Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA623
2009-04-12 07:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: U.S. ASSISTANCE HELPS CUSTOMS CONTROL

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL MNUC KNNP CH KZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000623 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND ISN/ECC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MNUC KNNP CH KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: U.S. ASSISTANCE HELPS CUSTOMS CONTROL
COMMITTEE COMBAT CORRUPTION

REF: A. ASTANA 2352

B. ASTANA 00052

C. ASTANA 00610

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin Milas, 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000623 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN AND ISN/ECC E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MNUC KNNP CH KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: U.S. ASSISTANCE HELPS CUSTOMS CONTROL COMMITTEE COMBAT CORRUPTION REF: A. ASTANA 2352 ¶B. ASTANA 00052 ¶C. ASTANA 00610 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin Milas, 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Post's Export and Related Border Security (EXBS) and Department of Energy (DOE) offices have provided assistance to strengthen border security at many of Kazakhstan's 112 border crossing points. Typical site assessments indicate Kazakhstan's border crossing points typically process large amounts of cargo, often in regions remote from large population centers. Many border crossing points, such as Dostyk on the Kazakhstan-China border, are vulnerable to corruption because of their isolation and remote location. However, Kozy-Korpesh Karbuzov, Chairman of Kazakhstan's Customs Control Committee, has been aggressively combating corruption, with several investigations even leading to the arrest of senior officials. The World Customs Organization was impressed enough with Karbuzov's $63 million customs modernization program that it reportedly is willing to consider Kazakhstan's proposal to establish a Central Asian regional customs training center in Astana. However, the endemic nature of corruption in Customs will make for a long, tough battle. END SUMMARY. U.S. ASSISTS KAZAKHSTAN TO SECURE ITS BORDER ¶2. (C) Per reftels, post's EXBS and DOE offices have been providing the government of Kazakhstan with assistance to strengthen border security at many of Kazakhstan's 112 border crossing points. DOE's Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program installed radiation portal monitors at nine border crossings in 2008, and is working on eight sites in 2009. This U.S.-funded assistance complements Kazakhstan's own installation of radiation portal monitors at over 40 border crossing points. The government of Norway also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Government to complement existing U.S. programs by providing $800,000 in Norwegian funding, which Norway has stipulated must be used at vehicle crossings on the Russian border. LARGE CARGO VOLUMES IN ISOLATED REGIONS ¶3. (C) EXBS and DOE teams have conducted detailed site assessments of border crossing points, including at Dostyk, the only rail crossing on the Kazakhstani-Chinese border. Dostyk is the processing point for the maj
ority of commercial cargo between Kazakhstan and China. The Dostyk assessment revealed several important findings. First, the volume of rail cargo between China and Kazakhstan is tremendous -- and, prior to the global financial crisis, had been growing rapidly. The rail crossing is open seven days a week, and processes 600 railcars per day, as well as four passenger trains per week. The Kazakhstani Customs Control Committee maintains documentation at Dostyk on the number of transactions (which can include multiple railcars, worth of cargo) and on cargo weight. In 2006, for instance, Dostyk recorded 13,000 transactions weighing 11.5 million tons, an increase of 4,000 transactions over 2005. Due to the poor road infrastructure in the region, there is little vehicular traffic. Prior to the economic crisis, on an average day 60 trucks entered Kazakhstan from China, all laden with cargo, while 10 to 20 returned empty to China. (COMMENT: The volume of trade is all the more significant and impressive because both Dostyk and its neighboring Chinese border town are very remote from major population centers. There are no neighboring cities or towns within 100 miles. EXBS staff observed that traveling by four-wheel drive vehicle from Dostyk to Almaty took thirteen hours of driving under extremely difficult conditions. END COMMENT.) ASTANA 00000623 002 OF 003 ISOLATION AND LUCRATIVE TRADE ENCOURAGE CORRUPTION ¶4. (C) Many border crossing points, such as Dostyk, are particularly vulnerable to corruption because of their isolation and remote location. Local officials told EXBS staff that 70 percent of Dostyk's population are employed by the national railroad company, and the remaining 30 percent are Customs, Border Guard, and military personnel and their families. Such work-force concentration makes senior leadership within Customs and the Border Guard Service very powerful because dissatisfied employees have few other job options in the area. Since almost all residents of the region are deeply reliant on the highly lucrative trade with China, the temptation at many levels is to seek a cut of the profits. ¶5. (C) EXBS staff were told anecdotally that Customs officials can make up to several hundred dollars in bribes per truck of cargo. Residents also reported, and Embassy staff observed, that many high-ranking officials involved in Customs and the Border Guard Service in the region live in very large houses and drive fancy cars. Our interlocutors widely acknowledged that positions in Customs cost thousands of dollars to obtain )- a practice which only makes economic sense if the payments will be recouped by the payee from income other than salary. (COMMENT: In many cases, corruption is not even recognized as such. If people involved in shipping cargo pay money to avoid wait times or get expedited service, they often view this as a legitimate business expense. Many shipping companies, expediters, and brokers collect modest fees for &unspecified Customs clearance procedures,8 which often include securing priority treatment for customs clearance. END COMMENT.) CUSTOMS HEAD TAKES STEPS AGAINST CORRUPTION ¶6. (C) Customs Control Committee Chairman Kozy-Korpesh Karbuzov has made strong statements denouncing corruption. He has also investigated and disciplined senior officials, some of whom have been arrested. On December 2, 2008, a newspaper article reported that a prominent Customs official, Mukhtar Salmenbayev, formerly the deputy head of the Department for Fighting Contraband at Customs, was arrested for allowing contraband to pass through the Kazakhstani-Kyrgyz border. Salmenbayev had been in charge of five ports, and was reportedly part of the "pass-up" system, in which Customs inspectors collect a bribe and pass a portion to their supervisors. Within the last several months, Customs also fired a second official, Makhfuz Baltaev, for corruption. Both had participated in the U.S.-funded International Airport Contraband Inspection (IACIT) Training conducted November 3-7, 2008 (reftel B). Ironically, Salmenbayev had used his cell phone to proudly show pictures of his huge house and many cars to U.S. Customs officials during the training program. An EXBS program assistant, who accompanied the Kazakhstani participants, reported that he showed little interest in the actual training, participating as minimally as possible and enjoying his free trip to the United States. Prior to their sudden dismissal, the two officials had not given any indications to post of inappropriate conduct. Post suspects that Customs either discovered something while Salmenbayev was away in the United States, or used the training as a way to get him away from his post long enough to conduct an investigation without interference. The December 2, 2008 article called Salmenbayev "the roof" that protected smugglers of illicit contraband, and reported that 20 trucks were allowed to enter Kazakhstan on December 1 carrying unspecified "illicit" cargo through the Kyrgyz-Kazakhstani border. Two other customs officers who worked at the Semey and Maikachagai posts along Kazakhstan's eastern border with China remain under investigation for "non-fulfillment of duties" after they ASTANA 00000623 003 OF 003 allowed several trucks to enter with imported goods not declared on customs manifests. Moreover, former Deputy Chairman of the Customs Control Committee Aisagalieva recently resigned, and an EXBS program assistant heard that this was allegedly due to the fact that she permitted a Chinese company doing business with Kazakhstan to pay educational expenses for her child. WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION CONSIDERS ASTANA TRAINING CENTER ¶7. (C) Despite the global economic crisis, the Kazakhstani government has declared that it remains committed to spending over $65 million on its customs modernization reforms, of which $18 million will come from the World Bank. Per reftel C, in December 2008, Kazakhstan unveiled an impressive new electronic system to track customs data electronically, which is currently available at five of Kazakhstan's 112 ports. Embassy officials from the DOE and EXBS offices have been impressed with the Karbuzov,s reforms and his receptiveness to Western assistance. Karbuzov has also expressed strong interest in visiting the United States to personally observe, and learn from, the U.S. system. His visit is currently expected to be from June 6-14. On April 7, the EXBS Advisor met with representatives of the World Customs Organization, which also seems impressed with Karbuzov's reforms -- enough so that it is willing to consider Kazakhstan's proposal establish a Central Asian regional customs training center in Astana, if all the countries of the region agree. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Karbuzov previously worked for the Committee for National Security (KNB),the Kazakhstani successor agency to the Soviet KGB. The head of the Border Control Department at Customs described Karbuzov to us as "a man of principle and tough character." EXBS Advisor has been impressed by the actions that Karbuzov has taken so far on fighting corruption. However, as recent examples also indicate, corruption is endemic to a degree that even if the senior Customs leadership demonstrates the best of intentions and political will, it will still take years to succeed in this fight, especially in such a lucrative area involving control over trade. It is not surprising that on a recent USAID-funded poll Kazakhstanis identified Customs as the most corrupt institution in Kazakhstan. Nonetheless, Karbuzov seems determined to turn Customs' image around. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND

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