KAZAKHSTANI FM TAZHIN'S PRIORITIES FOR HIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000714 SIPDIS STATE FOR D, P, SCA, S/P, S/SRAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2024 TAGS: PGOV PREL OSCE CH RS KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTANI FM TAZHIN'S PRIORITIES FOR HIS WASHINGTON TRIP, MAY 4-5 REF: A. ASTANA 0674 (SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER TAZHIN'S MAY 4-5 VISIT TO WASHINGTON) ¶B. ASTANA 0731 (KAZAKHSTAN...SEEKS AN ENHANCED RELATIONSHIP) Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Previewing for the Ambassador his May 4-5 visit to Washington, Foreign Minister Tazhin said: -- he hopes to be prepared to make new "strategic non-military proposals" for enhanced Kazakhstani asssistance in Afghanistan; -- he will be fully prepared to discuss with Secretary Clinton Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship, and wants to take back to President Nazarbayev Washington's realistic suggestions for countering Russian pressure; -- "frozen conflicts" will likely be one of Kazakhstan's signature issues during its OSCE chairmanship; -- he will be prepared for a fully frank geostrategic discussion with National Security Adviser Jones on Central Asia, Russia, and China; and -- he would appreciate a meeting (although he did not press for it),even if brief, with Vice President Biden for its symbolic value to demonstrate to Russia Kazakhstan's enhanced relationship with the United States. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met one-on-one with Foreign Minister Tazhin on April 25 to discuss Tazhin's visit to Washington, May 4-5. Tazhin said his key issues in Washington will be Afghanistan, the OSCE, and the geopolitics of the region. He said he needs to return to Astana with a clear message about Washington's priorities for Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship in order to counter heavy pressure from Russia. AFGHANISTAN ¶3. (C) Tazhin prefaced his remarks by saying, "Afghanistan is increasingly important to us." He said he is putting together "strategic non-military proposals for enhanced assistance" so that Kazakhstan can be more helpful to the United States and to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He declined to offer any details because his proposals are not yet fully cleared. He admitted he might arrive in Washington without final approval by the government and President Nazarbayev because he has been travelling so much and, in his absence, his ideas have not moved forward through the interagency process as quickly as he would have liked. However, he promised to make a full press in the final week before he departs for Washington. OSCE ¶4. (C) Tazhin said he has already consulted with Russia (and Russia has consulted with him more than once),the European Commission, and individual European capitals on Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship. He commented that Russia's views are crystal clear. Although he declined to elaborate, he said that Moscow is pressing him on ODIHR, the Parliamentary Assembly, and OSCE membership contributions, "among other issues." European views, however, are less clear to him. With a certain degree of frustration, Tazhin described the European views as "strongly ideological but not very coordinated, and sometimes even contradictory." ¶5. (C) Tazhin said it will be very important for him to return to Astana with a precise view of what Washington hopes to see during Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE chairmanship. He said that clear evidence of a realistic -- and he emphasized realistic -- U.S.-Kazakhstan partnership will allow him to sell progressive views to President Nazarbayev, whereas if he ASTANA 00000714 002 OF 003 presents them to the President simply as his own recommendations, he will have less chance of success. As an example, he cited Kazakhstan's current draft Internet legislation, which he described as "idiotic." He said that a strong message from the United States that he can pass to Nazarbayev would be helpful, because the President "is inclined to listen to you these days." ¶6. (C) Tazhin indicated Kazakhstan will include "frozen conflicts" in its 2010 priorities, and will likely propose a very high-level meeting during 2010, if not necessarily a summit, on this issue. In an aside, he praised the United States's role in the current Turkey-Armenia rapprochement. He confided that Armenian Foreign Minister Nalbandian had told him it couldn't have been achieved without President Obama's personal attention. GEOPOLITICS ¶7. (C) Tazhin expressed his gratitude that he will have a meeting with National Security Adviser Jones. He noted this, in fact, will be his 10th year of meeting with U.S. National Security Advisers. He said, "It will be really important for me to understand the Obama Administration's view of Central Asia, and especially the situation in Kyrgyzstan. He said bluntly that Kazakhstan sees Kyrgyzstan's President Bakiyev as weak, venal, and potentially dangerous for regional stability. He added that he finds "growing tension" between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan very worrying. Tazhin said he will be prepared to discuss the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Kazakhstan's vision for it. ¶8. (C) Tazhin emphasized he also will be keenly interested in gaining a clear understanding of the "strategic relations" between the United States and Russia, as well as between the United States and China, and said he will be prepared for a very frank exchange. He said he knows that Russia is not so important economically, but Moscow's military power is a point of concern. In an aside, Tazhin commented that Kazakhstan promotes its relationship with Russia more than its relationship with China "frankly because Russia is the weaker of the two. We would be uncomfortable with China as the dominant regional power." (COMMENT: Tazhin left it unsaid, but we know from other conversations that Russia's August 2008 invasion of Georgia was a wake-up call for Kazakhstan because it was the first time in the post-Soviet period that Russia took direct military action against a former Soviet republic. END COMMENT.) "SYMBOLISM IS IMPORTANT" ¶9. (C) Tazhin said he is very much looking foward to his meeting with Secretary Clinton because of his real respect for her, where he expects most of the OSCE conversations will take place. He said that he will officially invite her to visit Kazakhstan at any time, but hopes she will agree to participate in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council ministerial in Astana June 24-25. He conceded, however, that a "stand-alone visit" would have more symbolic importance. ¶10. (C) Without pressing for it, he mentioned that he would appreciate a short meeting with Vice President Biden for its symbolic value. Tazhin also said he has not yet coordinated with Nazarbayev, but he wants to push forward the idea of a U.S.-Kazakhstan Commission, perhaps similar to the Gore-Nazarbayev Commission during the Clinton Administration of the 1990s. While such commissions can be a bureaucratic annoyance, "they do make things happen," he said. Even more important is the symbolic value. He said bluntly, "Because of Russia, we need sustained, high-level contact with Washington." ¶11. (C) COMMENT: Foreign Minister Tazhin has long been a heavy-weight in President Nazarbayev's inner circle. Among his several previous senior positions, he was briefly the ASTANA 00000714 003 OF 003 chairman of the Committee for National Security (KNB, ex-KGB). Although we believe Tazhin is a key member of the progressive camp, he is also a consummate practitioner of the "art of the possible." That is why he is asking for clear -- but realistic -- messages from Washington that he can carry back to President Nazarbayev to reinforce his own positions. ¶12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: President-elect Obama's telephone call to President Nazarbayev in November was a watershed for U.S.-Kazakhstan relations, because it appeared to Kazakhstan to signal that the new U.S. Administration was ready to pay attention to this strategically located country (ref B) and to Central Asia as a whole. The April 23 Vice President Biden-President Nazarbayev telephone call reinforced that perception. We know from various sources and multiple conversations that Nazarbayev is uncomfortable with the relentless pressure from Moscow, both overt and covert, to limit U.S. influence in Kazakhstan and, more broadly, in Central Asia. The more we can forge realistic relations with Kazakhstan, the better it is likely to be for U.S. long-term interests in this volatile part of the world that stretches from Islamabad to Moscow. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND