MFA VIEWS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT, NRC, CFE, OSCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001627 SIPDIS NOFORN AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/13 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR GR AF SUBJECT: MFA VIEWS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT, NRC, CFE, OSCE REF: A.) STATE 116100, B.) ATHENS 1599 ATHENS 00001627 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Deborah A. McCarthy, Deputy Chief of Mission; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Greece supports our goal at the December Foreign Ministerial of MAP for Montenegro, and agrees BiH is not ready. On NATO-Russia, he noted that the SecGen's draft ministerial tasking to begin a joint review of common threats may be a bit overly ambitious, but that it was important to identify shared interests with Russia. He cautioned against ceasing to share CFE data with Russia, worrying that such as step risked killing the CFE Treaty. Turning to OSCE issues, he asked for close cooperation with the U.S. in crafting an OSCE Declaration that could be agreed at 56. He conveyed his view that Washington does not place much importance on the OSCE, based on readouts of meetings he had received from the Greek embassy in Washington. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Per reftel A, we discussed Greek views on NATO enlargement at the December Foreign Ministerial with Ambassador Theodoros Daskarolis, Deputy Director of the MFA's NATO policy office on November 10. The Greek government shares our view that Montenegro is ready for MAP, while Bosnia is not. Daskarolis added the granting MAP to Montenegro would also serve as a good example for other countries in the region, namely Serbia - even more important than Bosnia, he asserted. He accepted our point that Allied decisions with respect to the countries in the Western Balkans will not adversely impact Ukraine or Georgia in their pursuit of membership, but stressed that NATO institutional processes must be respected, and Ukraine and Georgia could not expect to bypass MAP if and when the time came. ¶3. (C) Turning to the NATO Russia Council, Daskarolis supported the concept of trying to identify shared interests with Russia in order to make common cause, but found the Secretary General's draft Ministerial tasking to begin a joint review of common threats facing NATO and Russia -- to include Afghanistan, terrorism, missile defense, piracy, the proliferation of WMD, disarmament and arms control, and the security of critical energy infrastructure - to be a bit overly ambitious. He doubted Russia's commitment to deliver results. We agreed that the NRC Afghan counternarcotics project had been a success thus far, and Daskarolis characterized it as on the most successful joint NRC projects ever. ¶4. (C/NF) We told Daskarolis we were a bit struck at the fact that more than two weeks into his job, Alternate FM Droutsas had little to say about Afghanistan in his meeting with PM A/S Shapiro on October 23 (reftel B). Daskarolis (protect) confirmed that NATO and Afghanistan were "vying for the Minister's attention" at present. He expressed confidence that an experienced NATO hand, Yiannis-Alexis Zepos (Greece's NATO PermRep from 2004-2007, and currently one of the SYG's Strategic Concept 'wisepersons') had been named MFA Secretary General, but noted that despite the NATO Foreign Ministerial in early December, the OSCE Ministerial (which Greece will host as CiO),hoped-for bilats on the margins of the OSCE to include the Secretary and Turkish FM Davutoglu, and the upcoming December European Council meeting continued to occupy top billing in the Ministry. ¶5. (C) On ISAF, Daskarolis noted the Ministry of Defense had the lead on planning any Greek deployment, but was not surprised that we had been receiving signals lately from MOD that budgetary constraints seriously threaten their pledged move of engineers to RC-West from Kabul and an OMLT deployment. He was pessimistic on President Karzai's legitimacy, and even moreso on what he deemed a lack of political progress over the past seven years that had led to the unfortunate electoral events. Daskarolis was suspicious of the Pakistani government's intentions toward Afghanistan, but acknowledged the key role of Pakistan if the insurgency in Afghanistan is ultimately to be squelched. ATHENS 00001627 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Daskarolis shared U.S. frustrations over the current situation regarding the CFE Treaty, where data shared with the Russians is not reciprocated, but questioned whether stopping to share our data was the correct policy decision to reach our desired goal. He cautioned that such a step might in fact backfire, leading to the demise of the CFE Treaty. Describing the CFE as "irreplaceable for the European security architecture," he worried that if NATO Allies were to inadvertently harm the CFE through a decision not to share data, it could lead to a more prominent role for the OSCE's non-binding Vienna Document, which he did not want to see. While failing to offer concrete counter-proposals, he did note whatever strategy Allies agreed on should have as its centerpiece an emphasis on the fact that the CFE is irreplaceable. ¶7. (C/NF) Though OSCE is not his primary responsibility, he shared his impression based on reporting from Greece's Washington embassy following high-level meetings in the Department that the U.S. did not have much interest in the OSCE or the upcoming Ministerial. We assured him that was not the case. He expressed optimism that a formal Ministerial Declaration could be adopted at 56 this year, and asked for U.S. help in making this happen in Vienna. Daskarolis had no specifics when asked what kind of U.S. help he meant, or whether Russia would play ball; he believed that appropriate CFE language could be found for the Declaration if sufficient will existed. Speckhard