CURRENT U.S.-KAZAKHSTANI NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ASTANA 001770

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, ISN
NSC FOR MCFAUL, DONNELLY

E.O. 12958: 10/02/2029
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, ECON, MNUC, KNNP, KZ
SUBJECT: CURRENT U.S.-KAZAKHSTANI NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Ref: A) ASTANA 01541
B) ASTANA 00623
C) STATE 76904
D) ASTANA 00521
E) 08 ASTANA 02298
F) 08 ASTANA 02316
G) ASTANA 00254

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: The U.S. government provided about $77 million in
security assistance to Kazakhstan in 2008; more than half -- $44
million -- was allocated under the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Agreement (CTR). Through one of the CTR's key programs, bilateral
teams have eliminated 181 nuclear test tunnels located on the former
Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS),and minimized the threat from the
residue of nuclear activity at Semipalatinsk by increasing security
at specific test-site locations. The United States and Kazakhstan
are working together in other CTR programs to safely store
spent-fuel, and convert reactors from using highly-enriched uranium
to low-enriched uranium. To prevent the proliferation of bio-weapons
materials and expertise, bilateral programs are enhancing
biosecurity, biosafety, and cooperative biological research. Other
security assistance programs, including 1206, Foreign Military
Finance (FMF),and International Military Education and Training
(IMET) programs, also strengthened Kazakhstan's capabilities to
detect and counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
particularly in the Caspian Sea region. Kazakhstan is a full and
supportive partner of the United States on non-proliferation, and the
United States continues to encourage Kazakhstan to strengthen its
ability to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(ref A). END SUMMARY.

THE CORNERSTONE OF THE OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP

2. (SBU) In 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a range of
bilateral implementing agreements, commonly known as the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Agreement (CTR). In December 2007, Ambassador Erlan
Idrissov signed an amended extension of the CTR, which Kazakhstan's
Mazhilis (parliament) ratified on May 13, 2009, and President
Nazarbayev signed into law on June 2. Kazakhstan's Ministry of
Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) remains the major Kazakhstani
implementing agency in partnership with the U.S. Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Department of Energy (DOE). Since
1993, the Department of Defense (DoD),Department of Energy (DOE),
and Department of State (DOS) have spent over $400 million, $164
million and $78 million, respectively, under the CTR.

NUCLEAR TEST TUNNELS ELIMINATED AND TEST-SITE BETTER SECURED

3. (C) After the successful elimination of 181 nuclear test tunnels
located on the former Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS),the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) funded the Weapons of Mass
Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI). Since
2000, U.S and Kazakhstani teams completed five projects to eliminate
or minimize the threat from the residue of nuclear activity (RONA) by
increasing security at specific test site locations selected by the
U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Federation through
bilateral consultations. DTRA provided physical security
enhancements that include warning signs, barriers, unattended ground
sensors (UGS),unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),patrol vehicles, and
other equipment required for Kazakhstan to maintain an adequate
security presence and remote monitoring capability on the STS.
Currently, with the government of Kazakhstan's cooperation, one DTRA
project to provide additional security at STS is running ahead of
schedule (ref A).

DEFENSE ASSISTANCE STRENGTHENS BORDERS -- ESPECIALLY ON THE CASPIAN

4. (C) The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention
Initiative (WMD-PPI) spent over $12 million in 2008 to help
Kazakhstan develop a WMD detection and interdiction capability,
particularly in the Caspian Sea region. While cooperation by the

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Border Guards was good at the working level, senior-level officials,
dominated by the Committee for National Security (KNB),refused to
cooperate, leading the United States to suspend the program. DoD
trained Kazakhstani counterparts on prevention of radiological
proliferation and maritime boarding operations. Counter-terrorism
security assistance through the 1206 program -- $12 million in 2008
-- helped Kazakhstan increase its ability to detect and respond to
terrorist activities on the Caspian Sea through the provision of
vehicles, boats, body armor, a docking facility, night vision and
communications equipment, and training courses.

NEW CONTRACTOR SELECTED TO ASSIST KAZAKHSTAN ON BIO-SECURITY

5. (SBU) Through the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP)
program, the DoD assists Kazakhstan in the prevention of
proliferation of bio-weapons materials and expertise. In terms of
biological weapons infrastructure elimination, DTRA dismantled the
Biomedpreparat Engineering Center anthrax production facility at
Stepnogorsk in 2007. It also undertook projects to enhance
biosecurity and biosafety (BS&S),threat agent detection and response
(TADR),and cooperative biological research.

6. (SBU) The previous integrating contractor for biological threat
reduction programs, Bechtel National Inc. (BNI),demobilized in April
2009 and turned interim sustainment of the program over to Raytheon
Technical Services Corporation (RTSC). On September 28, DTRA awarded
a new contract for analysis of Kazakhstan's existing capabilities to
detect and diagnose disease in order to draft an improvement plan for
future investments. The new contractor will provide expertise in
biosafety regulatory reform to assist Kazakhstan to adapt current
legislation to meet international guidelines, and develop a
sustainable training plan aligned with Kazakhstan's priorities.
Based on progress in this area, DTRA will consider enhancing safety
features at up to 10 additional laboratories. DTRA's new contractor
will also construct a biosafety-level 3 (BSL-3) lab at the Research
Institute for Biological Safety Issues (RIBSI) in Otar, install
biosecurity upgrades at the Kazakhstani Scientific Center for
Quarantine and Zoonotic Disease (KSCQZD) and RIBSI facilities to
enhance security of the EDP repositories, and build a National
Central Reference Laboratory.

KAZAKHSTANI MINISTRIES FAIL TO COORDINATE ON STATE-OF-THE-ART LAB

7. (C) Modeled on a facility in Winnipeg, Canada, the Central
Reference Laboratory (CRL) would preserve a maximum level of security
and efficiency by consolidating most of Kazakhstan's especially
dangerous pathogens into one BSL-3 lab. Kazakhstan's Ministries of
Health, Education and Science, and Agriculture would share it.
Current DoD policy guidance makes construction contingent upon the
issuance of a letter or decree by the government of Kazakhstan that
states the CRL's location, operation, and management. The three
ministries have not yet agreed on these issues. In 2005, the lead
Kazakhstani implementing partner for the CTR Umbrella Agreement, the
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR),designated
"implementing agent" responsibilities for biological threat reduction
projects to the Ministry of Health (MOH). (COMMENT: Although the
Ministry of Health has been increasingly supportive of U.S. programs,
it lacks authority to speak for other ministries. Post recommends
encouraging Kazakhstan to transfer implementing responsibilities to
the cabinet level. Raising the level of oversight for biological
threat reduction programs to this level would increase the efficiency
of dispute resolution among competing ministries. END COMMENT.)

CUSTOMS AND INTERIOR MINISTRY WELCOME ASSISTANCE

8. (SBU) DTRA, in coordination with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security, implements the
International Counter-Proliferation Program (ICP) in Kazakhstan by
providing training to a wide range of Kazakhstani law-enforcement,
security, customs, and border control personnel. The Ministry of the
Interior and Customs participate consistently and enthusiastically in
ICP courses. Kazakhstani WMD experts thanked the United States for
its law-enforcement related non-proliferation assistance, and

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requested more training programs focused on this area (ref B).

9. (C) The Committee for National Security's (KNB) Border Guards
Service, however, refused to participate in ICP and most other
U.S.-sponsored activities. The Border Guards chose not to send
participants to the upcoming October WMD Border Security course in
Bucharest. Post will report on participation, especially by the KNB,
in its upcoming November cyber-crime course in Astana.

REACTOR DECOMMISSIONED, FUEL RETURNED, BORDER STRENGTHENED

10. (C) The DOE's National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA),
with full cooperation from MEMR, decommissioned Kazakhstan's BN-350
fast breeder reactor and is working with Kazakhstan to begin
transportation of its spent fuel from Aktau to a secure, long-term
storage site at the Baikal-1 facility in Semipalatinsk. It
orchestrated the return of nearly 75 kilos of highly enriched uranium
(HEU) to Russia in May, and is converting an experimental reactor at
the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) from HEU to low-enriched
uranium (LEU). The NNSA, working with Customs and the Border Guards,
also installed radiation detectors to enhance security along
Kazakhstan's land, air, and sea borders (ref B).

11. (C) NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) office
provided over $150 million in funding, as well as technical
assistance and oversight, for the complete decommissioning of the
BN-350 reactor. (NOTE: The weapons material currently stored in the
BN-350 reactor includes 30 metric tons of heavy-metal RADIOACTIVE
materials, three metric tons of better-than-weapons-grade plutonium,
and 10 metric tons of HEU, which is sufficient to fabricate 775
weapons of mass destruction. END NOTE.) The government of
Kazakhstan is primarily responsible for the current and final stage
of the strategically-important project -- to move the spent fuel from
Aktau to the Baikal-1 storage facility. The U.S. government
continues (at Kazakhstan's request) to provide funding and technical
assistance on many aspects. On September 9, the Deputy Prime
Minister announced that Kazakhstan had allocated $5 million -- the
minimum amount necessary to fund the initial fuel runs planned for
2009. On September 18, the Prime Minister signed decrees on reserve
funding and equipment transfer, resolving long-standing property
transfer issues. Post continues to urge the government of Kazakhstan
to provide funding for 2010 and complete the project as quickly as
possible.

12. (C) In 2006, DOE and Kazakhstan's Ministry of Finance entered
into an implementing arrangement to enhance Custom's ability to
detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material
across borders. Through the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program,
the DOE is installing equipment at 19 border crossings and conducting
relevant training programs to detect nuclear and radiological
material. The SLD program, which spent $10 million in 2008, also
provided handheld radiation detection equipment and constructed and
equipped a state-of-the-art training center (ref B).

13. (C) In 2008, the Export Control and Related Border Security
(EXBS) Program in Kazakhstan provided $2 million worth of equipment
and training programs -- including inspection/detection devices and a
training program on air cargo interdiction and coast guard safe boat
operations -- to Kazakhstan's Customs and Border Guards (ref B). In
2009, with a budget of $1.5 million, EXBS conducted training
activities on land border interdiction and funded a legal seminar on
export control and counter-proliferation for prosecutors. EXBS
provided equipment, including three portable shelters for the border
guards, four Rapidscan x-ray machines for customs, and computer
equipment for the border-guard training center. Rail interdiction
training is scheduled for November 2009 and delivery of four more
shelters for border guards and five x-ray machines for customs should
be completed by the end of the year.

14. (SBU) In 2008-2009, key EXBS events included a demonstration for
40 Parliamentarians of modernizations completed with U.S.-assistance,
and the hand-over to the Head of the Border Guard service of modular
shelters, designed to strengthen Kazakhstan's long and lightly

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protected green-border. (NOTE: EXBS purchased the shelters from a
Kazakhstani company in Almaty, stimulating Kazakhstan's economic
development and diversification. The media covered the event very
favorably. END NOTE.) The Customs Chairman, a very experienced
official with close ties to President Nazarbayev, is genuinely intent
on the improvement of Kazakhstan's Customs Committee and expressed
interest in a visit to the United States in order to analyze possible
reforms. Due to recent improvements by Kazakhstan's Customs, most of
which were made with U.S. assistance, the World Customs Organization
decided to establish a regional office in Almaty.

15. (SBU) In 2010, with a budget of $1.4 million, EXBS plans to
conduct a legislative review of the Kazakh Export Control Laws,
establish a training program on end-use/end-user responsibilities,
undertake x-ray image analysis training, and support a regional
radiation training center. EXBS will also procure three additional
shelters for the Border Guards and electronic equipment upgrade for
Kazakhstan's first training center for Customs' personnel.

STATE DEPARTMENT WORKSHOPS ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

16. (SBU) In 2006, the Department of State's Nuclear Smuggling
Outreach Initiative negotiated a bilateral communiqu to strengthen
non-proliferation cooperation. The joint action plan includes
priority steps to improve Kazakhstan's capabilities. With input and
cooperation from Kazakhstan, NSOI secured funding commitments from
U.S. government agencies and other international partners, such as
France and Norway, to provide necessary training and equipment.
During a June 2009 review of the communiqu, Kazakhstan's government
reported significant enhancements to its capability to prevent
nuclear smuggling (ref C). Post continues to conduct follow-on
activities, such as facilitating Kazakhstan's continued search for
orphaned nuclear sources, encouraging the Ministry of Health and the
Kazakhstani Atomic Energy Committee to share resources, holding a
legislative drafting workshop, and helping Customs purchase modular
shelters to secure the green border.

17. (SBU) The Prevention of Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP),a
component of the NSOI program, also held a workshop with Kazakhstani
government officials in Astana in February 2009 to exchange
best-practices to prevent nuclear smuggling (ref D). Kazakhstani
participants thanked the United States for bringing together "an
unusually broad spectrum of U.S. and Kazakhstani specialists
including nuclear experts, prosecutors, police, and health
inspectors." Post is working with government of Kazakhstan officials
to facilitate the development of national nuclear forensics
libraries, law-enforcement training programs, national response
planning, and regional workshops.

STATE FUNDS SAFE STORAGE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

18. (SBU) Through the Nuclear Disarmament Fund, the DOS spent $13
million on WMD proliferation threat reduction projects, including the
destruction of fermenters for biological weapons, and completion of
five projects related to the irreversible shutdown of the BN-350
reactor. The United States spent $3.35 million to design and
construct a sodium processing facility to assist Kazakhstan in the
safe disposal of RADIOACTIVE waste. At a ceremony marking completion
of the facility in November 2008, Embassy representatives urged the
government of Kazakhstan to finish the geo-cement stone facility
(refs E-F). Designed with U.S. and UK technical assistance, it is
the last step necessary to safely dispose of all BN-350 materials.

BIOWEAPONS SCIENTISTS

19. (SBU) Since 1994, when Kazakhstan joined the International
Science and Technology Center (ISTC),the United States has provided
funding through this center to support scientists who previously
worked in bio-weapons programs. State Department's Bio-Chem Redirect
Program and Bio-Industry Initiative programs provided initial funding
and opportunities to partner with U.S. institutions and scientists.
Under these programs, Kazakhstan shipped samples of bubonic and
pneumonic plague to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and

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Prevention (CDC). U.S. and Kazakhstani scientists use these samples
to research preventive measures and possible cures for naturally
occurring deadly diseases, which are also potential bioterrorism
agents. Another successful program established an environmental
monitoring laboratory at a former anthrax production facility in
Stepnogorsk. Currently, DOS is funding 13 ISTC projects in
Kazakhstan.

20. (SBU) On August 24-26, the National Institutes of Health
organized a conference in Astana on sustainable development in
biotechnology to help local scientists develop long-term business
plans. Four projects in Stepnogorsk, an underdeveloped city that
once hosted a secret bio-weapons facility, have also created a close
ties between U.S. and Kazakhstani scientists. The projects are
expected to contribute to the creation of a new agricultural feed
product and an anti-cancer drug (ref G).

PROMOTING BIO-SAFETY

21. (SBU) In cooperation with Canada and the United Kingdom, U.S.
specialists assisted Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbors
establish the Biosafety Association for Central Asia and the Caucasus
(BACAC). Experts attended a September 16-17 conference on the safe
handling of biological materials in Astana. The U.S. Centers for
Disease Control, USAID, and the DoD also offered numerous training
opportunities for health specialists and scientists working with
dangerous pathogens, including a June workshop on monitoring during a
radiation emergency.

22. (SBU) COMMENT: Kazakhstani government officials, both at senior
and working levels, remain strongly committed to
counterproliferation. As Post looks forward to the completion of
several long-term projects of critical significance in relation to
efforts to secure nuclear and biological weapons material, Post hopes
to build on our bilateral successes to overcome any potential
administrative and logistical obstacles. PolOff's conversation
during a September 30 reception the Ambassador hosted to celebrate
some of the major milestones in our bilateral non-proliferation
cooperation highlighted both the successes -- and the challenges we
still face. Timur Zhantikin, Director of Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy
Committee -- Kazakhstan's chief authority for issues related to the
security and regulation of nuclear facilities -- told PolOff that his
agency, on behalf of MEMR, signed an agreement with the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. He admitted that his agency currently has
only 24 employees to supervise Kazakhstan's domestic inspections and
interaction with international partners and regulatory bodies, such
as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Despite limited
personnel and financial resources, Kazakhstan has the capability and
the political will to play a leading role in WMD
counter-proliferation in Central Asia. END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND