KAZAKHSTAN: REQUEST FOR NORTH-SOUTH OVERFLIGHT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 002198 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, PM E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2029 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AF KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: REQUEST FOR NORTH-SOUTH OVERFLIGHT PATH COMPLICATED BY THE WORD "LETHAL" REF: SECSTATE 128489 Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (A),(B),(D) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The long-existing east-west (trans-Caspian) overflight path agreement the United States has had with Kazakhstan to support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan never specified (or limited) the cargo of the aircraft. The agreement was simply to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. And so, we initially judged that a request for an additional overflight path, north-south, could be relatively quickly achieved by a simple exchange of diplomatic notes. That has not proved to be the case. As soon as we specified "lethal" cargo, we triggered a policy debate within the government of Kazakhstan that is still not resolved. We believe that the Committee for National Security (KNB, ex-KGB) and other conservative forces are arguing to President Nazarbayev that public knowledge of "lethal cargo" would make Kazakhstan a target for terrorist attacks. We must stop publicly using the word "lethal" in seeking a new north-south overflight path. If we can drop that word, we likely will achieve our goal, but it will take more time. END SUMMARY. POLITICALLY DOABLE, BUT... ¶2. (S) During his December 15 meetings in Astana, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake raised the overflight request with President Nursultan Nazarbayev's foreign policy adviser Kairat Sarybai and State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev. Sarybai told Blake, "Politically this is not a problem for us. We have always supported, and continue to support, your policy in Afghanistan. But we have to take our law into account. Thus, we'll probably need parliamentary approval for this new request." Sarybai stated firmly that the United States should not emphasize -- should not even state openly -- that our request is for lethal transit. "Do not use that word. This would be a huge complication for us internally and externally." Repeating that our request can ultimately be achieved, that Kazakhstan broadly supports U.S. efforts in Afghanistan because it is in Kazakhstan's interest to do so. Sarybai added, "We have our historical experience how to live with the dragon (China) and how to live with the bear (Russia)." YIKES! LETHAL? DON'T SAY IT! 
¶3. (S) When A/s Blake raised our need to have a quick reply to our November 9 diplomatic note requesting the addition of a north-south overflight path, Foreign Minister Saudabayev blanched and replied, "Lethal, huh? That's a new issue for us!" At A/S Blake's request, the Ambassador elaborated that there is nothing at all new in this request, because, in fact, the cargo of previous overflights had never been specified. Saudabayev tasked Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov and the Ambassador to work this issue intensively. Saudabayev said, "You must convince us this is nothing new. The more detail you can give us, the easier it will be for us to convince our 'other agencies.'" Saudabayev added, "You know from experience that not all head-of-state decisions find support in society. That's why we need your very best arguments that this is nothing new. Please pay attention: you cannot, I emphasize cannot, use the word 'lethal' in the agreement language, and especially never, ever in public." Saudabayev expanded, "Our entire history of cooperation -- on non-proliferation, on Iraq, on Afghanistan -- our strongest desire to support President Obama, all of this shows that we remain strongly committed to achieving mutual goals. But you must make the strongest, most careful points possible, to achieve this agreement." A/S Blake assured Saudabayev that we would with with his team and respect Kazakhstan's sensitivity about the word "lethal." ASTANA 00002198 002 OF 002 ¶4. (S) COMMENT: During these conversations, Kazakhstani officials noted that they vetoed a recent Chinese request to transit lethal equipment through Kazakhstan's territory for a joint military exercise in Russia. They have that in mind because of their policy of equivalent multi-vector foreign policy. But even more important, we judge that Kazakhstan's KNB is arguing strongly to President Nazarbayev that no agreements can be made that would possibly expose Kazakhstan to potential terrorist attacks. In their view, the transit of "lethal" equipment and troops would do so. That, in the end, is probably the key issue. We judge that an additional north-south overflight path agreement is doable, but it will take more time. Above all, in both private and -- especially -- public statements, we should not use the word "lethal." If we can drop that word, as we did in the the proposed addendum (reftel) we likely will achieve our goal. But it will probably take significantly more time now that we have used the "L word" in our bilateral conversations. Achieving an additional north-south overflight path will be this Mission's highest immediate priority. END COMMENT. ¶5. (U) Assistant Secretary Blake cleared this cable. HOAGLAND