Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA1487
2009-09-08 06:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Astana
Cable title:  

KAZAKHSTAN: OSCE AMBASSADOR BELIEVES KNB TOOK CONTROL OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR PHUM OSCE KZ 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001487 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: OSCE AMBASSADOR BELIEVES KNB TOOK CONTROL OF
THE ZHOVTIS CASE

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001487

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RPM, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM OSCE KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: OSCE AMBASSADOR BELIEVES KNB TOOK CONTROL OF
THE ZHOVTIS CASE

Classified By: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland: 1.4 (B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a September 4 meeting, the head of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Center,
Ambassador Alexandr Keltchewsky, told the Ambassador Kazakhstan has
taken some positive steps in its preparations to become the 2010 OSCE
Chairman-in-Office. He added, however, that since February,
Kazakhstani authorities violated the OSCE's principles by passing the
Law on the Internet and conducting trials not in complete accordance
with the legal code. According to Keltchewsky, the OSCE cannot
tolerate egregious violations of its principles, such as the Zhovtis
case. He said the OSCE Astana Center has hired a lawyer to review
Zhovtis' trial, and will comment after completing a review of the
proceedings. Keltchewsky expressed hope that during Zhovtis' appeal,
the authorities would give him a fair trial, as they would any
ordinary citizen.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The important point that emerged from
this meeting is that Kazakhstan seems to think it will have a "more
successful" OSCE Chairmanship if it silences domestic critics in
advance. It is possible that the Committee for National Security
(KNB) saw Zhovtis' unfortunate auto accident as a target of
opportunity. This is unacceptable, and we will make that point clear
to senior officials in Astana. END SUMMARY.

HEAD OF OSCE CENTER PRAISES KAZAKHSTAN MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS
COMMITMENTS


3. (C) The Ambassador met with the head of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Center, Ambassador
Keltchewsky, to discuss his views on Kazakhstan's preparations for
the OSCE Chairmanship, and the criminal case against the
internationally respected human-rights advocate, Yevgeniy Zhovtis.
Keltchewsky said Kazakhstan has taken a number of positive steps
toward the OSCE's objective of meaningful, long-term reform.
According to Keltchewsky, Kazakhstan's most significant actions
include passing the Madrid Commitments legislation, and creating "the

Path to Europe" document that clearly spells out Kazakhstan's
commitment to pursuing European values. Keltchewsky also emphasized
other positive developments, "especially in comparison to the
situation in other Central Asian countries," such as the existence of
a vibrant civil society, and relatively free press. "The picture of
reform in Kazakhstan is not bleak," Keltchewsky averred. Kazakhstan
has created an "open space" for dialogue, in which a strong (albeit
not always public) debate is taking place. Keltchewsky also
emphasized that Kazakhstan has progressive, reform-seeking leaders in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),the Presidential
Administration and Parliament, who consider the views of civil
society and the international community in policymaking.


4. (C) Despite Kazakhstan's positive steps, however, Keltchewsky
noted a troubling trend. He argued that, since February, Kazakhstan
has violated OSCE principles by initiating several
politically-motivated legal cases, like former BTA bank Chairman
Mukhtan Ablyazov and journalist Ramazan Yesergepov, and now against
Zhovtis. Keltchewsky admitted that Ablyazov allegedly committed
criminal acts, and that Yesergepov might have been paid to publish
secret material, which undermines his credibility. Nevertheless,
Keltchewsky said, it is unacceptable for the authorities to violate
Kazakhstan's legal code, as they appear to have done in the Zhovtis
case.

IS PUBLIC OPINION A FOREIGN CONCEPT FOR KAZAKHSTAN?


5. (C) Keltchewsky noted that a fundamental problem leading up to
the Zhovtis case has been a tension between the old guard and
elements in the government of Kazakhstan who understand and respond
to public opinion, civil society, and the views of the international
community. Keltchewsky also highlighted the difference between
President Nazarbayev's decision to send the Law on Freedom of
Religious Freedom to the Constitutional Council (a victory for civil
society and the international community) and Nazarbayev's decision to
approve the Law on the Internet. Keltchewsky said he was not

ASTANA 00001487 002 OF 003


surprised, considering that most people believe the Internet law was
designed, however ineffective it will be, to prevent Nazarbayev's
exiled ex-son-in-law Rakhat Aliyev from distributing negative
information about Nazarbayev via the internet in Kazakhstan.
According to Keltchewsky, the string of politically-motivated cases
since February, most of which involve the Committee for National
Security (KNB),demonstrates that "the KNB and others in the old
guard, do not consider reactions from the international community."

THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK?


6. (C) Keltchewsky told the Ambassador that Zhovtis' case is
particularly important because "it is not acceptable for a country
that will chair the OSCE to allow flagrant violations of law."
Keltchewsky, who has a close relationship with Zhovtis, passed to the
Ambassador a document that describes in detail his August 14 meeting
with Zhovtis. Zhovtis expressed concern over a trend in restrictions
on the rights of defense lawyers and their clients in a number of
sensitive cases. Zhovtis said the trend is linked, in his view,
with the increasing influence of the conservatives versus the
reformists. Zhovtis also told Keltchewsky that the Kazakhstani
political and business "diaspora" are preparing a strong September
"publicity attack" in the West, particularly in London and
Washington. By "diaspora," he meant primarily the London-based
exiles -- former BTA Bank Chairman Ablyazov and former Prime Minister
Kazhygeldin.

ZHOVTIS BELIEVES HE WAS WARNED


7. (C) During their August 14 meeting, Zhovtis told Keltchewsky that
the KNB had reportedly been instructed to find compromising material
on himself and his associates prior to and during Kazakhstan's
Chairmanship, which could lead to travel restrictions. According to
Zhovtis, Ambassador Abdrakhmanov, Head of the Kazakhstani Delegation
to the OSCE in Vienna, had asked him about the NGO community's
approach in the run-up to the OSCE Chairmanship, and Zhovtis replied
that he planned "not to tolerate" any violations of OSCE commitments.
About his July 26 accident, Zhovtis told Keltchewsky that before he
was declared a suspect the police "worked professionally on the
accident case, but the KNB and the prosecutor's office were
pressuring the victim's family to testify against him." On August
15, a preliminary investigation concluded Zhovtis could have
prevented the accident, and on August 17, the Ministry of the
Interior declared Zhovtis a suspect.

AN ORDINARY CITIZEN?


8. (C) After the OSCE Center in Astana published an August 18 spot
report about Zhovtis' accident, Keltchewsky said Abdrakhmanov asked,
"Why are you commenting on a normal case involving an ordinary
Kazakhstani citizen?" Keltchewsky said he explained that the OSCE
published a report only after Zhovtis was named a suspect. "It was
clear that strange games were being played in Zhovtis' case,"
Keltchewsky told the Ambassador. Keltchewsky said there were clear
breaches of the law in Zhovtis' trial. Keltchewsky thanked Post for
sending its Political Assistant to observe the trial, and said the
OSCE has hired a Kazakhstani law firm to review the proceedings.
Keltchewsky told the Ambassador that his OSCE Center will release the
report and observe monitor how Kazakhstan's civil society reacts
before it comments. "The OSCE cannot shape or reform Kazakhstan;
Kazakhstan must shape itself, although we are willing to provide
assistance," asserted Keltchewsky. Similarly, Keltchewsky said the
OSCE plans to defer to its member states to provide initial
commentary on the case, although Keltchewsky welcomed initiatives to
present "a united front" on this important issue. Keltchewsky said
he expressed hope that during Zhovtis' appeal, the authorities would
give him a fair trial and treat him "as an ordinary citizen."
Keltchewsky said it was virtually certain that Zhovtis' Human Rights
Bureau would be awarded a prize for its work in France in November,
and said, "maybe this is a game we can play? We can help by making
Zhovtis -- and his organization -- as prominent and as popular as
possible."


ASTANA 00001487 003 OF 003


CONSERVATIVES VS. REFORMERS


9. (C) Keltchewsky acknowledged the need to "manage the fall-out"
from the Zhovtis case, and continue to move forward by seeking real
solutions. Keltchewsky asked the Ambassador about the U.S. views on
how much influence the conservatives have versus the reformers, and,
if the case reaches Nazarbayev, how he would likely resolve it. The
Ambassador told Keltchewsky he plans to provide senior officials, as
soon as he can get appointments, with a frank, even blunt,
assessment. Keltchewsky concluded that "in Kazakhstan, my own
personal assessment is that the President will not act under
pressure, but he also will not act without it."


10. (C) COMMENT: Keltchewsky, whose views largely coincide with
ours, is a senior French diplomat of White Russian extraction. The
important point that emerged from this meeting is that Kazakhstan
seems to think it will have a "more successful" OSCE Chairmanship if
it silences domestic critics in advance. It would seem the KNB saw
Zhovtis' unfortunate auto accident as a target of opportunity. This
is unacceptable, and we will make that point clearly at the first
opportunity to Foreign Minister Saudabayev and Presidential Foreign
Policy Adviser Sarybai. END COMMENT.

HOAGLAND