DAS Kaidanow's Sept. 1-2 visit to Athens Features Turkey,

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001465 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/09/11 TAGS: PREL PGOV CVIS MARR MOPS SUBJECT: DAS Kaidanow's Sept. 1-2 visit to Athens Features Turkey, Turkey, Turkey, VWP, Budget... and MK Name CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DAS Tina Kaidanow visited Athens September 1-2, meeting with FM Bakoyannis, PASOK Party president George Papandreou, Deputy FM Valinakis, Deputy MOD Tasoulas, Interior Ministry SecGen for Public Order Bitsios, Finance Ministry SecGen Sideropoulos, and Parliament External Affairs Committee president Kanellopoulo (at which Bouli President Soufias dropped by). DAS Kaidanow also had several opportunities to meet with business and opinion leaders, and a cross section of MFA office directors at a luncheon hosted by PolDir Pareskevopoulos. Her GoG interlocutors all conveyed a similar message regarding Turkey, noting that Greek support for Turkey's EU accession was at risk from perceived Turkish intransigence over Cyprus and escalations of Aegean airspace provocations. FM Bakoyannis, in particular, noted that time is limited on Turkey's EU accession prospects, as the EC will be issuing a report on Turkey's performance in mid-October, and under current circumstances, she would be politically pilloried were she to go to Brussels and say Turkey is demonstrating it is a serious EU candidate. The FM said she had related her concerns to Turkish FM Davutoglu in a call the day before but had nothing positive to report from the conversation. On the Macedonia name issue, the Greeks maintained they were willing to proceed on the basis of previously identified positions, but claimed they did not perceive much flexibility from Skopje, despite DAS Kaidanow's underscoring the strategic importance for the region as a whole of resolving the issue. ¶2. (C) Interior Ministry SecGen Bitsios focused on the still growing challenges of illegal immigration, noting the problem is now an EU problem, not just Greek, and asking for U.S. support for obtaining readmission agreements with source countries primarily in south central Asia and the Middle East. On domestic terrorism, he said changing public attitudes are permitting the GoG to make progress using technical means to fight the problem. PASOK President George Papandreou assured DAS Kaidanow that if in government, he would continue the broad lines of Greek foreign policy, but with better atmospherics. Finance Minster SIderopooulos focused on Greece's very difficult budget, forecasting a rise in the deficit to 6 percent of GDP - well over the EU threshold for special supervision of eurozone countries. END SUMMARY. FM Dora Bakoyannis ¶3. (SBU) VISA WAIVER: Dora noted that the Greek parliament had ratified agreements relating to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). She asked whether the U.S. side would be able to wrap up its last VWP related tasks in time for the UNGA meetings later in September. ¶4. (C) OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP: DAS Kaidanow thanked the FM for her efforts as CIO, noting the good work the Greeks have done on Georgia. Dora said she will keep trying to bring the sides together on Georgia, but thought Russian intransigence on the Georgia IDP resolution in the UN might threaten the "Corfu Process" to review European security architectures. Nevertheless, she saw value in using the informal Gymnich-like format in OSCE meetings and hoped that the Corfu Process would continue. ¶5. (C) TURKEY: Asked about Bakoyiannis' call to Turkish FM Davutoglu, Dora said she was concerned that there was a "clear qualitative deterioration in activities in the Aegean." Greece, she said, was ready at any time to engage Turkey on the delimitation of the continental shelf, and Greece has been a staunch supporter of Turkey's EU accession without Turkish reciprocation. She had called Davotoglu because during a recent TUAF incursion, one F-16 had, according to Greek information, passed within 100 meters of an approaching Olympic Airlines plane. An accident that led to civilian deaths would be a catastrophe. She had asked Davutoglu why these provocations continued, but said she had not received a clear answer. DAS Kaidanow pointed out that anchoring Turkey in Europe is critically important, and urged continued Greek support for its candidacy. FM noted that time is short for Turkey to show that it is a serious EU candidate; the EC will issue a report on Turkey's accession progress in mid-October. The FM said she had told Davutoglu that he could put meaning into his pledge of "zero problems" with Turkey's neighbors by changing the Turkish position on "causus belli." The Turkish parliament could "agree a new defense doctrine indicating explicitly that Turkey does not threaten any neighbor with war." She said the "Code of Conduct" that Turkey had passed to the GoG was not realistic, as it "basically just divides the Aegean down the middle." ¶6. (C) CYPRUS: FM Bakoyannis noted that the island will be reunified when both sides resolve to create a viable state within the EU. She was concerned at Davutoglu's statement in Cyprus, which she characterized asinsisting on Treaty Guarantees and averring the EU should not be a central issue. Such guarantees were not consistent with Cyprus' current status as a full EU member, which should bring benefits to all of Cyprus' citizens. DAS Kaidanow impressed on the FM the short timeframe for reaching a settlement, and asked the GoG to encourage the Greek Cypriots to be flexible, which Bakoyannis said the Greek government was doing. ¶7. (C) MIGRATION: In response to DAS Kaidanow's query on EU engagement on Greece's migration problem, the FM said the Turks had complained that the Greeks had raised the migration issue to the EU level - which was foolish since it will help bring additional EU resources to bear to help solve the problem. Greece was unable to address the migration challenge alone, since the solution will entail joint approaches - at the EU level and with the USG - to obtain readmission agreements from the source countries of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, etc. The GoG also needs EU help to implement the readmission agreement signed with Turkey two years ago. ¶8. (C) MACEDONIA NAME: The FM assured DAS Kaidanow that Greece's domestic situation will not derail momentum, as both major parties were in agreement on the essence of the solution - a hyphenated name with geographic qualifier, used "erga omnes." She cautioned, however, that she - unlike UN negotiator Nimetz - saw less reason for optimism given what she claimed was Skopje's "failure to accept with pride" a name that would involve a geographic qualifier. She noted as well that "the GoG needs the agreement to be legally binding at the UN and within FYROM," and said that the GoG would not agree to a solution that involved a referendum on one side only -- the Greek parliament would not agree unless there was a similar referendum in Greece. She suggested that a referendum giving Macedonian PM Gruevski broad authority to negotiate would be a preferable alternative, but showed little flexibility on the issue in the Greek domestic context. Deputy Foreign Minister Valinakis ¶9. (C) Valinakis in his earlier meeting forecast most of the FM's points, emphasizing Greece's fundamental support for the European prospects of its neighbors in accord with the requirements and conditions of EU membership. Greece supported Turkey's EU perspective, he said, but has yet to see improvements in bilateral relations. He said it would be hard to continue to promote Turkey's EU accession without a change in Turkish attitudes. On Cyprus, Valinakis said the solution will have to be submitted to a referendum in the two communities, and thus the "out of balance" Annan Plan solutions would have to be changed to be made acceptable to both sides. This might take time, and "threats of this being the last chance won't help." The most important elements to be addressed now were the security elements. ¶11. (C) On Macedonia, Valinakis said the original UNSCRs called for a "mutually acceptable solution," and claimed that the U.S. bore responsibility for Macedonian intransigence when it recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name in 2004. DAS Kaidanow replied that the solution to the name issue was not simply a bilateral issue between Greece and Macedonia, but had serious implications for the stability of Macedonia and thus the region as a whole. The USG perceived a willingness in Skopje to move, and trusted that Greece would engage seriously to resolve the issue as soon as possible. Ministry of Interior Secretary General Constantinos Bitsios ¶12. (C) Ministry of Interior Secretary General Constantinos Bitsios outlined for DAS Kaidanow September 1 the challenges of illegal immigration, terrorism, and public order. He stressed that the migration numbers were - after a brief period of modest improvement - again getting worse, with a thousand migrants a week transiting Turkey to Greek islands. The situation was "out of control." Conditions for the migrants were "terrible." Bitsios said he would continue to push northern European countries to understand that this was an EU-wide problem that needed a sustained EU-wide policy. He asked for U.S. help to encourage source countries to accept return of their citizens from Europe. He said he had stressed with Turkish officials the need for improved border enforcement and cooperation, but the worsening conditions could lead him to go public in criticizing the Turkish attitude, as he had done several months ago. ¶13. (C) Bitsios was more optimistic on domestic terrorism and public order, stressing public attitudes had shifted in favor of greater police powers following the December 2008 riots. The government could now enact new legislation permitting a DNA database, surveillance cameras and phone taps. The Ministry was working to implement these reforms, but it would take some tie to populate the database and to repair cameras not used since the 2004 Olympics. He predicted a "difficult winter" with anarchist groups using the traditional November 17 Polytechnic anniversary and the December 6 anniversary of last year's killing of a teenager to spur protests and violence. The government would not let the situation get out of hand as it did last December, he said, and was placing more police on the streets and instructing them to intervene early in any demonstrations. The police were making progress in their investigations of hard-core domestic terrorist groups, but it was only a matter of time before violent Greek extremists establish ties with extremists among the newly arrived immigrant populations. He expressed strong support for close coordination with Western partners on law enforcement and security. Deputy Defense MInister Costas Tassoulas ¶14. (C) Deputy Defense MInister Costas Tassoulas noted September 2 to DAS Kaidanow that earlier that day Parliament had passed an "umbrella" MOU between Greece and SHAPE that eliminates the need for separate MOUs for each NATO exercise. Picking up on Kaidanow's suggestion, Tassoulas said there was a broad consensus among the major Greek political parties on the country's foreign policy orientation toward the U.S., although it was "not always obvious" on the surface. For example, even though PASOK had voted against the MOU, its MPs all but admitted that they had done so because they were sure the MOU would pass anyway. Tassoulas cautioned that the biggest threat to positive views of the U.S. in Greece was the Greek-Turkish issue. Tassoulas stressed recent examples of Turkish Air Force over flights of Greece. Kaidanow said that the U.S. was concerned about the escalatory potential of such incidents, and had raised these concerns with the Turks, though both sides bore responsibility for not raising tensions. Tassoulas encouraged the U.S. to continue stressing this point, arguing that U.S. influence was likely to be the most effective tool for improving the situation. ¶15. (C) Kaidanow thanked Tassoulas for Greece's good cooperation in Afghanistan, including the recent decision to remove a caveat limiting the Greek engineering battalion to Kabul, and asked if there was room for Greece to do more. Tassoulas said Greece would definitely consider it. He noted that Greek Defense Minister Meimarakis had recently proposed to the EU that expenses for such missions abroad not be counted in deficit calculations under EU fiscal rules, commenting that in the current arrangement countries are in effect punished for contributing to international efforts. Kaidanow and DCM noted the importance of U.S. Naval Support Activity Souda Bay in Crete, and asked for Greek help in finalizing the approvals for construction of a new fuel pipeline there. PASOK President George Papandreou ¶16. (C) Lead opposition PASOK party president George Papandreou offered a tour d'horizon September 1. He said PASOK had pressed for early parliamentary elections in conjunction with the June European Parliament elections, and they could happen as early as October 4, but at any rate the government will be obligated to hold them in conjunction with the presidential elections next March (Note: the day after, Greek PM Karamanlis indicated he would call for early elections, subsequently scheduled for October 14.). The suffering economy, political scandals, government corruption, and low public trust in government made it hard for tough decisions to be taken. Papandreou said this climate also makes Greece's foreign policy "jittery." Recalling the days in the late 1990s when he had been Foreign Minister, Papandreou said a PASOK government could offer a better atmosphere to solve Greece's problems with it s neighbors. He would take a less confrontational approach with Turkey, and work with his Turkish counterparts. Greece would continue to support Turkey's EU accession "though they are at fault for the current tensions with their over flights." Once Greece and Turkey resolve their problems together, Papandreou noted, they would be a great force for stability in the region. ¶17. (C) On Cyprus, Papandreou said rebuilding people-to-people relationships was key. Greece will support, but will follow Cyprus' lead. On the Macedonia name issue, Papandreou supported the basic government position, but emphasized that with skillful talks and the right atmosphere, progress could be made. Ministry of Economy & Finance Secretary General Ioannis Sidiropoulos ¶18. (C) DAS Kaidanow and Ministry of Economy and Finance SecGen Ioannis Sidiropoulos discussed how Greece's economy is faring under the financial crisis, Greece's economic policy response, and the impact of potential elections on economic reforms and growth. Sidiropoulos confirmed that the crisis has arrived in full measure, with most real economic indicators showing signs of stress: GDP turned negative in the second quarter of 2009, unemployment is rising, and production growth has declined 14 months in a row. He expects to see a fall in GDP by 1 percent by year's end. The GoG was focused on limiting expansionary fiscal policy, but the budget deficit would very likely reach 6 percent in 2009. [Note: This is the first time a GoG official has moved away from the 3.7 percent budget deficit target established in the formal 2009 budget passed by Parliament in December. End Note.] He indicated that the situation in 2010 would very much depend upon the international economy, particularly Europe, given how intertwined the Greek economy was with the EU. ¶19. (C) Sidiropoulos stated Greece needed consistent reforms to address its persistent structural problems. The GoG is focused on implementing structural reforms, including ending the trend of wage growth outpacing productivity growth by making labor markets more flexible, alleviating the pressures on the pensions system by increasing the retirement age, and improving public finances through more efficient taxation. Elections, he acknowledged, could disrupt the GOG's drive towards reforms; such a situation could translate into even lower growth for Greece this year. ¶20. (U) DAS Kaidanow has cleared this cable. Speckhard