KAZAKHSTAN STRONGLY DENIES REPORT OF POTENTIAL URANIUM TRANSER TO IRAN

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTA #2273/01 3650744
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310744Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7141
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0549
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1617
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0244
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2379
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0098
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2662

S E C R E T ASTANA 002273 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN, SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2029 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, MNUC, KNNP, IR, JA, KZ 
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN STRONGLY DENIES REPORT OF POTENTIAL URANIUM 
TRANSER TO IRAN 
 
REF: A. ASTANA 2257 
 B. SECSTATE 131723 
 C. ASTANA 2158 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D) 
 

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We have quickly checked all questions and are taking additional

measures, but there are no leads to confirm the intention to transfer

uranium." Umarov concluded by requesting "documents and materials,

with names and data, on those conducting the negotiations."



NO CONTRACTS, NO CONTACT, AND NO NEGOTIATIONS



3. (S) Umarov then turned to his private report on the interagency

investigation, which concluded that KAP has neither contracts nor

contact with Iran on any possible uranium shipment. Furthermore, he

asserted, "No one has received a proposal from Iran, and a check of

all potential mediators has not shown any evidence of a request from

Iran." Turning to Baiken-U, owned jointly by KAP and Energy Asia

Limited, a consortium of Japanese power companies, Umarov underlined

its 95% Japanese ownership. "Even with that, KazAtomProm has no

information that negotiations are in process," he stated.



ONE-THIRD OF KAZAKHSTAN'S URANIUM PRODUCTION



4. (S) To emphasize the improbability of the sale, Umarov then

recited detailed information on Baiken-U's limited mining operations

and small stock of unprocessed uranium ore -- 70 tons. The volume of

yellowcake under alleged negotiations, he continued, equals one-third

of all Kazakhstan's production. "To ship that amount unaccounted is

crazy," he argued. Highlighting the regular inventory of stockpiles

by the competent Kazakhstani agencies, he revealed, "They have

checked half, nothing is missing, and no documents have been

distorted."



MANDATORY END-USE CERTIFICATES



5. (S) About transportation, Umarov told the Ambassador that all

uranium exports occur exclusively by railway, and that no shipments

have ever passed through Kazakhstani sea ports [on the Caspian Sea].

Kazakhstan's multi-layered, strict export controls would ensure

immediate identification of any shipment of any amount of uranium, he

argued. Furthermore, he said, "No Kazakhstani company has requested

a license to export uranium to Iran, and we never ship uranium to a

non-nuclear power without an end-use certificate."



REPUTATION AT STAKE



6. (S) "This investigation led to our statement, and now we have big

questions for you and Washington. Information is very important



because Kazakhstan's reputation has been put at stake," he asserted.

"If you consider us a strategic partner, as you say, you must share

information. We are working for one and the same goals, and we have

always been helpful on Iran. The appearance of this article and the

mention of intelligence leads to questions about trust." Umarov then

underlined the government's "disappointment" that the State

Department's statement (drawn from press guidance) did not more

firmly support Kazakhstan and underline Kazakhstan's staunch support

for non-proliferation. "Now, we are in a damage-control situation,"

he concluded with real chagrin.



INCIDENT ORCHESTRATED?



7. (S) Umarov relayed the Kazakhstani government's request to the

IAEA for the report. "The IAEA says that they do not have the

report, which leads us to the conclusion that it was orchestrated."

He then repeated his request for additional information in order to

continue the investigation in greater detail. "As partners, we must

work together constructively to stop activity confidentially. Our

previous experiences have shown the effectiveness of this approach.

You trusted us before with such sensitive projects as Operation

Sapphire."



STRONGER, BROADER INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION WELCOMED



8. (S) After thanking the Ministry and government for its serious,

speedy response, the Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. government

is not accusing the Kazakhstani government of involvement in the

alleged negotiations. He asserted that he met with the Foreign

Minister in advance of the article, because the U.S. government sees

Kazakhstan as a strong partner. The Ambassador mentioned the U.S.

government's recognition and praise for Kazakhstan's long history of

positive cooperation, especially on non-proliferation. Recalling his

meeting with the new head of the National Security Committee (KNB)

(ref C),the Ambassador welcomed stronger, broader intelligence

cooperation.



PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT?



9. (S) Looking for a way to restore Kazakhstan's image, Umarov

concluded with a request that the U.S. government make a public

statement of support, "We have strenuously worked on our

non-proliferation reputation, and now it is being questioned, now the

word has gone out. We would appreciate strong support from our

partners." The Ambassador agreed to relay the request.



10. (S) In a private pull-aside, Umarov told the Ambassador that

Kazakhstan has some degree of suspicion that a third nation (unnamed)

might have fabricated the initial report and, for its own purposes,

leaked it to the Associated Press.



11. (U) BEGIN DECEMBER 30 PRESS STATEMENT:



STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS



The Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorically repudiates certain news

media reports alleging Kazakhstan's connection to a possible deal to

supply uranium to Iran and considers them groundless insinuations

damaging the reputation of our country.



As is known, Kazakhstan has voluntarily renounced the world's fourth

largest nuclear and missile arsenal, shut down the world's second

largest Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, and is one of the recognized

leaders of the global process of disarmament and nonproliferation.



Kazakhstan is firmly committed to the principles of nonproliferation

of weapons of mass destruction and tough control over the turnover of

dual use materials. As a non-nuclear weapon state, Kazakhstan has

been unwaveringly committed and remains committed to the principles

of the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, relevant

resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, the UN Convention

on physical protection of nuclear materials, as well as the

principles and rules of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.



All the operations with nuclear materials in Kazakhstan, including

our cooperation regarding peaceful use of atomic energy with foreign

countries, are subject to IAEA comprehensive safeguards.



In this connection, Kazakhstan expects the IAEA to give an

appropriate assessment of the information being disseminated by the

news media.



END STATEMENT.





12. (S) BEGIN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN

AFFAIRS NON-PAPER:



Thank you for providing the information on the attempts of Iranian

company Nur Afzar Gostar (NAG) to purchase uranium ore from

Kazakhstan.



Kazakhstan unwaveringly fulfills its tight export-control obligations

with respect to nuclear materials and is committed to strengthen the

international nuclear non-proliferation regime.



We fully support your efforts to prevent the export of nuclear

materials to the Islamic Republic of Iran, in accordance with UN

Security Council resolution 1737. Kazakhstan's export-control system

excludes any possibility of illegal deliveries of uranium products to

that country. Kazakhstan's government agencies and private companies

are not conducting, nor have they ever conducted, official

negotiations for the delivery of uranium ore to the Islamic Republic

of Iran.



Based on your inquiry, the government conducted a thorough

investigation of the companies you identified and took additional

steps to prevent the illegal transfer of purified uranium ore,

including yellowcake. To date, no evidence of an illegal export of

significant amounts of uranium ore have been found.



From our side, we request that you provide copies of materials

containing further information on the companies and individuals

engaged in the negotiations to transfer uranium ore from Kazakhstan.



END NON-PAPER.



13. (S) COMMENT: We know from other sources that Kazakhstan's

initial investigation was indeed swift and relatively thorough.

Nonproliferation is one area where the United States and Kazakhstan

have consistently and successfully cooperated for nearly two decades,

and sensitive nonproliferation programs still continue. Given the

very strong disappointment, almost chagrin, that Umarov expressed, we

suggest it would not be remiss for the Department to issue a press

statement (or for Embassy Astana to be authorized to issue one) that

notes the government of Kazakhstan's full cooperation in the

investigation of this current allegation, as well as our long and

successful partnership to prevent the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction. Please advise. END COMMENT.



HOAGLAND