KAZAKHSTANI FM TAZHIN'S PRIORITIES FOR HIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000714

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, P, SCA, S/P, S/SRAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2024
TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE CH RS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI FM TAZHIN'S PRIORITIES FOR HIS
WASHINGTON TRIP, MAY 4-5

REF: A. ASTANA 0674 (SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER
TAZHIN'S MAY 4-5 VISIT TO WASHINGTON)

B. ASTANA 0731 (KAZAKHSTAN...SEEKS AN ENHANCED
RELATIONSHIP)

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Previewing for the Ambassador his May 4-5
visit to Washington, Foreign Minister Tazhin said:

-- he hopes to be prepared to make new "strategic
non-military proposals" for enhanced Kazakhstani asssistance
in Afghanistan;

-- he will be fully prepared to discuss with Secretary
Clinton Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship, and wants to
take back to President Nazarbayev Washington's realistic
suggestions for countering Russian pressure;

-- "frozen conflicts" will likely be one of Kazakhstan's
signature issues during its OSCE chairmanship;

-- he will be prepared for a fully frank geostrategic
discussion with National Security Adviser Jones on Central
Asia, Russia, and China; and

-- he would appreciate a meeting (although he did not press
for it),even if brief, with Vice President Biden for its
symbolic value to demonstrate to Russia Kazakhstan's enhanced
relationship with the United States. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The Ambassador met one-on-one with Foreign Minister
Tazhin on April 25 to discuss Tazhin's visit to Washington,
May 4-5. Tazhin said his key issues in Washington will be
Afghanistan, the OSCE, and the geopolitics of the region. He
said he needs to return to Astana with a clear message about
Washington's priorities for Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE
chairmanship in order to counter heavy pressure from Russia.

AFGHANISTAN


3. (C) Tazhin prefaced his remarks by saying, "Afghanistan
is increasingly important to us." He said he is putting
together "strategic non-military proposals for enhanced
assistance" so that Kazakhstan can be more helpful to the
United States and to the International Security Assistance
Force in Afghanistan. He declined to offer any details
because his proposals are not yet fully cleared. He admitted
he might arrive in Washington without final approval by the
government and President Nazarbayev because he has been
travelling so much and, in his absence, his ideas have not
moved forward through the interagency process as quickly as
he would have liked. However, he promised to make a full
press in the final week before he departs for Washington.

OSCE


4. (C) Tazhin said he has already consulted with Russia (and
Russia has consulted with him more than once),the European
Commission, and individual European capitals on Kazakhstan's
2010 OSCE chairmanship. He commented that Russia's views are
crystal clear. Although he declined to elaborate, he said
that Moscow is pressing him on ODIHR, the Parliamentary
Assembly, and OSCE membership contributions, "among other
issues." European views, however, are less clear to him.
With a certain degree of frustration, Tazhin described the
European views as "strongly ideological but not very
coordinated, and sometimes even contradictory."


5. (C) Tazhin said it will be very important for him to
return to Astana with a precise view of what Washington hopes
to see during Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship. He said
that clear evidence of a realistic -- and he emphasized
realistic -- U.S.-Kazakhstan partnership will allow him to
sell progressive views to President Nazarbayev, whereas if he

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presents them to the President simply as his own
recommendations, he will have less chance of success. As an
example, he cited Kazakhstan's current draft Internet
legislation, which he described as "idiotic." He said that a
strong message from the United States that he can pass to
Nazarbayev would be helpful, because the President "is
inclined to listen to you these days."


6. (C) Tazhin indicated Kazakhstan will include "frozen
conflicts" in its 2010 priorities, and will likely propose a
very high-level meeting during 2010, if not necessarily a
summit, on this issue. In an aside, he praised the United
States's role in the current Turkey-Armenia rapprochement.
He confided that Armenian Foreign Minister Nalbandian had
told him it couldn't have been achieved without President
Obama's personal attention.

GEOPOLITICS


7. (C) Tazhin expressed his gratitude that he will have a
meeting with National Security Adviser Jones. He noted this,
in fact, will be his 10th year of meeting with U.S. National
Security Advisers. He said, "It will be really important for
me to understand the Obama Administration's view of Central
Asia, and especially the situation in Kyrgyzstan. He said
bluntly that Kazakhstan sees Kyrgyzstan's President Bakiyev
as weak, venal, and potentially dangerous for regional
stability. He added that he finds "growing tension" between
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan very worrying. Tazhin said he will
be prepared to discuss the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and Kazakhstan's vision for it.


8. (C) Tazhin emphasized he also will be keenly interested
in gaining a clear understanding of the "strategic relations"
between the United States and Russia, as well as between the
United States and China, and said he will be prepared for a
very frank exchange. He said he knows that Russia is not so
important economically, but Moscow's military power is a
point of concern. In an aside, Tazhin commented that
Kazakhstan promotes its relationship with Russia more than
its relationship with China "frankly because Russia is the
weaker of the two. We would be uncomfortable with China as
the dominant regional power." (COMMENT: Tazhin left it
unsaid, but we know from other conversations that Russia's
August 2008 invasion of Georgia was a wake-up call for
Kazakhstan because it was the first time in the post-Soviet
period that Russia took direct military action against a
former Soviet republic. END COMMENT.)

"SYMBOLISM IS IMPORTANT"


9. (C) Tazhin said he is very much looking foward to his
meeting with Secretary Clinton because of his real respect
for her, where he expects most of the OSCE conversations will
take place. He said that he will officially invite her to
visit Kazakhstan at any time, but hopes she will agree to
participate in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ministerial in Astana June 24-25. He conceded, however, that
a "stand-alone visit" would have more symbolic importance.


10. (C) Without pressing for it, he mentioned that he would
appreciate a short meeting with Vice President Biden for its
symbolic value. Tazhin also said he has not yet coordinated
with Nazarbayev, but he wants to push forward the idea of a
U.S.-Kazakhstan Commission, perhaps similar to the
Gore-Nazarbayev Commission during the Clinton Administration
of the 1990s. While such commissions can be a bureaucratic
annoyance, "they do make things happen," he said. Even more
important is the symbolic value. He said bluntly, "Because
of Russia, we need sustained, high-level contact with
Washington."


11. (C) COMMENT: Foreign Minister Tazhin has long been a
heavy-weight in President Nazarbayev's inner circle. Among
his several previous senior positions, he was briefly the

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chairman of the Committee for National Security (KNB,
ex-KGB). Although we believe Tazhin is a key member of the
progressive camp, he is also a consummate practitioner of the
"art of the possible." That is why he is asking for clear --
but realistic -- messages from Washington that he can carry
back to President Nazarbayev to reinforce his own positions.


12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: President-elect Obama's
telephone call to President Nazarbayev in November was a
watershed for U.S.-Kazakhstan relations, because it appeared
to Kazakhstan to signal that the new U.S. Administration was
ready to pay attention to this strategically located country
(ref B) and to Central Asia as a whole. The April 23 Vice
President Biden-President Nazarbayev telephone call
reinforced that perception. We know from various sources and
multiple conversations that Nazarbayev is uncomfortable with
the relentless pressure from Moscow, both overt and covert,
to limit U.S. influence in Kazakhstan and, more broadly, in
Central Asia. The more we can forge realistic relations with
Kazakhstan, the better it is likely to be for U.S. long-term
interests in this volatile part of the world that stretches
from Islamabad to Moscow. END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND