GREECE WILL FOLLOW EU CONSENSUS ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AT

					  C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001479 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/16 
TAGS: AORC PARM PREL KNNP IAEA GR
SUBJECT: GREECE WILL FOLLOW EU CONSENSUS ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AT 
IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE 
 
REF: A.) STATE 94890, B.) ATHENS 1431 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: John D. Cockrell, Acting Poltical Counselor; REASON: 
1.4(B), (D) 
 
					

1. (C) Pol-Mil Chief delivered Reftel A points to the MFA's
Disarmament Sub-Section Head Loukas Tsokos on September 16. Tsokos
reiterated the Greek position, as detailed in Reftel B, noting that
Greece continues to believe that a single Middle East resolution is
desirable, and that Greece will align itself with the common EU
position. He stated that at the end of August, the Swedish embassy
in Cairo delivered a note to Arab League Secretary General Moussa
informing him that the EU would not support the Arab League's
Israeli Nuclear Capabilities resolution. Tsokos also noted that
the Lebanese had separately demarched the Greek government for
support of the INC resolution, to which Greece had replied
negatively.





2. (C) Sharing some observations of the ongoing General
Conference, Tsokos agreed with us that the Iranian-requested agenda
item regarding the prohibition of military strikes against nuclear
facilities was not appropriate for the IAEA, and should be
addressed by the UN Security Council. He noted the EU Presidency
had demarched the IAEA Secretariat in an effort to keep the item
from the agenda, but had failed. He speculated that the NAM
nations may be using the Iranian paper for leverage in order to
gain support for the Arab League's INC resolution, by ultimately
withdrawing the Iran paper as a hard-fought "concession" in order
to increase the chances of a vote on the Arab League resolution.
Tsokos was somewhat pessimistic at the chances of another
successful "no action" vote on the INC resolution, noting that the
Arab League and NAM states appeared much better organized this year
than last, yet hopeful the "Vienna Spirit" of compromise would
ultimately moderate views of some among the NAM.
Speckhard