KEEPING CALM IN THE AEGEAN: EMBASSY ATHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000109 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO TU GR SUBJECT: KEEPING CALM IN THE AEGEAN: EMBASSY ATHENS PERSPECTIVE REF: A. ANKARA 78 ¶B. 08 ATHENS 966 Classified By: AMBASSADOR DANIEL V. SPECKHARD. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) . -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Embassy Ankara has shared an important message laying out U.S. interests in maintaining calm in the Aegean (ref A). We concur with Embassy Ankara on the importance of not getting drawn into the disputes in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece, and we share the view that our goal must be to keep both sides from provoking the other. In this message we seek to caution on the clever use of the Luns principle by either party to strengthen their position in these disputes. ¶2. (SBU) NATO's Luns principle was established as a tool to insulate NATO from maneuverings by either sid to score points at the expense of the other,and to help NATO, and by extension the U.S., remain neutral. However, over time, through maneuverings of both Greece and Turkey, NATO exercises have all too frequently become the venue for one side or the other to strengthen claims or positions at the expense of the other. Often, due to the arcane nature of the dispute, NATO officials have been ambushed with a situation requiring a decision that is deceptive in nature as to the precedent it sets or the repercussions it will have. ¶3. (C) From our perspective, given the possibility and probability of never-ending claims and counter-claims, and the potential for increased efforts by both sides to seek NATO involvement in their disputes, it seems the wiser course is the one NATO appears to be currently charting -- to maintain official neutrality on questions of the disputed status of any island that either ally asserts is disputed, but to reject the rationale that overflight of an island constitutes any statement on its status. ¶4. (C) We believe that the current situation presents a rare opportunity to apply the principle of neutrality embodied in the Luns Doctrine and to set a precedent that will eliminate NATO air exercises as the field of play in the Aegean negotiating position tug of war. On this basis, we believe it best for NATO to maintain the precedent set in Noble Archer 08 of not considering the mere overflight of an island to be either a confirmation of its militarized status or a violation of its demilitarized status. End Summary. -------------- Background: "Noble Archer" and AE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) A review of the history of the Noble Archer exercise series is useful in clarifying the positions that NATO has taken, and has carefully avoided taking, in applying the principle of neutrality embodied in the Luns Doctrine. Despite perceptions to the contrary, NATO has avoided taking any stance on the demilitarized status of AE. ¶6. (SBU) To our knowledge, the question of AE's status was first raised by Turkey in the year 2000 in the course of planning for a NATO exercise, "Destined Glory 2000." In these planning sessions, Turkey raised two new objections: -- Based on a reference to the 1914 "Six Party Decision" it considered Agios Efstratios, Thassos, Psara, and Antipsara to be demilitarized, and -- It considered overflight of any demilitarized island to be a violation of its demilitarized status. ¶7. (SBU) Since "Destined Glory 2000," neither of these two Turkish objections came up in issues related to NATO exercises until "Noble Archer 2007." Greece, through its personnel at the NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) 7, sought NATO AWACs support for "Noble Archer." Turkey, recalling its 2000 position related to "Destined Glory," objected to the inclusion of an overflight of Agios Efstratios in the exercise and sought to have it cancelled. Upon review of the exercise plan, NATO personnel noticed that the exercise plan included the Limnos Terminal Military Area (TMA),and on that basis NATO headquarters withdrew AWACs support. The question of Limnos' demilitarized status is a long-standing dispute between Greece and Turkey based on competing interpretations of provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923),the Convention on the Straights (Lausanne 1923),and the Montreaux Convention (1936),and it figured directly in the correspondence establishing the Luns Doctrine. NATO rightly did not provide support to "Noble Archer 2007," based on the inclusion of the Limnos Terminal Military Area, and explicitly told Greece and Turkey this. However, at that time, NATO authorities made no decisions related to whether the Luns Doctrine also applied to Agios Efstratios. ¶8. (SBU) However, regardless of the stated reason for the cancellation of the exercise, Turkey considered NATO to have set a precedent applying the Luns Doctrine to AE as a disputed island. Greece equally considered this not to be the case and was anxious to clarify that NATO had not ruled on the sovereignty or status of AE. Following cancellation of the 2007 exercise, the Greeks expressed concern to NATO and U.S. authorities that its cancellation could be misconstrued as NATO support for the 2000 Turkish claims related to Agios Efstratios, Thassos, Psara and Antipsara. To help defuse the Greek domestic firestorm, then-U/S R. Nicholas Burns made a public statement standing next to Greek FM Bakoyannis in Washington that the United States considered Agios Efstratios to be Greek territory, that the U.S. has the clear impression it is not demilitarized, and that this is an issue for NATO to review to see if it can reach an arrangement to allow such military exercises to proceed. ¶9. (C) It then became a Greek priority to develop a new exe!!QQQQQ QQQQd again overfly the islan$$ QQQQQ!!!QQQ!QQQQ the inclusion of LimnosD ! Q !!Q$QQQ! Q, and believed they r !)QQ$ !!Q$%! QQQQQQ`e NATO Secretary GenQQQ QQ @"ordance with this undersQQQQQQ@Q through their personnel a4QQQQQQQQQheduled Noble Archer for 08. In the face of strong opposition from Turkey, and after consultations in Brussels, the NATO Secretary Geneneral decided to postpone the May 08 exercise. The Greeks believed that Turkish threats to intercept aircraft flying under NATO command and control in the exercise were a decisive factor in this decision. ¶10. (C) Shortly after the postponement of the May 08 exercise, Greece was told by NATO and U.S. officials that Greece must raise this issue at the political level with NATO political authorities, and that before Greece made any effort to schedule a new exercise it was essential to ensure that NATO had issued clear, written assurances that it would allow the exercise to proceed (ref B). The Greeks were also advised not to force the issue by rescheduling the exercise absent such written assurances, otherwise they would be headed for a repeat performance of the May postponement. The Greeks then addressed the issue to SACEUR and the NATO Secretary General. They eventually received a memo from SACEUR that he would make NATO AWACs assets available to support a rescheduled exercise in December. ¶11. (C) Through its personnel at CAOC 7, Greece once again sought to craft "Noble Archer 08" to isolate the issue of AE. The Greeks avoided inclusion of Limnos or other disputed islands, but did include an overflight of Agios Efstratios. Turkey strongly objected and insisted on an application of the Luns Doctrine that would support its interests. In response, in an effort to accommodate Turkish sensitivities and still allow the exercise to go forward, NATO withdrew all references to all islands in the exercise documentation, and used geocoordinates instead. In so doing, NATO sought to find a face-saving way forward that would allow NATO to exercise its military capabilities, but that did not necessarily single out a "winner" or "loser" in the question of AE's demilitarized status. -------------- - Way Forward: Demilitarized Doesn't Mean No-Fly -------------- - ¶12. (SBU) NATO has never been asked to recognize or support any effort to station military forces on or launch military forces from AE (or any other island with disputed demilitarized status). Rather, NATO has been asked to provide support to an exercise that includes an overflight of the island. With approval of NATO AWACs support of Noble Archer 08, NATO can still credibly claim that it continues to take no position on any given island's demilitarized status, including AE. ¶13. (C) We recommend NATO quietly let each side know that it does not support the assertion that overflights by military aircraft of the airspace above an island whose demilitarized status is in dispute is -- de facto -- a violation of that demilitarized status. This would allow NATO to avoid being placed in the uncomfortable position of being perceived as supporting one side or the other's position on an island's demilitarized status -- or whether there is a even a "legitimate" dispute on that question -- by its decision on whether to support an exercise in an area that is important to Alliance defenses. The Luns principle should not become a tool for either side to advance their interests. -------------- Luns Doctrine Application -------------- ¶14. (C) Just as Embassy Ankara has highlighted potential consequences should NATO repeat Noble Archer or a similar exercise scenario, there are also important consequences should the Greeks come to the conclusion that NATO will apply the Luns Doctrine to any island that the Turks assert is demilitarized, or that NATO neutrality will only be applied to scenarios in which that neutrality that would seem to support Turkish claims. Ref A rightly points out that the list of islands that Turkey could consider "demilitarized" is finite if based on the existing legal instruments. However, from the Greek perspective, Turkey's claim that AE is "demilitarized" is recent and suspicious. Although the Turks base this assertion on the 1914 Six Party Decision, the Greeks wonder why Turkey waited until the year 2000 to make this claim. And, the logical expectation would be that in addition to AE, the islands of Thassos, Psara, and Anti-Psara could be added to the list of disputed islands as they are also referred to in the 1914 Six Party Decision. In addition, we understand that the 1914 communique contains a vague reference to the island of Gavdos south of Crete, which Turkey has also suggested may be demilitarized. ¶15. (C) Although less likely, the Greeks have also expressed concern that Turkey may seek to pull NATO into additional complications in the Aegean, including Turkey's "Grey Zone" claims or questions related to the implementation within the Dodecanese of the demilitarization provisions of the 1947 Treaty of Paris. (Comment: A comprehensive look at Greek views of the legal basis for the status of the Aegean islands and responses to Turkish claims can be found at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs website at www.ypex.gov.gr. When responding to Turkey's grey zone thesis, the Greeks often point to Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne in which Turkey renounces all rights and titles to Aegean islands outside of three nautical miles, with the exception of Imbros, Tenedos, and the Rabbit islands. End Comment.) ¶16. (C) From our perspective, given the possibility and probability of never-ending claims and counter-claims, and the potential for increased efforts by both sides to seek NATO involvement in their disputes, it seems the wiser course is the one NATO appears to be currently charting -- to maintain official neutrality on questions of the disputed status of any island that either ally asserts is disputed, but to reject the rationale that overflight of an island constitutes any statement on its status. ¶17. (C) As we move forward from Noble Archer 2008, it will be important that NATO resist efforts to draw it back into the fray. NATO should continue its long-standing practice of evaluating every proposed exercise on a case-by-case basis, factoring in sensitivQQQ%Q$QQ well as the costs and "Q"QQQQQQQQ Q(@ !`. In that vein, we arQ !!Q !QNATO revisit any precedeQQ QQ !QQQQ"!blished with respect to QQ!!QQ QQQ d we believe that affirmi QQQ!Q!QQQQQ overflight of an islanQQ QQQQQ`ition to any claim or QQemilitarization of an island would, to some degree, weaken the ability of either Greece or Turkey to use NATO exercises to pursue their political agendas. ¶18. (C) We acknowledge that neither Turkey nor Greece will be completely satisfied with this way forward. Per Ref A, Turkey would like all overflights of AE or other disputed islands to be off limits. Greece would equally prefer that NATO publicly state that overflights are allowed because it does not consider AE to be demilitarized. Leaving both sides less than happy may be confirmation that this approach offers the best way forward. SPECKHARD