KAZAKHSTAN: NATO REP FOR CENTRAL ASIA BRIEFS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 000494 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, EUR/RUS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR NATO OSCE RS KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: NATO REP FOR CENTRAL ASIA BRIEFS ON HIS ASTANA VISIT Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia Robert Simmons told NATO Ambassadors in Astana on March 18 that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Security Forum is administratively on track for June 24-25 in Astana, even though Kazakhstani officials made an effort to limit the agenda. He estimated that Kazakhstan's commitment to its Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO is "way down," and suggested this might be the fault of Minister of Defense Danial Akhmetov under Russian influence. Simmons reported that Security Council Chairman Kairbek Suleymenov said Kazakhstan will be prepared to sign the NATO Transit Agreement at the EAPC in June, "now that NATO has restored its relations with Russia." Following Simmons' briefing, NATO Ambassadors discussed whether his experience during this visit portends Kazakhstani attitudes during its 2010 OSCE Chairmanship. Most agreed on the need for early and sustained highest-level engagement with President Nazarbayev in the run-up to the 2010 Chairmanship to ensure he receives the West's unvarnished views without any intermediation. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) NATO Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia Robert Simmons briefed NATO Ambassadors in Astana on March 18 on his two-day visit to Kazakhstan. He said his agenda included introducing the new NATO Information Officer for Central Asia, AmCit Evan Tracz (who might eventually be based in Tashkent or Bishkek); preparing for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) Security Forum in Astana on June 24-25; reviewing next steps for Kazakhstan's Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO; pressing for conclusion of the NATO Transit Agreement with Kazakhstan; and assessing Kazakhstan's interest in future NATO cooperation, especially in Afghanistan. JUNE 24-25 EAPC IN ASTANA ON TRACK ¶3. (C) Simmons reported that the EAPC, planned to take place in Astana June 24-25, is administratively on track and will be held in the Palace of Independence. The NATO Secretary-General will arrive on June 23 for bilateral NATO-Kazakhstan meetings. Simmons said NATO had already presented Kazakhstan the agenda for the EAPC that includes discussions on Central Asia and Afghanistan, the situation in the Caucasus, and energy infrastructure security. He said Minister of Defense Danial Akhmetov and other senior officials pressed to have the Caucasus and energy infrastructure security removed from the agenda. Simmons noted that NATO sets the agenda, not Kazakhstan. In the ensuing discussion, Simmons and a few others conjectured that Kazakhstan was carrying Russia's water on the agenda. Others speculated that Kazakhstan might feel the need to tell Moscow with a straight face that it had made a good-faith effort, but in the end would not seriously oppose the proposed agenda. INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP ACTION PLAN ¶4. (C) Simmons reported "with some disappointment" that Kazakhstan's cooperation with NATO is "way down" since Danial Akhmetov became Minister of Defense. Simmons acknowledged that Deputy Minister of Defense General Bulat Sembinov had recently visited both Kabul and Washington to discuss enhanced Kazakhstani military cooperation with NATO and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, but he questioned whether Akhmetov is "simply allowing Sembinov to do this." The Ambassador suggested that the final arbiter is President Nazarbayev, who appears to want to keep his options open, and has allowed the unusual situation where the Deputy Minister of Defense at least appears to operate independently from the Minister of Defense. Simmons noted that the Ministry of Defense has blocked him for two years from meeting with General Sembinov, even though both established a good working relationship before Akhmetov became Minister of Defense. Simmons judged that the Ministry ASTANA 00000494 002 OF 003 of Defense seems to have dropped interoperability with NATO as a goal. (NOTE: We have not seen any concrete evidence of this. END NOTE.) ¶5. (C) According to Simmons, Akhmetov characterized Kazakhstani military officers travelling to NATO-sponsored information and training events as "military tourists" and reportedly said he "will not permit it." Simmons said that all of this seems to him to be "the negative influence of Russia." However, the Kazakhstani Peace-keeping Brigade (KazBrig),designated for international peace-keeping operations, seems to be moving forward. Simmons also reported that the best cooperation between NATO and Kazakhstan is on Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) with Minister of Emergency Situations Sergey Bozhko. NATO will conduct a CEP exercise in Kazakhstan in September. NATO TRANSIT AGREEMENT ¶6. (C) Simmons said that Security Council Chairman Kairbek Suleymenov told him, "Now that you (NATO) have restored your relations with Russia, we can sign the NATO Transit Agreement at the EAPC in June." Simmons said NATO had provided Kazakhstan the draft text of the agreement in September 2008, but until now had not had "the courtesy of a reply." Simmons said that during this visit he had a meeting at the Ministry of Transport, but found it less than useful because the ministry focused only on technocratic details. (NOTE: When we were negotiating the Northern Distribution Network for the commercial transit of non-lethal supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan, which we concluded successfully in January, we found the same situation at the Ministry of Transport, which is not a policy decision-making ministry. The real decision-maker, giving his recommendation to President Nazarbayev, is Security Council Chairman Suleymenov. END NOTE.) Simmons said that NATO wants a clause in the NATO Transit Agreement that will provide "interim entry into force upon signature," because experience shows that formal Kazakhstani ratification can take "months, if not years." He clarified that the agreement allows for the transit of non-lethal military supplies (including trucks, jeeps, etc.) but not troops. ¶7. (C) Simmons said he was struck by Suleymenov's "oblique warning" that NATO should not get too close to Uzbekistan or Tajikistan "because 'recent events' have shown there could be big changes coming in those countries." Simmons said that Suleymenov neither explained the sources of this judgment nor elaborated on it. QUO VADIS? ¶8. (C) During the lively discussion that followed Simmons' briefing, Italian Ambassador Bruno Pasquino commented, "It seems your visits follow a pattern -- one is upbeat, the next is downbeat. Is that an accurate observation?" Simmons responded that the Russia factor plays a role. He recounted a recent discussion in Brussels with the DCM of Russia's Mission to NATO, who had asked him, "How can you meet with our colonies without Russia at the table?" Pasquino noted that Russian Ambassador in Astana Mikhail Borcharnikov seems to have latched onto him for detailed NATO information, having told him, "You must understand our intense interest in every single move NATO makes in our region of interest." ¶9. (C) Several Ambassadors wondered if Simmons' mixed experience during this visit portends what the West can expect during Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE Chairmanship. One asserted we can expect Kazakhstan "to shill for the Kremlin." Others judged that Kazakhstan will be a tough but honest broker between Russia and the West. Those who advocated this latter view emphasized the importance of early and sustained highest-level engagement with Nazarbayev in the coming months to ensure that he receives the West's unvarnished views without any intermediation. ASTANA 00000494 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) COMMENT: We would observe that the current NATO Contact Embassy in Astana is the United Kingdom, which is small and, necessarily, has relatively limited opportunities for sustained contacts at high levels in the Government of Kazakhstan -- not the least because the UK Ambassador is also accredited to Kyrgyzstan and is frequently on the road. We would note that the previous NATO Information Officer left Kazakhstan late in 2008; and so, NATO and Simmons might not have been as extensively briefed on the complicated, multi-layer current realities of Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy as would have been desired. Further, at least at this point, NATO seems to be a more hair-on-fire issue for Russia than the OSCE. In our judgment, until we have real-world proof otherwise, Kazakhstan is likely to continue to play a hard-nosed but, in the end, honest broker between the West and Russia in international fora. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND