FM BAKOYANNIS ON GAZA, AEGEAN ISSUES, OSCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000019 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM OSCE GG GR RS TU CVIS CJAN MOPS, PTER, KTIA, KCRM SUBJECT: FM BAKOYANNIS ON GAZA, AEGEAN ISSUES, OSCE, GEORGIA, U.S.-EU MLAT, VISA WAIVER, AND TERRORISM REF: A. 08 STATE 134559 ¶B. STATE 1199 ¶C. ATHENS 11 Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) In a January 7 meeting with Ambassador Speckhard, FM Bakoyannis led off by expressing concern about the situation in Gaza, and emphasizing the need for a "humanitarian truce," and a UN Security Council Resolution. The Ambassador responded that the U.S. was also deeply concerned about the situation, and that this issue was at the top of our agenda, but the U.S. sought a ceasefire that was sustainable and durable and not a return to the status quo ante. FM Bakoyannis said she was concerned about an "increase in provocative Turkish activity" in the Aegean, including recent direct overflights of Greek islands and that morning's interception of Greek aircraft in Greek airspace conducting rescue operations. These incidents harmed public support for the GOG's policy to support Turkish EU accession, but she pledged that the GOG's policy remains "firm." The Ambassador reiterated the importance of avoiding incidents that could escalate, and emphasized the need for "reserve and calm" in response to any perceived provocations. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador delivered ref A points on Georgia and noted the importance ensuring the OSCE supports Georgia in the context of the OSCE mission closure; FM Bakoyannis had no substantive reply on the "way forward" paper, but said Georgia was among her highest priorities as OSCE Chairman-in-Office (CIO). The Ambassador reiterated our desire for close consultation on OSCE matters, particularly on European "security architecture." FM Bakoyannis said she looked forward to early consultations with the new Secretary of State on OSCE matters, adding that Greece was satisfied with current security arrangements, but that, as CIO, Greece had to "promote dialogue," as this was the best way to "move forward on difficult subjects." The Ambassador said some were skeptical about the motives behind the Russian proposals, and reiterated the need to proceed cautiously. OSCE Task Force Head Kalantzianos said ODIHR was "reluctant" to send a technical team to assist in observation of the January 31 Iraqi elections. The FM also promised to press the new Minister of Justice to move the US/EU MLAT and Extradition Treaties to Parliament for approval, and to press for completion of the inter-agency review of the criminal data sharing agreement (PCSC) for the visa waiver program. Finally, the FM stressed the differentiation between recent riots and domestic terrorism -- as exemplified in the January 5 shooting of a police officer (ref c),adding that there was agreement among all political parties to respond aggressively to a renewed domestic terrorist threat. End Summary. -------------- Gaza - Desire for "Humanitarian Truce" -------------- ¶3. (C) FM Bakoyannis led off expressing her "deepest concern" about the situation in Gaza, terming images of dead children "really unbearable." Greece was friends of both Israel and Palestine and had supported the Annapolis process. Greece understood well "who we are dealing with" in Hamas. However, it was "important" to achieve at least a "humanitarian truce," and there was the possibility of "guaranteed frontiers with other troops." The FM said a UNSCR was needed as soon as possible, highlighting the risks of "losing Arab countries who are our partners." She said that allowing the violence to continue only ran the risk of creating "more militants." She said Greece had faced significant problems in providing humanitarian assistance to Gaza, noting that Greece had sent two aircraft with supplies, and it had required 5 days for the assistance to get in. She termed the crisis "unprecedented," and argued that a "humanitarian truce" was needed to "allow breathing space" and to "remove the injured." ¶4. (C) The Ambassador said the U.S. was also deeply concerned about the situation in Gaza, and that this issue was at the top of Washington's agenda. Our objective was also an end to violence in Israel and Gaza, but this required a permanent and sustainable ceasefire. Our focus was constructing a ceasefire that endures over the long term. The United States had also provided humanitarian aid, and has ATHENS 00000019 002 OF 003 urged all parties to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and condemned the unlawful targeting of civilians. -------------- Aegean - "Increase in Provocative Activity" -------------- ¶5. (C) Bakoyannis said she was concerned about an "increase in provocative activity" in the Aegean by Turkey. In recent months, Turkey had directly overflown the Greek islands of Farmakonisi and Agathonisi. Today, in response to two requests for assistance (one from a "Greek cell phone" and the oth%2 "Q!! ! "TQQ*)1( !%$$ Q(one") Greece sent a he$)!a@Q%Q Ta !* aQ%! "ear Farmakonisi that was )bD%Q!d@Q%$Q "Q QQ) TQrkish fighter aircraft and QQ$$ !Q Q!Q )Q TQQ))Q` airspace (septel re0!QQQ 4()Q !"!)$%"Qtherefore made "life harder" for the GOG in its "steady and determined support for Turkish realization of its European aspirations." ¶6. (C) Ambassador Speckhard said the U.S. watched developments in the Aegean closely and wanted to avoid any incidents that could escalate tensions. The U.S. believed it best to be reserved and calm in response to perceived provocations, and had given this same message to Turkish officials. The Ambassador noted that some Turkish officials had felt that the Greek press had "gloated" after NATO's Noble Archer exercise; Bakoyannis interrupted to insist that there had been "no gloating." Becoming animated, she insisted that the GOG had taken deliberate steps to keep Noble Archer out of the press, making no statements even though it would have been politically advantageous for her personally to do so. ¶7. (C) Bakoyannis said that she had expected "more reciprocity" from Turkey following the PM's 2008 visit to Ankara. The government was taking hits in the press and from the public because its Turkey policies were not delivering positive benefits. The Ecumenical Patriarchate's status remains restricted, Halki seminary has not been reopened despite efforts by 4 U.S. Presidents, and Turkey maintains its "casus belli" against Greece should it extend its territorial waters from 6 nm to 10 nm as it is entitled to do under the Law of the Sea Convention. -------------- OSCE Matters -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassador delivered ref A points on our strategy for dealing with the separatist regions of Georgia to the FM. She had no substantive reply to our strategy. The Ambassador also asked that she, as OSCE CIO, pay close attention to how the OSCE could best support Georgia now that the mission is closing. Bakoyannis said that Georgia would be among her top priorities as OSCE CIO. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador emphasized our interest in the OSCE's core principles and institutions, and our concern that Russia was seeking to weaken core human rights and democracy activities. He also said that any discussion of European "security architecture" would need to be carried out in close consultation and in a "thoughtful, prepared way." He advised against any effort to skip the preparatory work in favor of high-profile higher-level meetings. The U.S. was not against consultations but had questions about the motives behind this initiative, which may be to diminish or weaken existing European institutions. FM Bakoyannis said Greece was "satisfied" with current security structures. However, as CIO, Greece intended to "promote dialogue" and be an "honest broker" to achieve "as much consensus as possible." Any discussion of European "security architecture" would need to be "extraordinarily well prepared;" otherwise it could "backfire." But Greece believed dialogue was a way to "move on difficult subjects." The Ambassador again underscored our reservations and highlighted the need to proceed carefully and in full consultation. FM Bakoyannis responded that she "counted on U.S. support" and wanted close cooperation. For this reason, she had already requested an early meeting with the incoming Secretary of State. The Ambassador responded that he was certain that the new Secretary would be in touch on OSCE matters, but that since the new administration was not yet in place, he was not able to discuss timing for such ATHENS 00000019 003 OF 003 contacts. Bakoyannis said she fully understood, but again expressed hope for an "early" meeting. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador raised the Iraqi government's request for observers for the January 31 election, adding that USOSCE had asked CIO/Greece and EU states to consider sending a small technical team to assist. MFA OSCE Task Force Head Kalantzianos rapidly responded that the OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was disinclined to send a team to Iraq, and that "most" participating states had reservations about the idea. The Ambassador asked FM Bakoyannis to review the matter, arguing that few could argue with the common interest in supporting good elections in a new democracy that as suffered so much. -------------- U.S.-EU MLAT and Visa Waiver -------------- ¶11. (C) Per ref B, the Ambassador said the U.S. had completed its approval of the U.S.-EU MLAT and Extradition Treaties. The Ambassador noted they had been concluded under the Greek EU Presidency, and that Greece was one of only four EU states that still had not ratified them. He asked FM Bakoyannis to help achieve ratification as soon as possible. FM Bakoyannis said it should move and that she would talk to the new Minister of Justice "next wek" (septel reports on Greece's cabinet reshufle) and press him to move them to Parliament as soon as possible. ¶12. (C) On visa waiver, the Ambassador noted that the HSPD-6 Agreement was substantially completed, that the Memorandum of Understanding was well advanced, but that the U.S. awaited Greek comments on the criminal data sharing agreement (PCSC), which Greece had received on October 17. Bakoyannis said that the document had received close scrutiny by the Greek inter-agency, and that she would again raise this "next week" with the new Minister of Justice to obtain comments back to the U.S. ASAP. -------------- Domestic Terrorism -------------- ¶13. (C) Asked her views on recent events, FM Bakoyannis said it was important to decouple the recent riots -- an "unfortunate response to a tragic shooting of a youth" with domestic terrorism. On the riots, she noted that there had been "some caution" on whether the police should respond more aggressively, as some felt that a "strong reaction" by the police might lead to a "Los Angeles experience" (apparently referring to the Rodney King riots). However, she termed the January 5 shooting of a police officer by Revolutionary Struggle (RS) a different thing all together. She said RS "is or wants to be" a terrorist organization, and the GOG will "spare no effort to get rid of it as soon as possible." She noted that some in Greece had become complacent about the domestic terrorist threat. Now, there is recognition by all political parties of the need to "restart talking about domestic terrorism," and there is a political consensus on the seriousness of the situation. Greek politicians and the public "see a difference between demonstrators and killers." The Ambassador thanked her for the cooperation the Embassy has received from the police and security forces and expressed U.S. support for the right against terrorism. SPECKHARD