MOD VENIZELOS: POSITIVE SIGNS, BUT SOME TOUGH ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001605 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/05 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS GR AF TU SUBJECT: MOD VENIZELOS: POSITIVE SIGNS, BUT SOME TOUGH ISSUES REF: ATHENS 1563 ATHENS 00001605 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: New Minister of Defense Evangelos Venizelos expressed his commitment to a strong bilateral defense relationship in the Ambassador's first one-on-one meeting with him November 4. Well-briefed on Afghanistan, he said Greece would keep its medical teams (there for the elections support mission) in-country, would participate with funding for NATO's helicopter initiative, and would contribute 3-4 million euros to the ANA Trust Fund, but that Greece was now leaning toward keeping its engineering battalion in Kabul vice moving it to Herat as had been pledged. Venizelos is closely watching internal USG deliberations on Afghanistan for signals. On Turkey, he stated the government seeks to promote a new climate, but that it was not easy; he reiterated that Greece has problems with NATO plans to rotate a Greek then a Turk annually as commander of a NATO air center in Larisa. He was opaque on plans to reform Greek procurement, in contrast to his bold statements before Parliament on October 18. The Ambassador urged Venizelos to follow through on Greek commitments to move its Kabul forces to RC-West; welcomed the other positive steps toward ISAF; pressed him to be proactive and not reactive in reaching out to Turkey in the Aegean; commended him on his intentions to bring more transparency to Greek defense procurement; asked Venizelos to work personally to break the impasse that would enable the U.S. to begin construction of an important infrastructure project at Naval Support Activity Souda Bay; and encouraged him to remove remaining obstacles to freeing up a Navy site for a mosque in Athens. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) In a warm and positive initial meeting with the Ambassador, MOD Venizelos stressed his commitment to fostering a strong relationship with the United States. He expressed his appreciation for meeting Secretary Gates at the NATO Ministerial in Bratislava in late October, commending his professionalism and record as SecDef. He noted his recent meeting with ASD Vershbow at the recent Southeastern Europe Defense Ministers meeting in Sofia, and predicted good working relationships with both. Venizelos stated that he intended to demonstrate firm civilian control over the Greek military, and was ready to make decisions on tough issues. -------------- --- Afghanistan: Some Good, Some Bad -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Speckhard noted U.S. hopes that Greece deploy its pledged OMLT and move its engineering battalion from Kabul to Herat in western Afghanistan as quickly as possible, and asked Venizelos for the status, given recent worrying signs that Greece lacked the proper equipment to enable its troops to fulfill this commitment. Venizelos stated that the presence of Afghan refugees in Greece constituted indirect but "substantial" support for ISAF. The Ambassador focused him on the fact that increased Greek support to the mission in Afghanistan and success there would directly affect refugee flows that have caused so many social problems in Greece. Venizelos agreed, but noted that the government has a hard time selling that point to the Greek public, which sees only Turkey to blame for allowing the transit of illegal immigrants and refugees through to Greece. He stated that he and the Greek government are closely watching the ongoing U.S. debate on Afghanistan, and are also concerned about the legitimacy of the Karzai government and its possible impact on the future political situation there. The Ambassador cautioned him not to read too much from the tea leaves found in the media. Our engagement in Afghanistan is solid; our debate is about the size, composition, and direction of our effort, not about whether or when to get out. ATHENS 00001605 002.2 OF 004 ¶4. (C) Venizelos proceeded to tick off positive Greek contributions to ISAF, which could be done within the existing MOD budget. Greece is ready to take over security at Kabul airport during the second half of 2010. Greece will keep the two medical teams that it had deployed for elections support earlier this autumn in Afghanistan. Greece will make a contribution to the Anglo-French NATO helicopter initiative aimed at addressing NATO's crucial helicopter shortfall in Afghanistan. The Greek monetary contributions to Hungary's PRT in Baglan will continue, and Greece intends to donate 3-4 million euros to the Afghan National Army Trust Fund. ¶5. (C) On the negative side, Venizelos indicated that budgetary pressures have placed Greek plans to deploy an OMLT and to move its engineering battalion from Kabul to Herat in jeopardy. Given force protection requirements recently identified by Greek planners, namely MRAP-type vehicles, anti-IED countermeasures, and armored road maintenance equipment, Greece needed $65 million it simply did not have in order to equip and maintain the Kabul-to-Herat redeployment. He also said that he was not sure if COMISAF still wanted the Greek engineers to go to Herat. The Ambassador urged Venizelos to follow through on this long-standing Greek commitment, and made the case that investing in the equipment necessary to accomplish this deployment would also pay dividends in increasing the future capability and deployability of the Greek armed forces beyond Afghanistan. Venizelos demurred, noting he had not received the full brief on the technical requirements of the proposed MRAP-type vehicles, and that in any case, Greek efforts would need to be coordinated with other European countries. -------------- -------------- -------------- Turkey: Support Old CBMs, but Still Want to Go Back on CAOC Deal -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador Speckhard asked Venizelos to comment on what he perceived were the threats to Greece, and how the MOD intended to balance severe budgetary constraints with the need to face those threats through means including procurement. Looking at Turkey, Venizelos confirmed that the Papandreou government is seeking to promote a new climate, although it was "not easy," he said, pointing to the dramatic increase in Turkish overflights of Greek Aegean islands over the summer compared to past years. The Ambassador urged him to be proactive in suggesting confidence building measures to his Turkish counterparts, to allow his generals to talk freely with their interlocutors, and to stop labeling unannounced Turkish military flights in the Athens FIR as "hostile," a small, technical move that could go over well in Ankara. ¶7. (C) Venizelos commented favorably on CBMs in general, but noted the problem was implementation. He supported reinstituting past measures such as the suspension of overflights during the summer, and on religious holidays. In response to the Ambassador's suggestion to stop labeling Turkish flights as hostile, he stated he would only do that in connection with resolution of the "CAOC problem," and asked for U.S. help. (Comment: In May 2009, NATO Allies - including Greece - agreed on a plan to close one of NATOs ATHENS 00001605 003.2 OF 004 Combined Air Operations Centers, located in Eskisehir, Turkey, and to implement an annual rotational command of NATO's CAOC in Larissa, Greece between a Greek and a Turkish general, with alternating deputies, as well, from the nation not presently in command. The U.S. will maintain command of NATO's Component Command Air HQ (CC Air) in Izmir, Turkey, while the CC Air deputy will rotate between a Greek and a Turk, and the Chief of Staff will rotate between a Turk and an Italian. In Greek eyes, this leads to a periodic, temporary imbalance of "flags," when no Greek will be in a top position at CC Air. End comment.) The Ambassador noted he would pass the message back, but that it was his understanding that Greece had already agreed to the future manning structure of the CAOC in the NATO framework. -------------- Procurement -------------- ¶8. (C) Despite Venizelos' bold comments before Parliament on October 18, to include a call for abolishing offsets contracts when buying foreign (to include U.S.) military equipment, he had no proposals to offer, though he expressed a commitment to transparency, and to establishing firm Parliamentary oversight over procurement processes. He told the Ambassador that the offsets issue needed to be "fixed," and that he intended to come up with a plan over the coming month. Venizelos stated that the F-16 purchase program was going well, but complained about a problem with the defensive systems on the Peace Xenia III F-16s, and stated that U.S. companies need to take more responsibility. (Comment: The ASPIS II defensive systems suite was programmed through direct commercial sale to go on the 60 Peace Xenia III aircraft. Due to stalled negotiations between the Greek MOD and Raytheon, none of the 60 PX-III aircraft have defensive systems installed. End comment.) ¶9. (C) Ambassador Speckhard commended Venizelos for his commitment to transparency, and his plans to increase Parliamentary oversight. He expressed confidence in the ability of U.S. firms to compete in a transparent environment, noting that such a situation would be good both for Greece and the U.S. While empathetic to Venizelos' desire to change an offsets system in their defense procurement that had not resulted in the desired outcomes, he encouraged him not to unfairly penalize U.S. companies who had been unable to deliver on contractual terms due to GoG policies and practices. -------------- Souda Bay Jet Fuel Pipeline -------------- ¶10. (C) Ambassador Speckhard asked Venizelos to cut through the red tape and to provide the U.S. with written authorization to proceed with the construction of a JP-5 jet fuel pipeline and fuel storage tanks that would maintain high-capacity refueling capabilities and protect the environment at and around our Naval Support Activity at Souda Bay, Crete. (Comment: permission to execute the project has been stuck in the Greek bureaucracy for nearly seven years, and the MOD at present is not certain whether or not it needs approval from cautious MFA lawyers to grant this authorization.) Venizelos assured the Ambassador he was "ready to ATHENS 00001605 004.2 OF 004 solve" this problem. -------------- Athens Mosque -------------- ¶11. (C) At the close of the meeting, the Ambassador pointed out to Venizelos our understanding that the construction of a mosque in Athens (a city that has no official mosque),which was approved by the Greek Parliament in 2000, is held up in part by the refusal of the Hellenic Navy to vacate the designated land, and asked him for his views. Venizelos, pointing to his background as a professor of constitutional law and proclaiming human rights to be a passionate interest, stated that he was unaware of the issue, but assured the Ambassador he would look into it and he was ready to contribute if that was a way his Ministry could help. Speckhard