Scenesetter: Deputy Secretary Steinberg's Visit to Athens,

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000757 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/05/11 TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP GR MK TU SUBJECT: Scenesetter: Deputy Secretary Steinberg's Visit to Athens, May 15-16 REF: ATHENS 657 CLASSIFIED BY: Ambassador Daniel Speckhard, Ambassador, STATE, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: We are delighted to welcome you to Greece. Your visit provides crucial support to our efforts to re-shape the U.S.-Greece bilateral relationship. Building on the overwhelmingly positive attitudes in Greece to the new administration, we are working to focus on common strategic interests and challenges. That means encouraging Greece to engage beyond regional concerns (Macedonia, Cyprus, and disputes with Turkey). While continuing our strong support for progress in these areas, we want Greece to focus more broadly on Afghanistan, counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, and support for Balkan stability. Your meetings with GOG officials, and your interaction with Greece's lively media, are key opportunities to emphasize our message of a common interest in cooperation on broader strategic challenges. END SUMMARY. NEW FOCUS: ADDRESSING COMON STRATEGIC CHALLENGES . . . ¶2. (C) The new President has dramatically altered public sentiments in Greece toward the United States. This provides a rare opportunity to fundamentally alter a relationship that has floundered over the last decade and has suffered from latent anti-Americanism since the Junta years. Greece's geo-strategic position makes it an important ally in pursuing a number of key Administration objectives: - Outreach to the Muslim world. Greece is central to keeping alive the EU perspective for Turkey and has a front row position for engagement and dialogue with the Muslim world in the Middle East, North Africa and Southwest Asia. - Afghanistan and Counterterrorism. A border country for entry into the European free Schengen zone, Greece had 140,000 illegal immigrants last year, 50,000 from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria and Iraq. Greece shares an interest in stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and in improving border control and identification of potential terrorists. - Proliferation of WMD. With Greek shipowners controlling nearly 1/6 of the world's merchant marine, Greece has played an important role in stopping shipments of sanctioned equipment to Iran, North Korea and Syria. 
 - European Energy Security. Greece has placed an emphasis on becoming a transit country for oil and gas to Europe, reaching out to Caspian countries, Russia, Iran, and Iraq to further this goal. ¶3. (C) With the advent of the new Administration, Greece has shown a willingness to work more closely together with us on these issues. Greece has already committed to increasing involvement in Afghanistan. It is open to discussing with us measures for identification of illegal immigrants at the borders. It hosts the track two discussion for the Middle East and has developed special programs to reach out to Israeli and Palestinian youth and to Muslim women in the broader Middle East. Greece also holds the OSCE Chairmanship this year, and is navigating problems ranging from Georgia to Russia's proposals for a new security architecture. Your visit offers an important opportunity to highlight that the U.S. relationship can be broader and more mutually rewarding than it has been in the past. . . . WHILE SUPPORTING RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL ISSUES: TURKEY/AEGEAN . . . ¶4. (C) As we move ahead on these broader challenges, we need to continue strong, sustained support for resolving regional issues. A recent uptick in Aegean tensions concerns us, given the potential for an incident between two NATO allies. We continue to push Greece to work directly with Turkish authorities. However, both we and Embassy Ankara believe there is merit in pressing for a negotiated long-term solution. Your visit provides a means of exploring that possibility. ¶5. (C) Greece sees Cyprus as a sub-set of its relationship with Turkey. They doubt whether Turkey will allow negotiators a free hand. You will want to emphasize our support for a solution, stress the difficulties the Turkish Cypriot leader, Talat, faces, ask them to encourage the Greek Cypriots to be flexible, and seek their views on progress during this year. . . . AND BALKANS/MACEDONIA ¶6. (C) Greece is concerned about Balkan stability, and as one of the major investors understands the importance of remaining engaged economically. However, the Macedonia name remains a "hot button" issue for Greece's electorate, and Greece's New Democracy government holds a slim one-seat majority. As a result, the GOG believes it has little flexibility though it would like to successfully end negotiations. We continue to encourage Greece to support the Nimetz process (to resume following the June 7 European Parliament elections). Our message: both of our countries support regional stability, and a solution (followed by a NATO invitation) is essential to that end. MILESTONES: NEARLY THERE ¶7. (C) We have made progress on two key milestones that - when complete - will play a significant role in reshaping our relationship. First, the U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements should move through Greece's parliament in the near future. Second, Greece is moving to complete the requirements for Visa Waiver Program eligibility. Two of the three bilateral documents are complete, and we just concluded negotiation this month on the third; only a few minor wording questions remain to be worked out. The Greeks have promised rapid approval in Parliament and we still need a quick DHS site visit, with the goal of Greek accession by late summer/early fall. Nothing would have a greater impact on the public perception of our relationship than extension of VWP to Greece. USING HIGH-LEVEL ENGAGEMENT TO IMPLEMENT OUR STRATEGY ¶8. (C) Policy-level visits are essential to our strategy. Greece is pressing for a visit by PM Karamanlis to Washington "soon." You should remind them of the steady engagement we have had with Greece since the new Administration took office: FM Bakoyiannis' meeting with the Secretary in February, the President's meeting with President Obama in early April, Minister of Defense Meimarakis' visit to Washington in late April, and your visit this month. Most of the chiefs of Greece's armed forces have also visited Washington this spring, and the Secretary may see FM Bakoyiannis at an informal OSCE Ministerial in Corfu in late June (a request for the Secretary's participation is pending). The White House is reviewing timing for a Karamanlis visit to Washington, but do not expect it will be possible before Fall, at the earliest. PRESS ¶9. (C) We anticipate a statement and short question/answer exchange with media representatives immediately following your meeting(s). Echoing the broad themes outlined above and the President's commitment to engagement, dialogue and renewing old alliances would be well received and could be used to parry attempts to draw you into specifics on the Aegean dispute, the Macedonia name issue, and Cyprus. SPECKHARD