Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA1914
2009-10-22 07:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: "BIG FRIEND" MEDDLES AGAINST U.S.

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PHUM MARR KDEM OSCE RS UZ KZ 
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P 220707Z OCT 09
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2556
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001914 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/RPM, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM MARR KDEM OSCE RS UZ KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: "BIG FRIEND" MEDDLES AGAINST U.S.
INTERESTS

REF: A. ASTANA 1899

B. ASTANA 1897

C. ASTANA 1772

D. ASTANA 1512

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001914 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, EUR/RPM, DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM MARR KDEM OSCE RS UZ KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: "BIG FRIEND" MEDDLES AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS REF: A. ASTANA 1899 ¶B. ASTANA 1897 ¶C. ASTANA 1772 ¶D. ASTANA 1512 Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov suggested on October 21 that disinformation from Russian intelligence played a role in Yevgeniy Zhovtis' conviction and prison sentence being upheld. He also said that Russian intelligence is getting the word to President Nazarbayev that the United States has a secret deal to establish a new military base in Uzbekistan. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) At the European Commission reception on October 21 to celebrate the 15th anniversary of relations with Kazakhstan, which the visiting OSCE Ambassadors' delegation also attended, I again pulled aside Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov to follow up on my conversation with him the previous evening (ref A) about the October 20 court decision upholding the conviction and four-year prison sentence of human rights advocate Yevgeniy Zhovtis (ref B). I gave Umarov a heads-up copy of the statement the Embassy subsequently released at opening of business on October 22 (text in ref B, para eight). He read it carefully and asked, "Can't you drop the reference to the government of Kazakhstan?" I replied, "No. Period." ¶3. (C) I assured Umarov that I am doing my best to provide full-spectrum reporting to Washington to help manage this crisis. Umarov said that he, too, had fully briefed State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev on our conversation the night before. Umarov said Saudabayev had been dismissive at first, but then had turned sober and said he would inform President Nazarbayev of the "strong U.S. view." A DEAL WITH UZBEKISTAN FOR A NEW U.S. MILITARY BASE? ¶4. (C) Umarov then interrupted our conversation about Zhovtis to press me to confirm -- "give me your word of honor" -- that the United States has not reached a secret agreement with Uzbekistan's President Islom Karimov to establish a new major U.S. military base at Navoi to replace Karshi-Khanabad. I asked why he would pose this question again when I had already authoritatively shot it down with Saudabayev (ref C). Umarov responded that the "Big Friend" (i.e., Russia) is pressing this report at every possible opportunity, saying they have "proof" that SCA Assistant Secretary Robert Blake had reached a secret agreement with Karimov during their recent meeting in Tashkent. Umarov said the "Big Friend" is portraying it as evidence that the United States cannot be trusted when it comes to Kazakhstan's national interests. "BIG FRIEND" LINKS ZHOVTIS TO "COLOR REVOLUTION"? ¶5. (C) I returned the conversation to the Zhovtis affair, reminding Umarov that I had trusted Saudabayev who had advised me to "stand down and be quiet" and that a solution would be found in the appeal process (ref D). Umarov confided that it was his understanding that a plan had indeed been considered, but that "Big Friend," in relation with "the liaison body" (i.e., Kazakhstan's Committee for National Security, KNB),had gotten the ear of the president that the United States wants to remove him from power, and has latched onto Zhovtis as the way to do so, portraying U.S. interest in Zhovtis as evidence that the United States is angling to stage a "color revolution" in Kazakhstan. "They're stronger than we thought," Umarov lamented. I told him that we, together, with the other progeressive elements around the president, must refute these views -- we must continue to be bedrock honest with each other, focused intently on truth and ASTANA 00001914 002 OF 002 pragmatic reality. HOAGLAND

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