NATO: GREEK UNEASE AT UPCOMING NATO CAOC AND CC-AIR COMMAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001673 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/04 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR GR TU SUBJECT: NATO: GREEK UNEASE AT UPCOMING NATO CAOC AND CC-AIR COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS REF: ATHENS 1605 CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Greek interlocutors, including Minister of Defense Venizelos and Chief of Defense Giagkos, have increasingly and more stridently expressed to us that NATO's new "Flags-to-Posts" (FTP) arrangement agreed by CHODs in May 2009 is not acceptable to the new Papandreou government, citing the imbalance of "stars" -- i.e. general officer positions -- divided between Greece and Turkey in the Command Groups at NATO's Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Larissa, Greece ("CAOC 4"),and NATO's Component Command Air (CC Air) in Izmir, Turkey. The Greeks have not explicitly threatened a NAC veto, but have pointed to an upcoming Council decision on NATO's End State Peacetime Establishments (ESPEs) -- of which we understand the FTP is a part -- as the means by which they could force a reconsideration of the CAOC and CC-Air command arrangements. Despite Greece's then-CHOD Grapsas formally joining consensus on the FTP earlier this year with his colleagues in NATO's Military Committee (MC),our Greek interlocutors remain suspicious and dismayed at what they tell us was, in their view, a "last-minute deal" between the U.S. and Turkey that tilted the regional NATO balance in Turkey's favor. We have told the Greeks to engage the Chairman of the Military Committee (CMC) and the U.S. Military Representative in Brussels. While it is too early to tell whether the Greeks would block consensus in the NAC, all signs in Athens are indicating that the Greeks are growing increasingly concerned with the status quo as the decision on the ESPEs approaches. END SUMMARY. -------------- The Command Arrangements -------------- ¶2. (C) We understand that in May 2009, NATO's Military Committee, meeting at the level of Chiefs of Defense, approved by consensus the Flags-to-Post for the New NATO Command Structure, which will be incorporated into the End State Peacetime Establishments, and submitted to the North Atlantic Council for approval in late 2009 or early 2010. While this FTP arrangement covers the whole of NATO's command structure in Europe and North America, the following arrangements were agreed for NATO's CAOC Larissa and CC Air Izmir: CAOC 4 (LARISSA) --COMMANDER: GR/TU Rotational (Major General) --DEPUTY COMMANDER: TU/GR Rotational (Brigadier General) --There will always be a Greek and Turk flag in the command group in Larisa CAOC 4. CC AIR (IZMIR) --COMMANDER: Always US (non-rotational) (Lieutenant General) --DEPUTY COMMANDER: TU/FR (Rotational) (Major General) --CHIEF OF STAFF: GR/TU (Rotational) (Major General) --There will always be Turk flag in command group in CC Air, but there will be periods when there is no Greek flag in this command group. -------------- What the Greeks Tell Us -------------- ¶3. (C) Greek interlocutors point to the period where there will be no Greek in the CC Air command group, but there will be a Turk in both Larissa and Izmir, as an unacceptable "imbalance." They have told us in a variety of settings, and at a variety of levels, that they resent what they characterize as a last minute, "11th-hour deal" between the U.S. and Turkey that saw the U.S. give up its longstanding position as the Deputy Commander of CAOC Larissa to a Turkish general, which "created" this imbalance. According to them, their CHOD only learned of the alleged deal while at the table during the MC meeting, when he saw a Turkish flag for DCOM Larissa on the PowerPoint display where he had always expected to see a U.S. flag. Not wanting to derail the overall FTP decision, details of which had taken months to negotiate to the point where CHODs could approve it, he joined consensus but, the Greeks tell us, on the understanding the issue would be revisited. (Note: We do not have details of what, if anything, was said during or after the session.) ¶4. (C) These concerns were raised most prominently in the Ambassador's initial meeting with MOD Venizelos on November 4 (reftel). In response to the Ambassador's suggestion on a seemingly unrelated issue, Venizelos stated he would only act in connection with resolution of the "CAOC problem," and asked for U.S. help. In a recent meeting between Embassy Athens Defense Attache and CHOD Giagkos, Giagkos asked for an explanation as to why the U.S. dropped out of the CAOC 4 Deputy Commander position, and why Turkey was selected for replacement. At the working group level of the November 16 High Level Consultative Committee bilateral defense meetings in Athens, senior Greek officers from the Hellenic National Defense General Staff raised identical concerns, and pointed to the NAC as the final option to address Greek concerns when we stated that their CHOD had joined consensus on the FTP. Recently at the MFA, NATO desk officers told us that the MFA was looking at the upcoming NAC decision on the ESPEs as a means of forcing Greek concerns to be addressed, though did not specifically threaten a veto. -------------- What We Tell the Greeks -------------- ¶5. (C) We continue to deflect Greek efforts to make this a U.S-Greek bilateral issue, and have pointed them to include Brussels in the discussion at every opportunity. We have counseled them to raise their concerns with the Chairman of the Military Committee, under whose chairmanship the FTP arrangement was agreed in May 2009, and suggested that if they seek to learn more about the FTP negotiations, to engage with the U.S. Military Representative at NATO HQ. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) Embassy Athens Defense Attache has been told that the U.S. wanted an O-6 level Deputy Chief of Staff Operations billet in CAOC 4 on a permanent, non-rotational basis, and negotiated to give up the rotational O-7 level Deputy Commander rotational billet at CAOC 4 in return for the O-6 level permanent DCOS Operations billet. Since NATO CMC DiPaola brokered the framework of the overall flags-to-post arrangement, we do not have any insight into the negotiating process that led to the FTP decision to place a Turkish Flag Officer into the CAOC 4 Deputy Commander rotation during that MC session at CHODs level, or the role of the CMC in brokering a final deal. Yet clearly, the fact is that at the end of the day, the Greek CHOD at the time joined consensus. Equally clear, however, is that the new Papandreou government is currently weighing options for redressing it. Our judgment at present is that the GoG is trying to press the United States into reexamining our interest in the CAOC 4 Deputy Commander rotation, and hoping to support our lead should we quietly ask for that position back. This relieves them of the burden of facing up to the embarrassing "mistake" of joining MC consensus in May 2009, and of drawing the ire of Allies in the NAC should they back away from a previous commitment and send the ESPEs back to the drawing board. While it is too early to call whether the Greeks will pursue this veto option in the NAC, all signs in Athens areQndicating the Greeks are growing increasingly concerned with the status quo as the NAC decision approaches. END SUMMARY. Speckhard