GREECE WILL FOLLOW EU CONSENSUS ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001479 SIPDIS AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/16 TAGS: AORC PARM PREL KNNP IAEA GR SUBJECT: GREECE WILL FOLLOW EU CONSENSUS ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AT IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE REF: A.) STATE 94890, B.) ATHENS 1431 CLASSIFIED BY: John D. Cockrell, Acting Poltical Counselor; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Pol-Mil Chief delivered Reftel A points to the MFA's Disarmament Sub-Section Head Loukas Tsokos on September 16. Tsokos reiterated the Greek position, as detailed in Reftel B, noting that Greece continues to believe that a single Middle East resolution is desirable, and that Greece will align itself with the common EU position. He stated that at the end of August, the Swedish embassy in Cairo delivered a note to Arab League Secretary General Moussa informing him that the EU would not support the Arab League's Israeli Nuclear Capabilities resolution. Tsokos also noted that the Lebanese had separately demarched the Greek government for support of the INC resolution, to which Greece had replied negatively. ¶2. (C) Sharing some observations of the ongoing General Conference, Tsokos agreed with us that the Iranian-requested agenda item regarding the prohibition of military strikes against nuclear facilities was not appropriate for the IAEA, and should be addressed by the UN Security Council. He noted the EU Presidency had demarched the IAEA Secretariat in an effort to keep the item from the agenda, but had failed. He speculated that the NAM nations may be using the Iranian paper for leverage in order to gain support for the Arab League's INC resolution, by ultimately withdrawing the Iran paper as a hard-fought "concession" in order to increase the chances of a vote on the Arab League resolution. Tsokos was somewhat pessimistic at the chances of another successful "no action" vote on the INC resolution, noting that the Arab League and NAM states appeared much better organized this year than last, yet hopeful the "Vienna Spirit" of compromise would ultimately moderate views of some among the NAM. Speckhard