KAZAKHSTAN: THE POLITICS OF PIPELINES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ASTANA 000530 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/CARC, EEB/ESC STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTDA FOR DAN STEIN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PINR ECON EPET EINV KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: THE POLITICS OF PIPELINES REF: (A) ASTANA 0283 (B) ASTANA 0131 ASTANA 00000530 001.2 OF 004 ¶1. (SBU) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet. ¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY: On March 17-18, Energy Officer spoke with representatives from Kazakhstan's national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG) and international oil companies about planned oil and gas export projects, particularly the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline and the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS). The general consensus is that these export projects will be necessary by 2013 if oil production in Kazakhstan increases as expected. Furthermore, the projects have continued to move forward, despite the impact of the financial crisis and lower oil prices on the cash position of the business partners. Several representatives said they do not expect Russia to openly oppose or obstruct any of the projects, even KCTS, which will give Kazakhstan an export route that circumvents Russian territory. Nevertheless, negotiations are expected to be difficult, particularly with Azerbaijan and the international oil companies on KCTS. Both KMG and international company officials expressed a keen interest in the status of U.S.-Iranian relations and said normalization of ties with Iran would be a "game changer" for crude exports from Kazakhstan. END SUMMARY. CPC EXPANSION UPDATE ¶3. (SBU) On March 17, Energy Officer met with Timur Rakhanov, Director of KMG's Department for New Transportation Projects and also a member of the Board of Directors of CPC. Rakhanov is an impressive, articulate individual and one of KMG's rising stars. He is young (early 30s),speaks fluent English, studied in London, has represented KMG's interest in CPC for more than five years, and prides himself on developing, mentoring, and delegating to junior staff. He said that CPC expansion is likely to be approved by all consortium members, although a final decision (sanction) is not expected until December. At this point, he said, the consortium is discussing "ship or pay" terms and is still seeking a legally binding volume commitment from suppliers. He confirmed that the plan is to expand capacity from 32 million tons/year to 67 million tons/year, by installing 10 new pump stations throughout the pipeline and replacing 700 mm pipe with larger 1000 mm pipe. Rakhanov also confirmed that CPC will expand the off-loading terminal at Novorossisyk and construct storage tanks with a capacity of 100,000 tons. LUKOIL AND BP IN A STALEMATE ¶4. (SBU) According to Rakhanov, CPC expansion will take three years to complete. He added that this is a "perfect time" to carry out expansion work, since the price of steel and other inputs is low and the consortium has a fixed tariff of $38/ton. Rakhanov also confirmed that BP and Lukoil were still in talks about the sale of BP's stake in LukArco and implied that negotiations had reached a stalemate. "BP says, 'Everything's OK, talks are continuing' but Lukoil says, 'We can't see the light at the end of the tunnel.'" He confided that within the next two weeks, KMG expects to complete the purchase of BP's share of Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures' 1.75 percent stake in CPC, which carries with it the right to ship 10.5 million tons of crude per year via the pipeline. However, he dismissed the idea that KMG would acquire a portion of the 7 percent stake in CPC that Russia purchased from Oman last year. "True, we have the right to acquire 3.5 percent of Oman's stake, but why should we? That 3 percent gives us nothing in terms of control or capacity rights," he said. CHEVRON CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT CPC EXPANSION ¶5. (SBU) On March 18, Jay Johnson, Managing Director for Chevron's Eurasia Business Unit, told Energy Officer that CPC expansion could be sanctioned by the end of the year, but "it all depends on how difficult BP wants to be." Zamira Kanapianova, Chevron's Country ASTANA 00000530 002.2 OF 004 Manager for Kazakhstan, added that Lukoil is "more cautious" now than in the past, partly for financial reasons and partly out of deference to the Russian government. She suggested that Lukoil will be careful not to make any moves without the approval of the Kremlin. "Look what happened to Yukos," she said. Johnson echoed Rakhanov's comments that the time is right for CPC capacity expansion given the low price of steel, and he confirmed that the necessary engineering work and feasibility studies are already underway. Kanapianova added that the 0-116 kilometer segment of CPC pipeline is now being replaced. Johnson said CPC expansion alone would not be sufficient to accommodate all of the increased crude volumes Kazakhstan expects to export beginning in 2013. "Once you have Tengizchevroil's second generation plant fully operational, plus Karachaganak's Phase III, and Kashagan production, you're going to need all the pipelines you can get," he said. IS KCTS A REAL PROJECT, OR JUST A PLOY? ¶6. (SBU) KMG's Rakhanov said some progress has been made on the Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System (KCTS),but he expressed doubts about the ability to secure volume commitments for both projects in the near term, suggesting that KCTS could actually compete with CPC for crude supplies once it is completed in approximately 2015. (NOTE: There are currently no crude volume commitments to KCTS. END NOTE). Nevertheless, Rakhanov supports the project, not least because the concept alone has given Kazakhstan useful leverage in negotiations with Russia over CPC expansion. Rakhanov said KCTS was "fifty percent responsible for changing Russia's attitude" toward CPC expansion. WHO WILL BUILD THE TANKERS? ¶7. (SBU) Chevron's Johnson supports the development of KCTS, but considers the project incredibly complex and risky, particularly from a maritime safety perspective. "Building a pipeline to Kuryk doesn't do you any good," he said. "You still need to get the crude across the Caspian. And there's a real issue around ships." He noted that neither Kazakhstan nor Azerbaijan currently has the capacity to build the 60,000 deadweight-ton tankers that would make the project viable, and he suggested that Russia would oppose efforts by either country to develop the infrastructure and expertise to build ships that large. Johnson said that, ironically, KCTS, which would circumvent Russian territory, might need the support from Russia, which could build the ships in Astrakhan or allow manufactured parts to travel down the Volga-Don for assembly in the Caspian. TENDER CONDUCTED FOR SMALLER TANKERS ¶8. (SBU) On February 25, the newspaper Vremya reported that KazMorTransFlot (KMTF) conducted a tender to build three new 12,000 deadweight ton oil tankers. According to the article, KMTF received seven bids: four from Russia, one from Ukraine, one from Bulgaria, and one from Korea. The lowest price came from the Bulgarian company MTG Dolphin, at 15.3 million euros per tanker, but the article claimed that the company began building tankers just two years ago and the terms of the tender require a minimum of five years' experience. The Ukrainian company Okean, owned by German shareholders, offered to build the ships for $21.7 million each. Russia's Zelenodolsk bid $23.5 million, but the article notes that KMTF previously ordered barges from this company and they missed the delivery deadline. Russia's Krasnoe Sormovo bid $22.3 million, but according to the article, one of their previous clients, a Turkish firm, complained that the company was two years late and kept trying to increase the cost per unit from $18 million to $26 million. The Korean company Hyundai was willing to offer a price of $23.5 million, although a company spokesman said they have built similar tankers for $30 million. Russia's Astrakhan shipyard offered a bid of $24.8 million and Russia's Vyborg offered 28.7 million euros. (NOTE: The Korean Ambassador to Kazakhstan told the DCM in mid-February that Hyuandai has made a strategic decision to enter ASTANA 00000530 003.2 OF 004 the Caspian region, despite the lack of a suitable shipyard in Kazakhstan. On March 18, KMG's Arman Darbayev, Executive Director for Oil Transportation and Service Projects, told Energy Officer that Astrakhan's bid was accepted, although the winner of the tender has not yet been publicly announced. END NOTE). AZERIS WANT "MONEY FOR NOTHING" ¶9. (SBU) KMG's Arman Darbayev, Executive Director for Oil Transportation and Service Projects, argued that the number one question for KCTS -- an issue even more important than the tanker fleet -- is whether or not international oil companies will be allowed to take an equity stake in the project. He said the tanker issue is a technical and commercial problem: "If you have enough money, you can solve this." According to Darbayev, however, the ownership issue is a "political problem" and therefore more intractable. Darbayev said that Azerbaijan has asked for volume commitments from the suppliers before work can begin on KCTS, but the suppliers will not commit volumes without a minority equity share that will give them greater control over project risk, cost, schedule, and safety. Regarding the proposed pipeline from Eskene to Kuryk, Darbayev said the government of Kazakhstan has agreed in principle to 49 percent ownership by private sector partners and the companies representing Tengiz and Kashagan have agreed to provide expertise to develop the terms of reference for the necessary feasibility studies. "I believe we are very close to signing an agreement" with the companies to build the pipeline, he said. However, Darbayev was clearly frustrated by the negotiating position of Azerbaijan's SOCAR, which is firmly opposed to international oil companies taking an equity stake, particularly if SOCAR must reduce its 50 percent share in the new venture. He complained that the lead negotiator for SOCAR, Vitaliy Bairlibayev, confessed he is not authorized or empowered to compromise with the government of Kazakhstan. "Azerbaijan is just a transit country, holding up KCTS so they can maximize their tariffs. They're getting money for nothing." IRAN OPTION GIVES KAZAKHSTAN LEVERAGE ¶10. (SBU) Darbayev said the only leverage Kazakhsktan has over Azerbaijan on the KCTS project is the threat to ship its crude to "other directions," meaning Iran. He noted that the Heads of Agreement negotiated with SOCAR includes a provision allowing shipment to "other directions," but only by mutual consent, which Darbayev said "means never. The Azeris are very worried about us going to Iran instead." RUSSIAN INFLUENCE OVER KAZAKHSTAN'S CRUDE EXPORTS ¶11. (SBU) When asked about Russia's attitude toward Kazakhstan's multi-vector oil export policy, Chevron's Kanapianova argued that Russia would prefer crude to travel through Russian territory, which would naturally give Russia greater leverage over Kazakhstan. She said that ten years ago, Russia "used to turn off the Atyrau-Samara oil pipeline, citing 'technical reasons,' whenever President Nazarbayev said something they didn't like. But they don't do that anymore. Their methods are more sophisticated and more subtle." When pressed to elaborate, Johnson suggested that Russia could introduce a pipeline tariff tax and simply raise the rate to increase the pressure on Kazakhstan. This would be particularly effective, Johnson said, if Kazakhstan were limited to exporting all of its crude via Russia. ¶12. (SBU) KMG's Darbayev acknowledged that Russia was not in favor of KCTS: "Their intention is to block the project," he said. However, he did not believe that Russia would take the extreme step of blocking transit shipments of tanker components through the Volga-Don, if the tankers were built outside the region and assembled in the Caspian. "That would be too much," he said, "especially considering the good relations we have with Russia." ASTANA 00000530 004.2 OF 004 ¶13. (SBU) Bolat Akchulakov, former Vice Minister of Energy, now Managing Director for Oil and Gas at national welfare fund Samruk-Kazyna, echoed Darbayev's remarks. On March 20, he told Energy Officer that Russia might try to discourage oil exports that circumvented Russia, but would ultimately respect Kazakhstan's sovereignty. "They know that we will continue to ship most of our crude through Russia and in fact have maximized the capacity of Atyrau-Samara and CPC," he said, suggesting that Kazakhstan simply needs other export options in order to accommodate increased production volumes. OPENING UP IRAN WOULD BE A GAME-CHANGER ¶14. (SBU) Johnson told Energy Officer that Iran is now building ships of suitable size for KCTS at its northern port of Neka and he suggested that normalization of relations with Iran would remove the threat of a Russian veto over KCTS and help ensure the diversification of crude export routes from Kazakhstan. "If we could work with Iran," he said, "that would change the equation entirely." Johnson added that both Total and ENI, partners in the Kashagan consortium, intend to ship Kazakhstani crude to Iran once full production begins in 2015. KMG's Darbayev said very much the same thing: "If KCTS does not go forward as anticipated, the European oil companies will ship their crude to Iran," he said. MILAS