Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA1518
2009-09-13 03:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESSES HIGH-LEVEL

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PHUM KNNP KISL OSCE RS KZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001518 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, P, S/P, SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, INS, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM KNNP KISL OSCE RS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESSES HIGH-LEVEL
BILAT ENGAGEMENT, PROPOSES OSCE SUMMIT; MORE ON ZHOVTIS

REF: A. ASTANA 1512

B. SECSTATE 94449

C. ASTANA 1513

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001518 SIPDIS STATE FOR D, P, S/P, SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, INS, DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM KNNP KISL OSCE RS KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESSES HIGH-LEVEL BILAT ENGAGEMENT, PROPOSES OSCE SUMMIT; MORE ON ZHOVTIS REF: A. ASTANA 1512 ¶B. SECSTATE 94449 ¶C. ASTANA 1513 Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In recent days, Kazakhstan has proposed an OSCE Summit in 2010 to be co-chaired by Kazakhstan and the United States, repeated its desire to establish a Joint Presidential Commission, and renewed its effort for an Obama-Nazarbayev meeting at the general time of the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit. Astana has also requested follow-up to the U.S. offer to be transparent about our negotiations with Russia for a START follow-on. As always, Kazakhstan wants balance in its big-power relations, and it seems to be looking to the United States to help recalibrate that balance -- with all that could imply for our own long-term interests. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During the Ambassador's meeting on September 10 with State Secretary-Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev to discuss the Yevgeniy Zhovtis case (ref A),Saudabayev said he keenly looks forward to meeting with Secretary Clinton on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in September, and asked for guidance on topics of discussion so that he can be thoroughly prepared for a "warmest and most productive" meeting. The Ambassador cautioned that the meeting is not yet confirmed, but undertook to pass Saudabayev's request to Washington. NEW DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ¶3. (SBU) To follow up on the meeting with Saudabayev, on September 11, the Ambassador met with Deputy Foreign Minister Kairat Umarov, who had just officially been appointed that day. Saudabayev called Umarov back from his five-year assignment as Ambassador to India to fill a vacant Deputy Minister position and take the Americas portfolio, which Deputy Foreign Minister Konstantin Zhigalov had previously handled. Umarov is now, in our terms, the Assistant Secretary for the Americas, principally the United States, and secondarily Canada and Brazil, among others. Zhigalov is now responsible for the European Union, NATO, and the OSCE, even though there is a separate Foreign Ministry OSCE coordinator. ¶4. (SBU) Before he was Ambassador to India, Umarov had served as Saudabayev's DCM in Washington, and he and the &#x
000A;Ambassador had had a warm and productive relationship, 2001-2003, when the Ambassador was the then-Director of the Office of Caucasus and Central Asian Affairs in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. Umarov speaks excellent English, is worldly, relaxed, and has an easy-going sense of humor. PRESIDENTIAL JOINT COMMISSION ¶5. (C) Umarov offered three initiatives that he said Saudabayev and President Nazarbayev have identified as highest priority to "jump-start" the U.S.-Kazakhstan relationship. First, Umarov pressed for a revival of the President-Clinton-era "Presidential Joint Commission." (NOTE: In fact, it was the VP Gore-Nazarbayev Commission, but Kazakhstan is keenly aware of the new U.S.-Russia Presidential Commission headed by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov. Kazakhstan makes muted noises about this, but does not seem overly demanding at this time, although they make it clear they are not pleased to be lumped with the other four Central Asian states. END NOTE.) Umarov said that, of course, Kazakhstan is prepared to implement the Annual Bilateral Consultations that the United States has ASTANA 00001518 002 OF 003 proposed, and is still waiting for further information, but argued forcefully that only presidential commissions can jump-start "sluggish and recalcitrant bureaucracies; only heads of state can make things happen. And that can only happen if they meet at least annually." OSCE SUMMIT ¶6. (C) Second, Umarov said Kazakhstan wants to organize an OSCE Summit during its 2010 chairmanship. He said, "We are capable of doing so. We will commit all of our best resources to make it fully international-standard and totally successful." Umarov said the summit could be "anywhere in the world -- the venue is much less important to us than that it happen. This is high priority for us." Umarov suggested that the topic of the summit should be something of core interest to the OSCE but non-controversial. Ideally, it should focus on the OSCE's Human Dimension. Kazakhstan will be "very flexible on the topic," but suggests that "tolerance" would be within the fundamental mainstream of the OSCE's Human Dimension. In fact, Umarov said, Kazakhstan would be "very keen to build on President Obama's historic message to the Muslim world that he delivered in Cairo. As a secular, Muslim-majority state, we keenly want to help advance President Obama's Muslim-world agenda." Umarov pointed out that a summit on Muslim tolerance would be especially timely, since Kazakhstan will be the 2011 Chairman of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and could, thus, carry through its 2010 OSCE focus into its 2011 OIC Chairmanship. Umarov proposed that Presidents Obama and Nazarbayev jointly call and co-chair a Muslim-tolerance OSCE Summit. ¶7. (C) As an alternative, Umarov said, Kazakhstan would be willing to consider an OSCE Summit in the Security Dimension to support President Obama's vision for nuclear security. "It's your choice," he said. "Anything is possible. We want to be your fullest partner." NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT ¶8. (C) As Saudabayev has done previously, Umarov pressed again for Nazarbayev to have a bilateral Washington day that would include an Oval Office meeting, either a few days before or a few days after the Nuclear Security Summit next April (ref B). Umarov said candidly, "This would open many doors in the bilateral relationship. We are prepared to do what it takes. The only thing is that we must start working on this soon, if we both are to make it fully productive." Alluding to the Russia-Kazakhstan relationship, Umarov said, "We know your leadership doesn't pick up the phone and chat -- or try to give instructions (as does Russia's leadership) -- every few weeks. We understand President Obama has global concerns and global responsibilities, not just in Central Asia. But I want to emphasize we are prepared to be fully helpful to you." OSCE POINT-PERSON, FOLLOW-ON START TREATY BRIEFING ¶9. (C) During a reception on September 9 that the DCM hosted to introduce the new PolEcon Chief, MFA Americas Director Askar Tazhiyev and the Ambassador had a 20-minute pull-aside. Among the many issues they discussed, two were most important. Tazhiyev said the Foreign Ministry wants a designated point-person in the State Department for informal but regular contact on Kazakhstan's 2010 OSCE leadership, and they want this established soonest in the run-up to their chairmanship (ref C) "because only months remain." ¶10. (C) Tazhiyev said that Kazakhstan had warmly welcomed the U.S. offer Under Secretary Burns had made to President ASTANA 00001518 003 OF 003 Nazarbayev, at Nazarbayev's request, to be transparent about its negotiations with Russia for a START follow-on agreement. But, so far, Tazhiyev said, they have heard nothing from us. As a heritage party to the original treaty, Kazakhstan understands it can now only be an on-looker, but would very much appreciate an interim update, if not a blow-by-blow account of the negotiations. To be specific, Tazhiyev said, Kazakhstan would warmly welcome a visit by an appropriate official to brief on the status of the negotiations. At a minimum, Kazakhstan requests a non-paper on the goals and status of the negotiations. He said, "Moscow is telling us nothing, despite our requests, and we are looking to you. Please don't forget that we are your historic partner to promote the global non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." MESSAGE ON THE ZHOVTIS CASE ¶11. (C) During the September 11 meeting, Umarov reiterated Saudabayev's private message to the Ambassador (ref A) on the Zhovtis case "to make sure you understand." He said, echoing Saudabayev's words, "Both sides have scored points. Go to silence now -- no more public statements. Let the legal process work to a proper conclusion." ¶12. (C) The Ambassador said he has heard this message clearly and has reported it to Washington, even though it remains somewhat ambiguous. He asked that Umarov pass to Saudabayev his personal view that the best outcome of the Zhovtis appeals process would be an exoneration because Zhovtis had already paid compensation to the victim's family, and the family had declined to press charges against Zhovtis. The Ambassador emphasized that a real effort must be made to undo the significant damage this case has inflicted. Umarov said he understood and would pass the Ambassador's message to Saudabayev. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: Should Saudabayev meet with the Secretary during UNGA, he will likely press the Presidential Joint Commission, the OSCE Summit, and an Obama-Nazarbayev meeting during the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010. We note the increasing number of proposals the Government of Kazakhstan seems to be offering for bilateral cooperation -- and they started long before the Zhovtis case. Some might say this is only Nazarbayev trying to pad himself for any number of reasons -- including the on-going Giffin trial in the Southern District Court of New York -- with protective layers vis-a-vis the United States. While there might be some truth in that, a pragmatist like the wily Nazarbayev would not lean so far forward, if he were not willing to deliver to at least some degree. We know that Russia has a full-court press on Kazakhstan in any number of areas to advance its "special sphere of influence." We know, as Prime Minister Masimov has told us, that Kazakhstan has real concerns that China wants to buy the place up economically. As always, Kazakhstan wants balance in its big-power relations, and it seems to be looking to the United States to recalibrate that balance -- with all that could imply for our own long-term interests. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND

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