behavior. The ghosts of the Iraq-Kuwait war linger. Our best leverage to get Maliki and his allies past their perception of injustice is to key on their desire to undo the pariah status Iraq gained in the 1990s. Moreover, there are likely others in the Iraqi government who likely agree with Foreign Minister Zebari that Baghdad should accept the borders without further discussion. End comment. BUTENIS