CURRENT U.S.-KAZAKHSTANI NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ASTANA 001770



SIPDIS



STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, ISN

NSC FOR MCFAUL, DONNELLY



E.O. 12958: 10/02/2029

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PARM, ECON, MNUC, KNNP, KZ

SUBJECT: CURRENT U.S.-KAZAKHSTANI NON-PROLIFERATION PROGRAMS



Ref: A) ASTANA 01541

B) ASTANA 00623

C) STATE 76904

D) ASTANA 00521

E) 08 ASTANA 02298

F) 08 ASTANA 02316

G) ASTANA 00254



Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (b),(d)



1. (C) SUMMARY: The U.S. government provided about $77 million in

security assistance to Kazakhstan in 2008; more than half -- $44

million -- was allocated under the Cooperative Threat Reduction

Agreement (CTR). Through one of the CTR's key programs, bilateral

teams have eliminated 181 nuclear test tunnels located on the former

Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS),and minimized the threat from the

residue of nuclear activity at Semipalatinsk by increasing security

at specific test-site locations. The United States and Kazakhstan

are working together in other CTR programs to safely store

spent-fuel, and convert reactors from using highly-enriched uranium

to low-enriched uranium. To prevent the proliferation of bio-weapons

materials and expertise, bilateral programs are enhancing

biosecurity, biosafety, and cooperative biological research. Other

security assistance programs, including 1206, Foreign Military

Finance (FMF),and International Military Education and Training

(IMET) programs, also strengthened Kazakhstan's capabilities to

detect and counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,

particularly in the Caspian Sea region. Kazakhstan is a full and

supportive partner of the United States on non-proliferation, and the

United States continues to encourage Kazakhstan to strengthen its

ability to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(ref A). END SUMMARY.



THE CORNERSTONE OF THE OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP



2. (SBU) In 1993, the United States and Kazakhstan signed a range of

bilateral implementing agreements, commonly known as the Cooperative

Threat Reduction Agreement (CTR). In December 2007, Ambassador Erlan

Idrissov signed an amended extension of the CTR, which Kazakhstan's

Mazhilis (parliament) ratified on May 13, 2009, and President

Nazarbayev signed into law on June 2. Kazakhstan's Ministry of

Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) remains the major Kazakhstani

implementing agency in partnership with the U.S. Defense Threat

Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the Department of Energy (DOE). Since

1993, the Department of Defense (DoD),Department of Energy (DOE),

and Department of State (DOS) have spent over $400 million, $164

million and $78 million, respectively, under the CTR.



NUCLEAR TEST TUNNELS ELIMINATED AND TEST-SITE BETTER SECURED



3. (C) After the successful elimination of 181 nuclear test tunnels

located on the former Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS),the Defense

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) funded the Weapons of Mass

Destruction-Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMD-PPI). Since

2000, U.S and Kazakhstani teams completed five projects to eliminate

or minimize the threat from the residue of nuclear activity (RONA) by

increasing security at specific test site locations selected by the

U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Federation through

bilateral consultations. DTRA provided physical security

enhancements that include warning signs, barriers, unattended ground

sensors (UGS),unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),patrol vehicles, and

other equipment required for Kazakhstan to maintain an adequate

security presence and remote monitoring capability on the STS.

Currently, with the government of Kazakhstan's cooperation, one DTRA

project to provide additional security at STS is running ahead of

schedule (ref A).



DEFENSE ASSISTANCE STRENGTHENS BORDERS -- ESPECIALLY ON THE CASPIAN



4. (C) The Weapons of Mass Destruction-Proliferation Prevention

Initiative (WMD-PPI) spent over $12 million in 2008 to help

Kazakhstan develop a WMD detection and interdiction capability,

particularly in the Caspian Sea region. While cooperation by the



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Border Guards was good at the working level, senior-level officials,

dominated by the Committee for National Security (KNB),refused to

cooperate, leading the United States to suspend the program. DoD

trained Kazakhstani counterparts on prevention of radiological

proliferation and maritime boarding operations. Counter-terrorism

security assistance through the 1206 program -- $12 million in 2008

-- helped Kazakhstan increase its ability to detect and respond to

terrorist activities on the Caspian Sea through the provision of

vehicles, boats, body armor, a docking facility, night vision and

communications equipment, and training courses.



NEW CONTRACTOR SELECTED TO ASSIST KAZAKHSTAN ON BIO-SECURITY



5. (SBU) Through the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP)

program, the DoD assists Kazakhstan in the prevention of

proliferation of bio-weapons materials and expertise. In terms of

biological weapons infrastructure elimination, DTRA dismantled the

Biomedpreparat Engineering Center anthrax production facility at

Stepnogorsk in 2007. It also undertook projects to enhance

biosecurity and biosafety (BS&S),threat agent detection and response

(TADR),and cooperative biological research.



6. (SBU) The previous integrating contractor for biological threat

reduction programs, Bechtel National Inc. (BNI),demobilized in April

2009 and turned interim sustainment of the program over to Raytheon

Technical Services Corporation (RTSC). On September 28, DTRA awarded

a new contract for analysis of Kazakhstan's existing capabilities to

detect and diagnose disease in order to draft an improvement plan for

future investments. The new contractor will provide expertise in

biosafety regulatory reform to assist Kazakhstan to adapt current

legislation to meet international guidelines, and develop a

sustainable training plan aligned with Kazakhstan's priorities.

Based on progress in this area, DTRA will consider enhancing safety

features at up to 10 additional laboratories. DTRA's new contractor

will also construct a biosafety-level 3 (BSL-3) lab at the Research

Institute for Biological Safety Issues (RIBSI) in Otar, install

biosecurity upgrades at the Kazakhstani Scientific Center for

Quarantine and Zoonotic Disease (KSCQZD) and RIBSI facilities to

enhance security of the EDP repositories, and build a National

Central Reference Laboratory.



KAZAKHSTANI MINISTRIES FAIL TO COORDINATE ON STATE-OF-THE-ART LAB



7. (C) Modeled on a facility in Winnipeg, Canada, the Central

Reference Laboratory (CRL) would preserve a maximum level of security

and efficiency by consolidating most of Kazakhstan's especially

dangerous pathogens into one BSL-3 lab. Kazakhstan's Ministries of

Health, Education and Science, and Agriculture would share it.

Current DoD policy guidance makes construction contingent upon the

issuance of a letter or decree by the government of Kazakhstan that

states the CRL's location, operation, and management. The three

ministries have not yet agreed on these issues. In 2005, the lead

Kazakhstani implementing partner for the CTR Umbrella Agreement, the

Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR),designated

"implementing agent" responsibilities for biological threat reduction

projects to the Ministry of Health (MOH). (COMMENT: Although the

Ministry of Health has been increasingly supportive of U.S. programs,

it lacks authority to speak for other ministries. Post recommends

encouraging Kazakhstan to transfer implementing responsibilities to

the cabinet level. Raising the level of oversight for biological

threat reduction programs to this level would increase the efficiency

of dispute resolution among competing ministries. END COMMENT.)



CUSTOMS AND INTERIOR MINISTRY WELCOME ASSISTANCE



8. (SBU) DTRA, in coordination with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security, implements the

International Counter-Proliferation Program (ICP) in Kazakhstan by

providing training to a wide range of Kazakhstani law-enforcement,

security, customs, and border control personnel. The Ministry of the

Interior and Customs participate consistently and enthusiastically in

ICP courses. Kazakhstani WMD experts thanked the United States for

its law-enforcement related non-proliferation assistance, and



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requested more training programs focused on this area (ref B).



9. (C) The Committee for National Security's (KNB) Border Guards

Service, however, refused to participate in ICP and most other

U.S.-sponsored activities. The Border Guards chose not to send

participants to the upcoming October WMD Border Security course in

Bucharest. Post will report on participation, especially by the KNB,

in its upcoming November cyber-crime course in Astana.



REACTOR DECOMMISSIONED, FUEL RETURNED, BORDER STRENGTHENED



10. (C) The DOE's National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA),

with full cooperation from MEMR, decommissioned Kazakhstan's BN-350

fast breeder reactor and is working with Kazakhstan to begin

transportation of its spent fuel from Aktau to a secure, long-term

storage site at the Baikal-1 facility in Semipalatinsk. It

orchestrated the return of nearly 75 kilos of highly enriched uranium

(HEU) to Russia in May, and is converting an experimental reactor at

the Institute of Nuclear Physics (INP) from HEU to low-enriched

uranium (LEU). The NNSA, working with Customs and the Border Guards,

also installed radiation detectors to enhance security along

Kazakhstan's land, air, and sea borders (ref B).



11. (C) NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) office

provided over $150 million in funding, as well as technical

assistance and oversight, for the complete decommissioning of the

BN-350 reactor. (NOTE: The weapons material currently stored in the

BN-350 reactor includes 30 metric tons of heavy-metal radioactive

materials, three metric tons of better-than-weapons-grade plutonium,

and 10 metric tons of HEU, which is sufficient to fabricate 775

weapons of mass destruction. END NOTE.) The government of

Kazakhstan is primarily responsible for the current and final stage

of the strategically-important project -- to move the spent fuel from

Aktau to the Baikal-1 storage facility. The U.S. government

continues (at Kazakhstan's request) to provide funding and technical

assistance on many aspects. On September 9, the Deputy Prime

Minister announced that Kazakhstan had allocated $5 million -- the

minimum amount necessary to fund the initial fuel runs planned for

2009. On September 18, the Prime Minister signed decrees on reserve

funding and equipment transfer, resolving long-standing property

transfer issues. Post continues to urge the government of Kazakhstan

to provide funding for 2010 and complete the project as quickly as

possible.



12. (C) In 2006, DOE and Kazakhstan's Ministry of Finance entered

into an implementing arrangement to enhance Custom's ability to

detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological material

across borders. Through the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program,

the DOE is installing equipment at 19 border crossings and conducting

relevant training programs to detect nuclear and radiological

material. The SLD program, which spent $10 million in 2008, also

provided handheld radiation detection equipment and constructed and

equipped a state-of-the-art training center (ref B).



13. (C) In 2008, the Export Control and Related Border Security

(EXBS) Program in Kazakhstan provided $2 million worth of equipment

and training programs -- including inspection/detection devices and a

training program on air cargo interdiction and coast guard safe boat

operations -- to Kazakhstan's Customs and Border Guards (ref B). In

2009, with a budget of $1.5 million, EXBS conducted training

activities on land border interdiction and funded a legal seminar on

export control and counter-proliferation for prosecutors. EXBS

provided equipment, including three portable shelters for the border

guards, four Rapidscan x-ray machines for customs, and computer

equipment for the border-guard training center. Rail interdiction

training is scheduled for November 2009 and delivery of four more

shelters for border guards and five x-ray machines for customs should

be completed by the end of the year.



14. (SBU) In 2008-2009, key EXBS events included a demonstration for

40 Parliamentarians of modernizations completed with U.S.-assistance,

and the hand-over to the Head of the Border Guard service of modular

shelters, designed to strengthen Kazakhstan's long and lightly



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protected green-border. (NOTE: EXBS purchased the shelters from a

Kazakhstani company in Almaty, stimulating Kazakhstan's economic

development and diversification. The media covered the event very

favorably. END NOTE.) The Customs Chairman, a very experienced

official with close ties to President Nazarbayev, is genuinely intent

on the improvement of Kazakhstan's Customs Committee and expressed

interest in a visit to the United States in order to analyze possible

reforms. Due to recent improvements by Kazakhstan's Customs, most of

which were made with U.S. assistance, the World Customs Organization

decided to establish a regional office in Almaty.



15. (SBU) In 2010, with a budget of $1.4 million, EXBS plans to

conduct a legislative review of the Kazakh Export Control Laws,

establish a training program on end-use/end-user responsibilities,

undertake x-ray image analysis training, and support a regional

radiation training center. EXBS will also procure three additional

shelters for the Border Guards and electronic equipment upgrade for

Kazakhstan's first training center for Customs' personnel.



STATE DEPARTMENT WORKSHOPS ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM



16. (SBU) In 2006, the Department of State's Nuclear Smuggling

Outreach Initiative negotiated a bilateral communiqu to strengthen

non-proliferation cooperation. The joint action plan includes

priority steps to improve Kazakhstan's capabilities. With input and

cooperation from Kazakhstan, NSOI secured funding commitments from

U.S. government agencies and other international partners, such as

France and Norway, to provide necessary training and equipment.

During a June 2009 review of the communiqu, Kazakhstan's government

reported significant enhancements to its capability to prevent

nuclear smuggling (ref C). Post continues to conduct follow-on

activities, such as facilitating Kazakhstan's continued search for

orphaned nuclear sources, encouraging the Ministry of Health and the

Kazakhstani Atomic Energy Committee to share resources, holding a

legislative drafting workshop, and helping Customs purchase modular

shelters to secure the green border.



17. (SBU) The Prevention of Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP),a

component of the NSOI program, also held a workshop with Kazakhstani

government officials in Astana in February 2009 to exchange

best-practices to prevent nuclear smuggling (ref D). Kazakhstani

participants thanked the United States for bringing together "an

unusually broad spectrum of U.S. and Kazakhstani specialists

including nuclear experts, prosecutors, police, and health

inspectors." Post is working with government of Kazakhstan officials

to facilitate the development of national nuclear forensics

libraries, law-enforcement training programs, national response

planning, and regional workshops.



STATE FUNDS SAFE STORAGE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE



18. (SBU) Through the Nuclear Disarmament Fund, the DOS spent $13

million on WMD proliferation threat reduction projects, including the

destruction of fermenters for biological weapons, and completion of

five projects related to the irreversible shutdown of the BN-350

reactor. The United States spent $3.35 million to design and

construct a sodium processing facility to assist Kazakhstan in the

safe disposal of radioactive waste. At a ceremony marking completion

of the facility in November 2008, Embassy representatives urged the

government of Kazakhstan to finish the geo-cement stone facility

(refs E-F). Designed with U.S. and UK technical assistance, it is

the last step necessary to safely dispose of all BN-350 materials.



BIOWEAPONS SCIENTISTS



19. (SBU) Since 1994, when Kazakhstan joined the International

Science and Technology Center (ISTC),the United States has provided

funding through this center to support scientists who previously

worked in bio-weapons programs. State Department's Bio-Chem Redirect

Program and Bio-Industry Initiative programs provided initial funding

and opportunities to partner with U.S. institutions and scientists.

Under these programs, Kazakhstan shipped samples of bubonic and

pneumonic plague to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and



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Prevention (CDC). U.S. and Kazakhstani scientists use these samples

to research preventive measures and possible cures for naturally

occurring deadly diseases, which are also potential bioterrorism

agents. Another successful program established an environmental

monitoring laboratory at a former anthrax production facility in

Stepnogorsk. Currently, DOS is funding 13 ISTC projects in

Kazakhstan.



20. (SBU) On August 24-26, the National Institutes of Health

organized a conference in Astana on sustainable development in

biotechnology to help local scientists develop long-term business

plans. Four projects in Stepnogorsk, an underdeveloped city that

once hosted a secret bio-weapons facility, have also created a close

ties between U.S. and Kazakhstani scientists. The projects are

expected to contribute to the creation of a new agricultural feed

product and an anti-cancer drug (ref G).



PROMOTING BIO-SAFETY



21. (SBU) In cooperation with Canada and the United Kingdom, U.S.

specialists assisted Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbors

establish the Biosafety Association for Central Asia and the Caucasus

(BACAC). Experts attended a September 16-17 conference on the safe

handling of biological materials in Astana. The U.S. Centers for

Disease Control, USAID, and the DoD also offered numerous training

opportunities for health specialists and scientists working with

dangerous pathogens, including a June workshop on monitoring during a

radiation emergency.



22. (SBU) COMMENT: Kazakhstani government officials, both at senior

and working levels, remain strongly committed to

counterproliferation. As Post looks forward to the completion of

several long-term projects of critical significance in relation to

efforts to secure nuclear and biological weapons material, Post hopes

to build on our bilateral successes to overcome any potential

administrative and logistical obstacles. PolOff's conversation

during a September 30 reception the Ambassador hosted to celebrate

some of the major milestones in our bilateral non-proliferation

cooperation highlighted both the successes -- and the challenges we

still face. Timur Zhantikin, Director of Kazakhstan's Atomic Energy

Committee -- Kazakhstan's chief authority for issues related to the

security and regulation of nuclear facilities -- told PolOff that his

agency, on behalf of MEMR, signed an agreement with the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission. He admitted that his agency currently has

only 24 employees to supervise Kazakhstan's domestic inspections and

interaction with international partners and regulatory bodies, such

as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Despite limited

personnel and financial resources, Kazakhstan has the capability and

the political will to play a leading role in WMD

counter-proliferation in Central Asia. END COMMENT.



HOAGLAND