KAZAKHSTAN: PREPARATIONS FOR DFM UMAROV'S VISIT --

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 002050 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, AND DEPT FOR NEA/IR, ISN NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY E.O. 12958: 11/17/2029 TAGS: PARM PGOV PINR PREL KNNP START IR RS UP UZ KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: PREPARATIONS FOR DFM UMAROV'S VISIT -- NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES REFTELS: A. ASTANA 2000 ¶B. ASTANA 2007 ¶C. 08 ASTANA 1967 ¶D. 08 ASTANA 2295 ¶E. 08 ASTANA 2573 ¶F. ASTANA 1541 ¶G. STATE 83600 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Pamela L. Spratlen, 1.4 (b), (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 12. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY: At the request of Kazakhstan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),PolOff met on November 13 with the Director of the Multilateral Cooperation Department, Barlybai Sadykov, whose Department is responsible for all non-proliferation, security and disarmament issues. In preparation for Deputy Foreign Minister Umarov's upcoming visit to Washington, Sadykov requested clarification concerning U.S. positions on non-proliferation issues, specifically Semipalatinsk, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Sadykov provided a non-paper -- transmitted separately via e-mail to SCA/CEN on November 16 -- on Kazakhstan's views on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Sadykov also requested an answer to Kazakhstan's proposal to recognize the participants of the START-1 Treaty for completing their obligations. Sadykov's high-level engagement highlights the importance the MFA attaches to the U.S.-Kazakhstani non-proliferation and security relationship. END SUMMARY. ENSURING PHYSICAL SECURITY AT SEMIPALATINSK ¶3. (S) In preparation for Deputy Foreign Minister Umarov's November 18-20 visit to the United States, Sadykov told PolOff that Umarov would like to discuss trilateral non-proliferation projects, which the United States, Kazakhstan, and Russia currently are undertaking at Semipalatinsk. According to Sadykov, during a telephone conversation between President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Vice President Joe Biden, Nazarbayev proposed a trilateral agreement on work at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS). Emphasizing that Nazarbayev proposed the concept "in order to optimize a mutually-beneficial plan of work," the Director asked the U.S. government to clarify its position on the President's proposal. Sadykov also inquired if the United States believes the current measures at Semipalatinsk are enough to fully guarantee STS' protection. (NOTE: Sadykov confirmed that "protection of the STS," does not refer to remediation, or ecological protection, but rather physical security of the site. END NOTE.) Finally, the Director also asked about U.S. satisfaction with the pace of work at the STS. ¶4. (S) On November 10 and 12, the Ambassador met respectively with Marat Tazhin, State Secretary of the National Security Council, and Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Sauat Mynbayev, to discuss bilateral projects at Semipalatinsk (refs A-B). Since the U.S. and Kazakhstani governments consider information on these projects very sensitive, it was not clear the extent to which Sadykov, and the two assistants who accompanied him to the meeting, are informed on U.S.-Kazakhstani cooperation at Semipalatinsk. KAZAKHSTAN INQUIRES ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION ROADBLOCKS ¶5. (C) Sadykov told PolOff that the government of Kazakhstan views Semipalatinsk in the context of its commitment to maintain a cooperative, bilateral non-proliferation relationship. He requested information from the U.S. government about non-proliferation projects, which require further cooperation from Kazakhstan, in order to brief Umarov before his visit. According to Sadykov, a list of "stumbling blocks" would be sufficient, and he specifically asked about U.S. requests related to the BN-350 spent-fuel transfer and the Central Reference Laboratory. "What are the United States' priorities in relation to non-proliferation projects?" queried Sadykov. ASTANA 00002050 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Sadykov has been running the Foreign Ministry's Multilateral Cooperation Department for over a year. Previously, he served as Kazakhstan's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and Chief of the Foreign Ministry's Americas Desk. As the primary point of contact for all Post's non-proliferation related issues, the Multilateral Cooperation Department plays an important role in policymaking related to non-proliferation issues. Over the last year, under both former Deputy Director of the Multilateral Cooperation Department Sergey Savelyev and current Deputy Director Anvar Baisuanov, the Multilateral Cooperation Department has responded reasonably quickly -- and very cooperatively -- to all U.S. non-proliferation-related requests, including upholding commitments under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835, which aims to prevent Iran's acquisition of new supplies of uranium, and designating additional Iranian entities and individuals under Executive Order 13382 (refs C-F). Sadykov's two assistants, Anvar Tanalinov, Chief of the Security Division, and specialist Azat Makhmudov, who have worked very cooperatively with PolOff on a number of sensitive issues, also participated in the November 13 meeting. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ¶7. (C) In response to PolOff's inquiry about the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),Sadykov responded concisely that Kazakhstan favors strengthening the regime, but declined to elaborate further. (COMMENT: Despite its overall strong cooperation on non-proliferation and Post's repeated requests for more information on Kazakhstan's NPT position, until this meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been reluctant to clearly define its position (ref F-G). It appears Kazakhstan wants to consider the positions taken by other states' at future conferences before it finalizes its policy. END COMMENT.) Sadykov asserted that Kazakhstan would soon provide its views on the NPT, and delivered a non-paper -- transmitted separately via e-mail to SCA/CEN on November 16 -- on Kazakhstan's suggestions for an effective NPT. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME ¶8. (C) Sadykov expressed his government's hope that the United States will support Kazakhstan's candidacy to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Director thanked the U.S. government for financing, through an Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program, the translation into English of some of Kazakhstan's export control-related national legislation. Sadykov asked for U.S. assistance in arranging seminars to identify Kazakhstani products subject to technical control under the MTCR. (NOTE: According to Sadykov, Kazakhstan's lists are similar to those of the European Union. END NOTE.) KAZAKHSTAN ASKS FOR STATEMENT ABOUT COMPLETION OF START-1 ¶9. (C) In relation to the START-1 Treaty, Sadykov asked about the U.S. position on Kazakhstan's proposal, which he discussed with U.S. officials during his last visit to Washington. , Specifically, Kazakhstan has requested that the text of the new agreement, which the United States and Russian Federation are negotiating, recognize the contribution of START-1's five participants, because Kazakhstan has fulfilled all obligations stipulated in the START-1 Treaty. Sadykov told PolOff Kazakhstan had approached the Russian Federation, who "responded positively" to this suggestion. ¶10. (C) Sadykov also inquired about U.S. plans to politically mark START-1's completion -- especially on or before December 5. The Director noted Belarus' suggestion that the Foreign Ministers of all five START-1 participating states issue a joint statement. According to Sadykov, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine "had agreed, in principle, that this could be a good idea." Sadykov asked that the United States inform Kazakhstan of its views on this position, as soon as possible. Sadykov added quietly, "If the United States is not on this team, it would send a negative message." ASTANA 00002050 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) According to Sadykov, the MFA had requested a statement that would affirm that Kazakhstan completed its START-1 obligations, is not a party to the new agreement under negotiation by the United States and Russian Federation, and that no further inspections of any facilities located on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan will occur. Sadykov told PolOff that he had previously received verbal assurances that it should not be a problem for Kazakhstan to receive some kind of statement about Kazakhstan's completion of its START-1 obligations. (COMMENT: When asked Sadykov could not identify the agency or individual who had given him the assurances, but he clearly took it seriously and is expecting a response. END COMMENT.) ¶12. ACTION REQUESTS: Post requests guidance on how to respond to Sadykov about STS issues, specifically, clarifying the U.S. position on Nazarbayev's proposal, current site protection measures, and the pace of work at the STS. In relation to overall cooperation on non-proliferation, Post requests information on which projects require further cooperation from Kazakhstan, and where the projects rank in terms of U.S. priorities. Post also requests guidance on Kazakhstan's request that the text of the new START-1 agreement, which the United States and Russian Federation are negotiating, will recognize the contribution of START-1's five participants. Post requests guidance about whether the U.S. supports Belarus' suggestion that the Foreign Ministers of all five START-1 participating states issue a joint statement marking the agreement's completion. Finally, Post also requests guidance on responding to Kazakhstan's request that the United States make a statement that verifies Kazakhstan completed its START-1 obligations, is not a party to the new agreement under negotiation by the United States and Russian Federation, and that no further inspections of any facilities located on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan will occur. SPRATLEN