SRSG BRIEFS PM MALIKI ON DIBS REPORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001012 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: SRSG BRIEFS PM MALIKI ON DIBS REPORTS REF: BAGHDAD 912 Classified By: PolMinCouns Robert Ford; reasons 1.4 (b and d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an April 12 meeting, a UNAMI official described PM Maliki's positive reaction to a briefing by SRSG de Mistura on the impending release of the UN's DIBs reports. Maliki reportedly welcomed news that the reports would disappoint the Kurds and offered no evidence that he is prepared to look for ways to reach out to KRG leaders. UNAMI officials expect their April 17 briefing for KRG President Barzani to be more difficult and want U.S. cover. They have a number of ideas for how to assist a period of political transition in Kirkuk, but their plans for a follow-on political negotiations process to take advantage of the release of their DIBs reports remain rudimentary. End summary. ¶2. (C) POLMIN met April 12 with UNAMI's Peter Bartu, who briefed on SRSG de Mistura's meeting earlier that day with PM Maliki, during which de Mistura provided Maliki with an oral briefing on UNAMI's reports on the disputed internal boundaries (DIBs) areas. Maliki welcomed the UN's efforts, particularly as he learned that the reports will make no specific recommendations on Kurdish territorial claims and that the list of options UNAMI will present for resolution of Kirkuk Province does not include incorporation into the KRG or allow for unilateral Kurdish moves like calling for a province-wide referenda. Maliki welcomed international support for UNAMI's efforts and asked that de Mistura brief him after he returns from briefing Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) President Barzani on April 17. Maliki also emphasized (twice) to de Mistura that UNAMI must share the reports with the Council of Representatives. ¶3. (C) Maliki said he favors a special status federal region status for Kirkuk. He asked that UNAMI prepare an additional report on demographic changes to DIBs areas perpetrated since ¶2003. (Comment: UNAMI's overall reports will contain information about the situation since 2003. UNAMI officials understand Maliki's request to be politically motivated. End comment.) De Mistura asked Maliki whether he would be willing to offer any "carrots" to the Kurds, since the reports will likely disappoint them more than Iraq's Arabs. Maliki did not offer anything, and said the Kurds would have to be satisfied with their rights under the constitution. Maliki, however, acknowledged that Article 140 is in the constitution, although he said the Kurds were "either too stupid or too cunning" in insisting it be included; he said he had warned KRG President Masoud Barzani that Article 140 "would go nowhere." ¶4. (C) UN officials think the April 17 presentation to Barzani will be "tough." They have heard that also participating in that meeting with be Kurdish parliamentary speaker Adnan Mufti, Deputy speaker Kamal Kirkuki, external affairs advisor Mohamed Ihsan, and Dindar Zebari. (Comment: Kirkuki and Ihsan are known for their particularly tough stances on internal boundaries. End Comment.) De Mistura was to brief FM Zebari and DPM Salih the evening of April 12 and President Talabani in Sulaymaniyah April 15 and Vice President Hashimi on April 16; UN officials expect these meetings to be less confrontational than the April 17 Barzani meeting. They plan trips to Mosul and Kirkuk later in the month as they continue their roll-out. ¶5. (C) UN plans for the transition from the roll-out period to a follow-on negotiations process remain fuzzy. In a Qfollow-up meeting with PolOff, Bartu said that Eileen Babbitt of the Harvard Program on Negotiation will come to Iraq May 17 to explore what is feasible. UN officials will continue to support local discussions among political leaders in Kirkuk and want to establish similar efforts in Ninewa and Diyala provinces. Their property rights and demography experts are close to completing working papers on Kirkuk. UNAMI officials contemplate a transitional administrative period during which they would help establish confidence-building measures, including additional progress on power sharing and security force ombudspersons. They also want to support MNF-I efforts to establish transitional security force arrangements in the DIBs areas. ¶6. Comment: Bartu said the atmospherics of the meeting with the PM were "very good," and he speculated that U.S. Embassy efforts to spur Shia Islamists to start thinking about how to use the DIBs reports had been helpful. Bartu said that UNAMI hopes to capitalize on that momentum to engage him in whatever political-level process can foster negotiations on DIBs status issues. As we reported in reftel, the PM has reason to be pleased. The reports protect his redlines in Sinjar, Khanaqin, and Kirkuk, and will put further political pressure on the Kurds. We will continue to work to manage BAGHDAD 00001012 002 OF 002 Iraqi reactions as the UNAMI reports are disseminated more widely and to press UNAMI to make more concrete plans for political negotiations. End comment. BUTENIS