AMBASSADOR AYALDE MEETS WITH PRESIDENT LUGO TO REVIEW

id: 230948 date: 10/22/2009 21:03 refid: 09ASUNCION617 origin: Embassy Asuncion classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 09ASUNCION613 header: VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHAC #0617/01 2952103 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 222103Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY ASUNCION TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0119 INFO MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM FP MACDILL AFB FL RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL -------------- header ends -------------- C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000617 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/22 TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM PA SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AYALDE MEETS WITH PRESIDENT LUGO TO REVIEW BILATERAL RELATIONS AND MUCH MORE REF: ASUNCION 613 CLASSIFIED BY: HollowayPerry, DCM; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: I met with President Lugo late October 16 at Lugo's request. Lugo was in good spirits but very concerned about the kidnapping of cattle rancher Fidel Zavala in Concepcion Department. Lugo recognized that the EPP (Paraguayan People's Army) was "very dangerous" and hoped for Zavala's safe release. Lugo decided not to travel to Bolivia to meet with President Morales on the margins of the ALBA meeting, and believed that his biggest problem at present is the press, lamenting that his administration struggles on a daily basis with public relations. I told Lugo I wanted to take stock of our mil-to-mil relationship following the GOP's decision to decline the New Horizons exercise, and he confirmed that he wants to see military relations move forward. Lugo expressed enthusiastic interest in the 1207 program. His goal seemed to be to touch base with the Embassy and reassure himself that our bilateral relations are on solid ground. He is obviously worried about Paraguay's latest high-profile kidnapping that strengthened his critics and was looking for someone outside his inner circle to talk. We hope the current security crisis will prod him to show more leadership, and will continue to encourage him to nurture Paraguay's democratic institutions. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) I met alone with a relaxed President Lugo late October 16 at his request. For the almost two-and-a-half hour meeting, we spoke one-on-one. Though in good spirits, he was very concerned about the kidnapping of cattle rancher Fidel Zavala in Concepcion Department (Reftel A). Lugo told me he spoke to Colombian President Uribe three times in less than 24 hours to discuss anti-kidnapping assistance and that he was very pleased that Uribe had responded so quickly with whatever was needed (both advisors and equipment). The plane was arriving that evening with the team and equipment. Uribe also told him that if he needed more or was not pleased with the individuals he should let him know. (Note: I subsequently learned that Uribe asked that the Colombian Anti-kidnapping Unit send its best team as quickly as possible. President Lugo met with the Colombian team of experts and Minister Filizzola the evening of October 16, shortly upon arrival.) ¶3. (C) Lugo recognized that the EPP (Paraguayan People's Army) was "very dangerous" and hoped for Zavala's safe and quick release. He indicated that since the Lindstrom kidnapping in July 2008, the GOP had been after the kidnappers and was doing good intelligence collection in the Concepcion/San Pedro area. They had embedded a handful of officers in the countryside who were living amongst the peasants "with beards and all." Lugo said the EPP really knew their territory (where Lugo served as a bishop) and their operators could detect "even a new cow moving into it." Lugo believed the original EPP core group consisted of about 15 people but that it had increased to about 25. He thought the new operators were extremely dangerous because they could react to anything (implying killing the victim) and did not yet have the discipline to respond to EPP leadership. Lugo indicated that the GOP had enough information to pursue the kidnappers and had planned to do it this week, but the EPP kidnapped Zavala before the GOP could move against them. ¶4. (C) Lugo also went into detail about problems within the National Police. He said police leadership had to change and that replacements would be named soon. Lugo said Police Commander Jimenez, though a very honest man did not have the leadership/personality to tackle such a horrendously corrupt institution. He referred to former Police Commander Machado, who admitted being part of a corruption scheme ($100,000 per month to allow meat trucks to enter Paraguayan customs). Lugo said Interior Minister Rafael Filizzola was doing a good job but had little support. -------------- -------------- GETTING ALONG WITH PARAGUAY'S NEIGHBORS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Lugo decided not to travel to Bolivia to meet with President Morales on the margins of the ALBA meeting. Morales called Lugo to offer a press conference first thing October 17 where they would publicly shake hands and show the public that "all was ok." Many Paraguayan leaders called Lugo to implore him to go and "give it to the Bolivians" about their arms purchases. However, Lugo knew if he went he would get blasted by the press for associating with the ALBA members, so he knew it was a "lose-lose" situation. Lugo asked his Embassy in La Paz for an analysis of why Bolivia was purchasing arms. His Embassy had four hypotheses: because of 1) Paraguay ; 2) Chile; 3) Peru; and 4) for domestic reasons. He personally believed it was for the fourth reason since Morales was concerned that at some point Bolivia would implode and divide and he needed to bring everyone together. Lugo believes that Paraguay was overreacting to Bolivia's arms purchase issue and said that if a regional arms race were really an issue, Brazil and Venezuela should be the focus - not Bolivia. -------------- -------------- CONTINUING PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Lugo believed that his biggest problem is the press, lamenting that his administration struggles on a daily basis with public relations. He was extremely annoyed by press reports that his government planned to purchase a large tract of over-priced land (owned by a family named Teixeira) . He indicated that he had signed a letter of intent (no legal commitment implied),and pulled out a notebook to show me the cost of the land ($31 million for 22K hectares, or $1,400 per hectare with the going rate between $750 and $3,000). He was very frustrated that the press was accusing him and his Chief of Staff Lopez Perito of unjust enrichment and believed Teixeira's lawyer (Felino Amarillo) was behind the scandal. Lugo said they were welcome to investigate his government and that they had done nothing wrong. (COMMENT: Press reports paint another picture, indicating that Teixeira, one of Lugo's primary campaign fundraisers, purchased a tract of land a year and a half ago for $11 million that he now wanted to sell to the GOP for $31 million. Allegations are that Lugo signed this letter of intent after the April election but before assuming office in August 2008. Due to the controversy, the purchase is currently on hold. END COMMENT). -------------- BULKING UP STATE COFFERS -------------- ¶7. (C) Lugo told me the GOP was considering hiring the law firm of Patton & Boggs to recover stolen assets for the state. He raised this to inquire about the firm's reputation. He indicated that he had already met with them twice and that the GOP had a list of 30 possible targets. As an example, Lugo said the former Itaipu director, Senator Victor Bernal, has $30 million in his bank account (allegedly accumulated during his time at Itaipu). He said Patton & Boggs had successfully seized assets in other countries (in Africa, for example) and that they would not be interested if this was not lucrative for the firm. According to Lugo, Patton & Boggs would get 10 - 20 % of what they recover. (NOTE: U.S. company Crescent Oil has also been considering hiring Patton & Boggs to work on a commercial dispute; Lugo appeared to be unaware of this connection. END NOTE.) -------------- MILITARY RELATIONS -------------- ¶8. (C) I told Lugo I wanted to take stock of our mil-to-mil relationship following the GOP's decision to decline the New Horizons exercise. I emphasized that we respected the GOP's decision but were confused by their signals, and particularly his September 26 speech in Margarita Island. Lugo jumped up in his chair and said "I know that they want us to be enemies but I'm not going to fight with you (the United States). There is nothing to this." He explained that he accepts input for his speeches from all actors, so presidential advisor Gustavo Codas, Chief of Staff Lopez Perito (neither believed to be pro-U.S.) and others may provide their comments but in the end he passes a draft to Communications Advisor Dos Santos. Dos Santos, Lugo said, has good judgment and is more neutral. Lugo asked what bothered me about his speech and I explained that he blamed the "country to the north" for Paraguay's poverty. Lugo disagreed, stating that he never pointed to the United States. He reminded me of the context of the conference, which were largely poor countries. He said he would be happy to share a copy of his speech with me, and again cited the press as his biggest enemy. ¶9. (C) Lugo said he envisioned our mil-to-mil relationship moving forward. "We have lots of programs with the U.S.," he said, "and we should continue." I noted that it was sometimes hard to know what the GOP wanted in terms of U.S. assistance, particularly on military cooperation, and that it was helpful to have written requests for assistance from them based on their own defense security strategy. Lugo agreed, and acknowledged that Paraguayans do not always clearly state their intentions. He worried out loud about the Japanese and the Korean Ambassadors who were putting so much time and effort into learning Guarani. In the end, Lugo said, they still won't understand Paraguayans. -------------- OTHER US ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶10. (C) Lugo expressed enthusiastic interest in the 1207 program, and recommended we coordinate with his Ministries of Interior, Agriculture and Industry/ Commerce. He also indicated that he had visited Paraguay's Anti-Money Laundering Secretariat (SEPRELAD) and saw the good work that they were doing. (NOTE: Embassy supports SEPRELAD with INL funds. END NOTE). Lugo said he was shocked at their small staff and the conditions in which they were working. He was not pleased that they were working in a basement and wanted to move them into the Presidency and provide them with the support that they needed. I noted that we were very pleased with SEPRELAD Director Oscar Boidanich's work and were glad to see that the Presidency would be providing them with more support. -------------- BIO REPORTING INFO -------------- ¶11. (C) Lugo said his health had improved and the medication he was taking for his circulatory problems was working. When his legs hurt, he rested until he recovered. He said he continued to watch his diet and exercise. I told him that I was exercising in my small vegetable garden. He immediately said he wanted to show me his garden, which was in his personal residence. Lugo personally drove himself in a Jeep Cherokee (with his security chief in the back seat) and my vehicle following him to his personal residence in Lambare, a suburb of Asuncion. Once there, he showed me the vegetable garden and the house itself. The walls were covered with religious photos and photos of his political career including the official document from the National Electoral Tribunal declaring him the elected President of Paraguay. It is a simple house, modified only with a closed circuit security system installed after he was elected president. He said he likes to go there for peace and quiet. He also talked about his retirement and his interest in finding a nice small place in the country from which he could write about his experiences. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Lugo's goal seemed to be to touch base with the Embassy and to reassure himself that our relations are on solid ground. He is obviously worried about Paraguay's latest high-profile kidnapping, and was looking for an opportunity to talk without a set agenda or the press hovering nearby. It is clear that he wants to maintain close relations with the United States in order to balance regional politics and perceptions and may have been worried that his rejection of the New Horizons exercise may have seriously damaged our bilateral relations. Lugo's true intentions, however, are not clear. We continue to have doubts whether he has a plan for Paraguay or whether a leadership vacuum has allowed him to become a part of someone else's plan. We also are not sure whether Lugo is maintaining his priestly ethics, given all the media allegations of corruption against his inner circle and in some cases him. In the best case scenario, his lack of leadership is enabling others to continue well-entrenched Paraguayan traditions of raping and pillaging the state. Paraguay is the rumor capital of the world and the intertwined relationships between people of power and their political groups makes separating truth from fiction difficult. Our hope is the current security crisis will prod Lugo to show more leadership, and we will continue to encourage him to nurture Paraguay's democratic institutions, before his political opposition tears them apart. END COMMENT. AYALDE AYALDE =======================CABLE ENDS============================