KAZAKHSTAN: KEEPING PERSPECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001513

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, P, S/P, ISN, SCA/FO, SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS, DRL
NSC FOR MCFAUL, DONNELLY
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KNNP OSCE AF RS KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: KEEPING PERSPECTIVE

REF: A. ASTANA 1512

B. ASTANA1494

C. ASTANA 1487

D. ASTANA 1470

E. ASTANA 1429

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (C) With the Yevgeniy Zhovtis case -- Zhovtis is the
internationally renowned human rights advocate whose most
unfortunate auto accident some in the government of
Kazakhstan appear to be exploiting -- we can all agree that
Kazakhstan has stepped on its tail in a most appalling and
old-guard KGB way. No one disputes that. But I would urge
that we keep our eye fixed on our long-term national
interests (reftel E).


2. (S) President Nursultan Nazarbayev is authoritarian, even
if generally progressive. He is a product of his traditional
culture, and apparently has been led to believe Zhovtis
overtly challenged his position as "pater familias" of the
nation of Kazakhstan by "seeking protection by the Western
critics of Kazakhstan" after his auto accident. The
Committee for National Security (KNB, ex-KGB) and other
Soviet-era dinosaurs, always looking for a way to turn
Nazarbayev away from the West, appear to have seized on
Zhovtis' auto accident as a godsend.


3. (S) I am working hard and urgently at very high levels
here in Kazakhstan to communicate Washington's universally
sharp displeasure with this disappointing turn of events
about Zhovtis, and to make clear the need for the highest
level of Kazakhstan's leadership to take specific, concrete
steps to mitigate the very real damage that has occurred. I
will tell you honestly that I cannot predict with confidence
at this time if they will "do the right thing," even though I
have laid out what needs to be done. After a a one-on-one on
September 10 with State Secretary and Foreign Minister Kanat
Saudabayev (reftel A),I am guardedly optimistic that this
case might eventually play out in a positive way.

OUR LONG-TERM NATIONAL INTERESTS (REF E)


4. (S) While some argue that Uzbekistan is key to
USTRANSCOM's Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to supply
U.S. and International Security Assistance Force troops in
Afghanistan -- and I fully agree -- the NDN cannot succeed
without Kazakhstan (the geographic size of all of Western
Europe),which straddles the land, sea, and air routes
between Russia and Afghanistan. Kazakhstan -- meaning
President Nazarbayev -- is leaning forward to do more with us
for Afghanistan, but wants to hear from us what we want.
Nazarbayev's ill-defined offer to host for us a "logistics
base," as he called it, is clearly a new opening and requires
that we respond as quickly as possible.


5. (S) We have enormously important, and critically
sensitive, non-proliferation of weapons-of-mass-destruction
initiatives under way in Kazakhstan. We now believe -- after
much persistent urging -- that we have begun to breach the
bureaucratic dams that were preventing significant forward
movement on these highly sensitive initiatives, including
achieving the various Government of Kazakhstan decrees for
VAT exemptions and to fund the transport for proper and safe
disposal of enough highly-enriched uranium/plutonium to make
hundreds of nuclear weapons. President Nazarbayev, for all
his considerable flaws, sees himself as one of the
fundamental U.S. partners in President Obama's historic goal
to achieve global nuclear security.


6. (C) With Kazakhstan about to assume the OSCE chairmanship
for 2010 -- with Russia breathing hard and hot down

ASTANA 00001513 002 OF 002


Kazakhstan's neck, especially to call for a new European
Security Treaty -- we have an historic opportunity to work
successfully with a key post-Soviet state. When former
Foreign Minister Marat Tazhin met with Secretary Clinton in
Washington on May 5, he said explicitly President Nazarbayev
wants the equivalent of a "hot line" to coordinate U.S. and
Kazakhstani views on OSCE. That might have been lost in the
normal flow of memcons, but a senior member of Kazakhstan's
foreign ministry reminded me of this "unfulfilled
understanding" on September 10. Of course, we will not
establish a physical "hot line," but I would recommend that
we designate a specific, DAS-level point-person for this
purpose. The positive will for closest cooperation on OSCE
exists in Astana. We need to respond to it -- and fully
exploit it to our advantage.


7. (C) And then there's Russia. Even if President Obama --
through hard-eyed pragmatism -- has achieved the best
U.S.-Russia relationship in nearly a decade, Russia is still
Putin's Russia. Nazarbayev has historically good relations
with Putin and, now, Medvedev; however, he does not slavishly
agree to everything Moscow asks. A strong U.S. relationship
with Kazakhstan, with Nazarbayev, would complement our reset
with Russia, and could prove useful from time to time.


8. (C) I want to suggest, based on my 16 years of experience
in Central Asia, that we keep our eye fixed on our long-term
national interests and national security goals. As Secretary
Clinton so eloquently said during her Senate Foreign
Relations Committee confirmation hearing, "President Obama
and I believe that foreign policy must be based on a marriage
of principles and pragmatism, not rigid ideology, on facts
and evidence, not emotion or prejudice." It seems to me,
here on the other side of the world managing the
U.S.-Kazakhstan bilateral relationship, to be a time for
pragmatism.
HOAGLAND