ATHENS LAY OF THE LAND FOR PM A/S SHAPIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001549 SIPDIS FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHAPIRO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/15 TAGS: PREL PHSA PGOV EWWT MARR MASS GR SUBJECT: ATHENS LAY OF THE LAND FOR PM A/S SHAPIRO REF: A.) ATHENS 1541, B.) ATHENS 1838, C.) ATHENS 1535, D.) ATHENS 1513, E.) ATHENS 875 ATHENS 00001549 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(C), (D) ¶1. (C) Andrew: Welcome to Greece. Your visit comes at a time of calm between two storms; the first being the recently concluded Parliamentary elections in which PM Papandreou scored a decisive victory over the moribund Karamanlis administration, and the second being Greece's dismal economic situation which will limit Papandreou's hand internationally, and create a tough domestic political environment for him when his post-electoral "honeymoon" is over. You will also be meeting with Ministers and officials new to their portfolios and offices, and in some instances, working in new hybrid ministries created through the mergers and combining of responsibilities of existing ministries. Remember our bureaucratic challenges in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security - only now "a la Greece" immediately following a transition in power - and you will have a picture of the unsettled nature of many components of Papandreou's new government. ¶2. (C) That said, we have an excellent opportunity to ingrain our piracy message early into the minds of our new interlocutors in the government, and the AMVER Awards ceremony where you will speak affords a prime venue to deliver that message to the illuminati of the Greek shipping sector - a key player in ultimately moving any Greek governmental policy on the issue. I believe you will find that your interlocutors value their cooperation both with the U.S. and the broader international community on counter-piracy, but will respectfully disagree with you on thorny legal issues such as prosecution and the relevance of the New York Declaration. If you can help the Greeks understand where we want to be bilaterally and multilaterally on piracy over the coming six months, gain some traction on the Declaration, and launch a dialogue that we can continue on the ground here, your visit will have been a success. -------------- Political Overview -------------- ¶3. (C) The twelve months leading up to the October 4 Parliamentary elections were marked by a succession of crises for the government of Prime Minister Karamanlis, who had managed to hold onto his one-seat majority in Parliament through a series of scandals, the global financial crisis, widespread rioting following the police shooting of a teenager, a resurgence in domestic terrorism, huge numbers of illegal migrants entering Greece, an increase in Turkish military overflights of Greek islands, and most recently the serious forest fires on the outskirts of Athens. On September 2, a somber Karamanlis, in the face of constant attack by the opposition and plummeting approval ratings, issued a fateful call for new elections. His New Democracy party lost by a decisive margin, which left PM Papandreou's center-left Socialist PASOK party in firm control of the government, and New Democracy in a state of disarray. ¶4. (C) New PM (and Foreign Minister) Papandreou has an American mother, and was born and has studied in the U.S. Having been Foreign Minister under a previous PASOK administration, he has developed a good reputation in the international community as a thoughtful and constructive interlocutor. While he must use careful rhetoric domestically to avoid the "Amerikanaki" (little American) label by detractors, our recent engagements with him have been very positive (reftel A). ATHENS 00001549 002.2 OF 004 -------------- -------------- -------------- Piracy: Lots of Common Ground, but Some Significant Differences Exist -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) We share many common views with the Greeks on piracy, and it is an issue where we can maintain a robust and fruitful dialogue. Greece is a staunch supporter of our position that opposes the creation of an international tribunal to try suspected pirates. They have stood up to the Germans, the Dutch, and others on this issue. Our Greek interlocutors continue to express their appreciation for our recent decision to expand participation in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to Cyprus in the face of a Turkish political block. Greece views positively the recent creation of an International Trust Fund under the auspices of the UN to help defray costs of piracy trials in developing countries, and is considering a donation. The MFA has urged Greek ship owners to send captains and crew to testify in piracy trials in other countries. Greece served as the flagship command of the EU's first ever naval operation, Atalanta, off of Somalia last year, has a frigate now in Atalanta's current rotation, and participates at present in NATO's Ocean Shield through its rotational contribution to NATO's Standing Naval Maritime Group 2. ¶6. (C) On the negative side, Greece declined to sign the New York Declaration on the margins of the last CGPCS Plenary in September. They cite concerns that the document added little value to existing IMO guidelines, was not a negotiated, consensus-based text among CGPCS participants, implied that merchant vessels should be armed, and was provided to them too late to be staffed through their interagency. They remain open to discussion, though. They also disagree with us on the need to prosecute piracy suspects in Greek courts. While Greece has the ability to try suspects in Greek courts, the government has in practice taken the stance that the flag nation of the vessel, not the nation from which the ship owners come, should have primary responsibility for prosecuting any piracy attacks against a vessel. This was demonstrated vividly in the May hijacking of the Amira, a Greek beneficially-owned, Egyptian-flagged vessel (ref E). The U.S. Navy captured 17 suspects, and we sought Greek assistance in prosecuting them in Greece, yet the Greeks were adamant that Egypt must take responsibility. ¶7. (C) In your meetings with governmental counterparts, I recommend you: -- Explain why we believe the New York Declaration adds value to international counter-piracy efforts, and seek to address Greek concerns noted above; -- Encourage a Greek signature to the Declaration at the next CGPCS plenary in January 2010; ATHENS 00001549 003.2 OF 004 -- Raise the International Trust Fund, and encourage a Greek donation; -- Lay out U.S. views on prosecution, both in domestic courts and in third countries such as Kenya, and encourage Greece to consider prosecuting suspects in cases where the attacked vessel is either Greek-flagged, or importantly, Greek-owned. In media engagements, you should be aware that a misperception exists in Greece that the U.S. approach to international affairs, including piracy, is to "shoot first and ask questions later." Your media outreach will enable you to set the record straight, and explain our position that involves a sophisticated combination of both law enforcement and military efforts, and our commitment to working with other countries such as Greece. -------------- OTHER ISSUES -------------- ¶8. (C) ISAF: At every opportunity, and at every level, we encourage the Greeks to contribute more to efforts in Afghanistan. Their caveat limiting Greek soldiers to Kabul was lifted in April ¶2009. However, even though planning with the Italian host force is continuing, the Greek engineer battalion has not yet moved to Herat, nor has its pledged OMLT deployed, because the Greeks are now seeking to upgrade their force protection assets. They seek 32 MRAP-type vehicles, 52 anti-IED ECM devices, and a host of other equipment from the U.S., including armored dump trucks and bulldozers. Our ODC recently forwarded to U.S. Army planners the detailed list of equipment the Greek military has told us they needed to fulfill this deployment commitment, and which they seek to procure from the U.S. (ref B). Greek participation in ISAF remains unpopular with the Greek population at large, but largely under the radar scope; any future casualties that can be attributed to inadequate force protection measures could result in extreme pressure on the Government to remove its forces from ISAF. ¶9. (C) OTHER MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS: Greek contributions to other important initiatives are substantial and should not be overlooked. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force rely heavily on Naval Support Activity Souda Bay in Crete as a support hub for sea and air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and Iraq. (Comment: Although it is fine to thank them privately during meetings, Greek public sentiment is generally anti-NATO, and anti-American military, so the help Greece gives us at Souda Bay and with frequent transshipments of ammunition are subjects they would like to keep private avoiding any public acknowledgments.) Greece allows over 24,000 over-flights of U.S. military aircraft a year; participates in NATO's Operations Active Endeavour and Ocean Shield, and in KFOR; the EU's counter-piracy mission off of Somalia Operation Atalanta; and the UN's Lebanon mission, UNIFIL. ¶12. (C) U.S DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND TRAINING: Greece is a large purchaser of U.S. defense goods and stands poised to purchase more. ATHENS 00001549 004.2 OF 004 We have over $8 billion in FMS cases and there is potential for more than $6 billion coming up for international competition over the next two years. As Greece tends to include political as well as technical and market-based evaluations in its decision making, your meeting will also provide an opportunity to show the value we place in our strategic relationship. We have been able to deal with the sharp cut in Greece's IMET budget to $100,000 but it is critical to maintain at least this amount in order for the GoG to continue to benefit from the reduced cost of training associated with IMET recipients. Of course we would like more IMET, and the additional training that goes with it, both for enhanced interoperability and to send a signal to the new GoG (which is looking to cut back Greek defense expenditures) that our defense relationship remains important to us. ¶13. (C) IMMIGRATION: Greece has become an entry point of choice for illegal immigrants into the European Union. The number of illegal migrants detained by Greek authorities has increased dramatically over the last two years, reaching 140,000 last year (in a country with a population of only about 11 million). The presence of these migrants - many of whom originated in conflict zones in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East and entered Greece via Turkey - has become a major political issue. It also roils Greek-Turkish relations on occasion, with the Greeks leveling accusations that Turkey does not do enough to stop the outflow to Greece, and indeed, aids and abets the illegal immigrants. Greece is making a strong push for the European Union to take this issue on and to negotiate repatriation agreements with source countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. ¶14. (S) TERRORISM: Greece has also been burdened with a resurgence of domestic terrorism. Following several years of a lull with the wrap-up of the November 17 group, attacks are again on the rise. The U.S. Embassy suffered an RPG attack in January of 2007, and more recently we have seen the first detonation of an ammonium nitrate car bomb at the Athens Stock Exchange on September 2, and the killing of a police officer in June. The U.S. has been offering technical assistance and sharing intelligence through DHS, FBI, and other agencies, but the Greeks are woefully unprepared for any significant increase in terrorist activity. We are also concerned that the rise of Greece as a migration path from troubled spots to Western Europe and vice-versa opens the door to international extremists making a foothold here or using Greece as a "safe house" for planning nefarious activities. ¶15. (U) We look forward to seeing you. Dan Speckhard