FOREIGN MINISTER ON HONDURAS AND US MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 000426 SIPDIS WHA/FO CMCMULLEN, WHA/BSC MDRUCKER, BFRIEDMAN, MDASCHBACH E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2029 TAGS: PREL MASS PGOV PINS HO PA SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON HONDURAS AND US MILITARY COOPERATION Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael J. Fitzpatrick; reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Lacognata called in Charge early July 7 to discuss Honduras and to lay out a proposed way forward on U.S-Paraguayan military cooperation. Lacognata stressed his overarching concern for OAS consensus; he suggested Honduran President Zelaya ) and "vanguard nations" such as Venezuela -- should never have tried to force his return without having first worked out a domestic agreement. He lauded quiet U.S. efforts to find such a compromise solution. Lacognata stated the Lugo government wished not to denigrate, but to deepen, military cooperation with the United States. But he proposed the current Special Forces training of the Rapid Reaction Force (DCEI) come to a conclusion (as currently planned) by the end of September, so as to provide some "space" between pre-Lugo government training and subsequent training and assistance efforts. He stated that other Special Forces in-country (e.g., MIST, CMSE) are encouraged to remain in-country while our two governments turn their attention to negotiating a broad overarching military cooperation agreement. Lacognata stated it was President Lugo's intention to conclude negotiations of such an agreement by the end of the calendar year. Lacognata committed to ensure that the Embassy would soon receive a formal letter from the Defense Minister to this effect. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Charge was called in to meet one-on-one with Foreign Minister Hector Lacognata in his office early July 7 to discuss the way forward on US-Paraguay security cooperation. (NOTE: The request came in response to Ambassador Ayalde's June 30 letter to Minister of Defense (MOD) Bareiro seeking clarity on the government's intentions. END NOTE.) As the meeting had been postponed one day due to President Lugo's travels (with Lacognata) in support of the attempted return of President Zelaya to Honduras, the conversation opened with Honduras. HONDURAS ========== ¶3. (C) Calling it both risky and a "fools' errand," Lacognata stated that he had counseled President Lugo against going to support Zelaya's (now failed) effort to return to Honduras July 4-5. Lacognata's reasons: 1. Even more important than the return of Zelaya to Honduras is the maintenance of unity and consensus among the OAS. If the OAS tries to push at the speed of those "vanguard nations" (read: Venezuela, Ecuador, et al.) and not at the slower speed of Canada and the Caribbeans, Zelaya would not be reinstated AND the OAS would be damaged in the process. 2. If Zelaya returned without a deal having been worked out, he would be arrested upon arrival. The international community would then shift focus to one of "Free Zelaya" instead of "Restore Democracy." 3. If Zelaya's plane was fired on, the social fabric of Honduras would be torn, with much violence possible ) making a peaceful exit even less likely. 4. The Paraguayan Constitution speaks to the non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. No matter the salon debates on finer points of international law, having the President of Paraguay land in a foreign nation in a plane not authorized to land in that country (even if it is to reassert the rule of law),cannot be seen as anything but interference in the internal affairs of another country. ¶4. (C) Lacognata recognized the special relationship the United States has maintained with Honduras, particularly on the military side. He stated his and President Lugo's great appreciation for the USG's approach thus far to the Honduran situation, and hoped that quiet diplomacy would win the day. He stated he was aware that there were unpublicized efforts underway, with strong USG engagement, to find a compromise solution, one that avoided bloodshed and secured a return to institutional norms in Honduras. He expressed concern only that the media attention to OAS and US efforts not to create "a reverse Cuba," in which external efforts in support of democracy only lead to the greater estrangement of Honduras from the region. He relayed President Lugo's appreciation for the personal involvement, public statements and private efforts of both President Obama and Secretary Clinton. US MILITARY COOPERATION ======================== ¶5. (C) Lacognata said he asked Charge to come in to discuss the way forward on US-Paraguay military cooperation after the Ambassador's June 30 letter to the MOD seeking clarity on the GOP,s intentions. Lacognata apologized that MOD Bareiro was not also present for our meeting, as intended, due to a last-minute scheduling conflict. Lacgonata stated he wanted to share the President,s policy, the result of extensive discussions June 2 among the President, the Defense Minister, the Foreign Minister and presidential and ministerial advisors. He committed to brief the President and the Defense Minister after our meeting. ¶6. (C) Lacognata stated that Paraguay's military cooperation was "historic," and that the Lugo government has absolutely no intention of either denigrating or stigmatizing that relationship. On the contrary; the government wishes to deepen and extend that relationship. But, as in a number of other areas of governance, certain steps were taken under the previous Colorado Party governments that this government wishes to rectify, if only to formalize. The government wishes to bring clarity and formal definition to a number of issues that the Colorados preferred to manage in the shadows. He noted, for example, that the presence of eleven U.S. Special Forces "ODA" (Operational Detachment Alpha) trainers of the DCEI (Paraguay's new rapid reaction force) are here based on the excellent working relations and mutual respect and faith among the representatives of the two governments. Lacognata stated that, given the changes in administration in both Washington and Asuncion, and the forthcoming conclusion of the training of the DCEI, this is the time for definition. (Charge readily agreed.) ¶7. (C) Lacognata proposed that the current Special Forces ODA draw down from 11 persons to six as planned this month, and that the training of the DCEI by those six conclude as planned by the end of September 2009. He underscored repeatedly the need for a short break ("un pequeno descanso") between the successful standing up and training of the DCEI under the old (Colorado) rules, and any future assistance that the USG might provide the unit under a new agreement with the current government. He suggested, without adding details, that any subsequent assistance to the DCEI might contain explicit new conditions. The government, he added, had no objection to concluding the current training and phase-out (as previously discussed with post) by the end of September, perhaps to include an official event marking the successful conclusion of the standing up and training of the DCEI. ¶8. (C) The Minister suggested, as a sign of continued desire for U.S. engagement, that "the Embassy" maintain control of the keys accessing the DCEI's "1208 equipment" while the two governments negotiate a broad, overarching agreement on defense cooperation. (NOTE: The 1208 equipment is currently proposed to be turned over to the DCEI's formal control in three phases over six months (as soon as the Chief of Defense Forces signs the draft Letter of Agreement now before him; until turned over, in fact, the equipment will indeed remain under U.S. key -- controlled by the SOCFWD-PRY Headquarters component commander, a member of the Country Team. END NOTE.) Such an agreement, the Minister suggested, would cover the entire range of engagements and cooperation between the two militaries. He also stated that it is the Lugo government's desire and intention to successfully conclude negotiation of such a security cooperation agreement with the USG no later than the end of December 2009. ¶9. (C) Lacognata stated he thought it neither in the U.S. nor Paraguayan government's interest that there is any lack of clarity on the extent and nature of the military cooperation. Harking back to his days in Congress and the "delirium" over supposed secret U.S. bases in Paraguay, Lacognata asserted that clarity and transparency should guide the bilateral engagement. The Minister noted, for example, that the absence of "administrative and technical" status for the ODA team presented risks to both governments should "crazies" seek to make an issue of their presence or any incident. He and Charge also discussed the somewhat confused/conflicting constitutional requirements for congressional approval of the presence of foreign military personnel in Paraguay. Lacgonata stressed that if and when the agreement or deployments or the like required congressional engagement, notification or approval, he would personally lead the Executive Branch,s lobbying of the Paraguayan Congress. ¶10. (C) Charge asked for clarification as to the continued presence of the other Special Forces elements in-country: the six-person Civil-Military Support Element and the 4-person MIST team and the SOCFWD-PRY Headquarters team working out of the Embassy (NOTE: All unarmed. END NOTE). Lacognata stated that these personnel are welcome, indeed encouraged, to stay on; just the ODA should wrap up before the end of September even as the two governments begin work on a new overarching security cooperation agreement. ¶11. (C) Charge suggested that, in pursuit of clarity and transparency as well, that the MOD's letter be explicit in: Recognizing the successful conclusion of DCEI stand-up and training by the end of September; Requesting the continued presence of the MIST and CMSE personnel; and, Stating the Paraguayan government's desire to seek to conclude the negotiation of an overarching bilateral agreement on security cooperation by the end of December. Lacognata agreed, and committed again to brief both the MOD and the President today on the outcome of our meeting. Charge reminded the Foreign Minister that the formal decree re-christening the DCEI with a new name and making it directly responsive to the Commanding General of the Military Forces remained unsigned on the Defense Minister's desk. Asked if he perhaps wished to advise us now of any of the possible conditions the government might desire to put in place on future support for the DCEI, the Foreign Minister declined, stating it was a presidential prerogative, and not yet developed in any detailed way. COMMENT ========= ¶12. (C) COMMENT: As he concludes his second month in office, Foreign Minister Lacognata continues to impress us with his methodical, decisive approach to getting things done ) a marked contrast to his empty-suit predecessor. His emphasis on obtaining clarity, transparency and a shared roadmap for a way forward on military cooperation is music to our ears. The devil, of course, will be in the details of any future cooperation agreement to be negotiated. Charge also used the opportunity of a latenight July 6 dinner to brief the new President of the Congress (reformist/modernist Miguel Carrisoza of Beloved Fatherland Party) on a range of U.S. activities, including the DCEI and military cooperation issues. Given Carrisoza's leadership and post's own constant pulse-taking in Congress, we expect there to be widespread Congressional support for an eventual military cooperation ageeement, as well as some vocal (though not so numerous) opposition. Post suspects that, in the end, the most intense negotiations likely will be not with the Congress nor with the USG -- but within President Lugo's own ruling coalition. END COMMENT. Fitzpatrick