Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA1914
2009-10-22 07:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Astana
Cable title:
KAZAKHSTAN: "BIG FRIEND" MEDDLES AGAINST U.S.
VZCZCXRO6784 PP RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHTA #1914/01 2950707 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 220707Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY ASTANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6694 INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 2073 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1444 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1079 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2144 RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFAAA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 1633 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 1493 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2859 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2556
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001914
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/RPM, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM MARR KDEM OSCE RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: "BIG FRIEND" MEDDLES AGAINST U.S.
INTERESTS
REF: A. ASTANA 1899
B. ASTANA 1897
C. ASTANA 1772
D. ASTANA 1512
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001914
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/RPM, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM MARR KDEM OSCE RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: "BIG FRIEND" MEDDLES AGAINST U.S.
INTERESTS
REF: A. ASTANA 1899
B. ASTANA 1897
C. ASTANA 1772
D. ASTANA 1512
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov
suggested on October 21 that disinformation from Russian
intelligence played a role in Yevgeniy Zhovtis' conviction
and prison sentence being upheld. He also said that Russian
intelligence is getting the word to President Nazarbayev that
the United States has a secret deal to establish a new
military base in Uzbekistan. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) At the European Commission reception on October 21 to
celebrate the 15th anniversary of relations with Kazakhstan,
which the visiting OSCE Ambassadors' delegation also
attended, I again pulled aside Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat
Umarov to follow up on my conversation with him the previous
evening (ref A) about the October 20 court decision upholding
the conviction and four-year prison sentence of human rights
advocate Yevgeniy Zhovtis (ref B). I gave Umarov a heads-up
copy of the statement the Embassy subsequently released at
opening of business on October 22 (text in ref B, para
eight). He read it carefully and asked, "Can't you drop the
reference to the government of Kazakhstan?" I replied, "No.
Period."
3. (C) I assured Umarov that I am doing my best to provide
full-spectrum reporting to Washington to help manage this
crisis. Umarov said that he, too, had fully briefed State
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev on our
conversation the night before. Umarov said Saudabayev had
been dismissive at first, but then had turned sober and said
he would inform President Nazarbayev of the "strong U.S.
view."
A DEAL WITH UZBEKISTAN FOR A NEW U.S. MILITARY BASE?
4. (C) Umarov then interrupted our conversation about
Zhovtis to press me to confirm -- "give me your word of
honor" -- that the United States has not reached a secret
agreement with Uzbekistan's President Islom Karimov to
establish a new major U.S. military base at Navoi to replace
Karshi-Khanabad. I asked why he would pose this question
again when I had already authoritatively shot it down with
Saudabayev (ref C). Umarov responded that the "Big Friend"
(i.e., Russia) is pressing this report at every possible
opportunity, saying they have "proof" that SCA Assistant
Secretary Robert Blake had reached a secret agreement with
Karimov during their recent meeting in Tashkent. Umarov said
the "Big Friend" is portraying it as evidence that the United
States cannot be trusted when it comes to Kazakhstan's
national interests.
"BIG FRIEND" LINKS ZHOVTIS TO "COLOR REVOLUTION"?
5. (C) I returned the conversation to the Zhovtis affair,
reminding Umarov that I had trusted Saudabayev who had
advised me to "stand down and be quiet" and that a solution
would be found in the appeal process (ref D). Umarov
confided that it was his understanding that a plan had indeed
been considered, but that "Big Friend," in relation with "the
liaison body" (i.e., Kazakhstan's Committee for National
Security, KNB),had gotten the ear of the president that the
United States wants to remove him from power, and has latched
onto Zhovtis as the way to do so, portraying U.S. interest in
Zhovtis as evidence that the United States is angling to
stage a "color revolution" in Kazakhstan. "They're stronger
than we thought," Umarov lamented. I told him that we,
together, with the other progeressive elements around the
president, must refute these views -- we must continue to be
bedrock honest with each other, focused intently on truth and
ASTANA 00001914 002 OF 002
pragmatic reality.
HOAGLAND
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/RPM, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM MARR KDEM OSCE RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: "BIG FRIEND" MEDDLES AGAINST U.S.
INTERESTS
REF: A. ASTANA 1899
B. ASTANA 1897
C. ASTANA 1772
D. ASTANA 1512
Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov
suggested on October 21 that disinformation from Russian
intelligence played a role in Yevgeniy Zhovtis' conviction
and prison sentence being upheld. He also said that Russian
intelligence is getting the word to President Nazarbayev that
the United States has a secret deal to establish a new
military base in Uzbekistan. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) At the European Commission reception on October 21 to
celebrate the 15th anniversary of relations with Kazakhstan,
which the visiting OSCE Ambassadors' delegation also
attended, I again pulled aside Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat
Umarov to follow up on my conversation with him the previous
evening (ref A) about the October 20 court decision upholding
the conviction and four-year prison sentence of human rights
advocate Yevgeniy Zhovtis (ref B). I gave Umarov a heads-up
copy of the statement the Embassy subsequently released at
opening of business on October 22 (text in ref B, para
eight). He read it carefully and asked, "Can't you drop the
reference to the government of Kazakhstan?" I replied, "No.
Period."
3. (C) I assured Umarov that I am doing my best to provide
full-spectrum reporting to Washington to help manage this
crisis. Umarov said that he, too, had fully briefed State
Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev on our
conversation the night before. Umarov said Saudabayev had
been dismissive at first, but then had turned sober and said
he would inform President Nazarbayev of the "strong U.S.
view."
A DEAL WITH UZBEKISTAN FOR A NEW U.S. MILITARY BASE?
4. (C) Umarov then interrupted our conversation about
Zhovtis to press me to confirm -- "give me your word of
honor" -- that the United States has not reached a secret
agreement with Uzbekistan's President Islom Karimov to
establish a new major U.S. military base at Navoi to replace
Karshi-Khanabad. I asked why he would pose this question
again when I had already authoritatively shot it down with
Saudabayev (ref C). Umarov responded that the "Big Friend"
(i.e., Russia) is pressing this report at every possible
opportunity, saying they have "proof" that SCA Assistant
Secretary Robert Blake had reached a secret agreement with
Karimov during their recent meeting in Tashkent. Umarov said
the "Big Friend" is portraying it as evidence that the United
States cannot be trusted when it comes to Kazakhstan's
national interests.
"BIG FRIEND" LINKS ZHOVTIS TO "COLOR REVOLUTION"?
5. (C) I returned the conversation to the Zhovtis affair,
reminding Umarov that I had trusted Saudabayev who had
advised me to "stand down and be quiet" and that a solution
would be found in the appeal process (ref D). Umarov
confided that it was his understanding that a plan had indeed
been considered, but that "Big Friend," in relation with "the
liaison body" (i.e., Kazakhstan's Committee for National
Security, KNB),had gotten the ear of the president that the
United States wants to remove him from power, and has latched
onto Zhovtis as the way to do so, portraying U.S. interest in
Zhovtis as evidence that the United States is angling to
stage a "color revolution" in Kazakhstan. "They're stronger
than we thought," Umarov lamented. I told him that we,
together, with the other progeressive elements around the
president, must refute these views -- we must continue to be
bedrock honest with each other, focused intently on truth and
ASTANA 00001914 002 OF 002
pragmatic reality.
HOAGLAND