Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASTANA1035
2009-06-17 10:54:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Astana
Cable title:
KAZAKHSTAN: DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001035
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EEB
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PINR ECON EPET EINV ELAB SMIG CH KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA
REF: (A) ASTANA 0678
(B) ASTANA 0982
ASTANA 00001035 001.3 OF 003
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ASTANA 001035
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EEB
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PINR ECON EPET EINV ELAB SMIG CH KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA
REF: (A) ASTANA 0678
(B) ASTANA 0982
ASTANA 00001035 001.3 OF 003
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 11, Energy Officer met separately with a Western manager from the U.S. oil services company Baker Hughes and an American partner with the consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, both of whom shared experiences and insights about doing business with Chinese companies in Kazakhstan. In particular, they noted that once Chinese companies sign a contract, they "close the circle," bring in their own personnel and equipment -- often illegally -- and control the project tightly, under close supervision from Beijing. A Chinese Embassy official confirmed
China's strategic interest in Kazakhstan's energy resources and
acknowledged that Chinese companies sometimes violate Kazakhstan's immigration and customs laws. END SUMMARY.
MAKING PROMISES THEY CANNOT KEEP
3. (SBU) On June 11, Energy Officer met with XXXXXXXXXXXX
(protect throughout),Caspian Sales Manager for Baker Hughes.
XXXXXXXXXXXX. He said that Baker Hughes currently employs Chinese nationals in Kazakhstan and has oil services contracts with AktobeMunaiGas, in which China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has an 85 percent stake, and PetroKazakhstan, in which CNPC owns 67 percent. XXXXXXXXXXXXsaid that American companies bidding against Chinese companies are
often at a disadvantage, because "the Chinese companies make
promises they know they cannot keep. They make these impossible
commitments on time and cost that they admit in private they will
not be able to meet. But that's what goes in the bid, and they win
the work."
CHINA'S INTEGRATED ENERGY STRATEGY
4. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he understands the logic behind CNPC's acquisition of 50 percent of MangistauMunaiGas (MMG, reftel A),its construction of oil and gas pipelines to China, its ownership of the Shymkent oil refinery, and its plans to build a new oil refinery in
eastern Kazakhstan. "They are building an integrated production,
processing, and delivery system. And for China, Kazakhstan has the
cheapest oil in the world. It's close and it's convenient. This is
a very strategic move on their part," he said. XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that China will increase its oil imports from Kazakhstan by 40 percent over the next three to five years and will begin to sell
refined oil products to Kazakhstan in the near future. He said that
CNPC is immune from rising oil prices because they own a diverse
portfolio of upstream and downstream assets around the world and can balance and swap reserves as necessary. "CNPC is in a position now where they can manipulate the market," XXXXXXXXXXXX said. (NOTE: Even with CNPC's recent acquisition of MMG, China controls no more than 18 percent of Kazakhstan's current oil production. U.S. companies Chevron and ExxonMobil combined to produce approximately 22 percent of Kazakhstan's oil in 2008. END NOTE).
DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINESE COMPANIES
5. (SBU) When asked to describe how the Chinese operate in
Kazakhstan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that they typically buy a medium-sized oil field, something productive and valuable, but "under the radar." According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the Chinese then bring in their own workers, their own suppliers, and their own equipment. They do not hire very many local staff or subcontractors and show no interest in developing the professional skills or capacity of local staff. They also do not share information about operations, even with their own staff and subcontractors. XXXXXXXXXXXX said CNPC's projects are tightly controlled by Chinese management and are run "almost like military operations. There is a checklist for everything and all decisions follow a clear chain of command that goes straight to Beijing." When told that CNPC twice declined to meet Energy Officer in Almaty,
ASTANA 00001035 002.2 OF 003
XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was not surprised. "They won't talk to you. They won't talk to anybody," he said.
CLOSING THE CIRCLE
6. (SBU) On June 11, Energy Officer met with XXXXXXXXXXXX
(protect),XXXXXXXXXXXX PricewaterhouseCoopers. XXXXXXXXXXXX has been resident in Almaty provides tax and legal advice to a wide range of foreign investors in Kazakhstan, including Chinese companies active in the oil and gas and mining sectors. XXXXXXXXXXXXindependently confirmed the Chinese modus operandi described by XXXXXXXXXXXX. She said that before a transaction, Chinese clients "deal above board and play by the rules." They pay promptly, hire top talent, and conduct thorough due diligence to understand the risks and costs of acquiring property, registering as a legal entity, hiring local and expatriate staff, and purchasing subsoil licenses. However, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, after the transaction is over, "they close the circle tight." XXXXXXXXXXXX said her Chinese clients then bring
in their own people, systems, procedures, and equipment. She said
that she does not have much information about what happens
operationally at this stage, because her Chinese clients are more
closed and opaque after closing a deal.
CASH IS KING
7. (SBU) Commenting on CNPC's labor and immigration practices,
XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is common knowledge that Chinese workers entering Kazakhstan always wait at the end of the line and carry plenty of cash. He said that is because most of them enter the country
illegally, without required work permits, and must pay bribes in
order to pass through immigration, labor, and customs controls.
XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that CNPC and its subsidiaries have paid fines for past violations of labor and environmental regulations, but he said this has had no effect on their business practices. "They have plenty of money and have no problem resolving these issues by paying cash." When asked about CNPC's relationship with national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG) -- which has insisted on a more prominent role in the development of the Kashagan oil field -- XXXXXXXXXXXX said simply, "KMG carries weight, but CNPC controls the cash, so they make the calls."
CHINESE EMBASSY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES ENERGY, LABOR ISSUES
8. (SBU) On May 25, Energy Officer met with XXXXXXXXXXXX of the Chinese embassy. XXXXXXXXXXXX the Chinese Embassy,
acknowledged China's long-term, strategic interest in securing
access to Kazakhstan's energy resources. He said CNPC aggressively pursued the MangistauMunaiGas acquisition, but insisted the company competed fairly for the asset. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Kazakhstan selected CNPC because it balances the presence of U.S., European, and Russian oil companies in western Kazakhstan. He noted that Chinese companies have also lost out on lucrative projects, such as the Balkhash coal-fired power plant, which he said was first promised to a Chinese company, but was eventually awarded to Korea's KEPCO Samsung.
9. (SBU) Anticipating questions about the labor practices of
Chinese companies in Kazakhstan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is very difficult to obtain work permits for Chinese expatriates with the necessary skills and experience to produce oil in Kazakhstan's challenging environment. He said Chinese companies would prefer to use cheaper local labor, but he complained that there are not enough qualified Kazakhstani specialists to staff ongoing projects. He also said that Chinese oil companies work under extreme deadlines and have no time to train local labor on projects that must be finished this year. He admitted that Chinese companies often bring expatriate
employees into Kazakhstan without visas and work permits, but
quickly added, "Of course, the Chinese Embassy requires the
companies to comply with local legislation."
ASTANA 00001035 003.2 OF 003
10. (SBU) COMMENT: Until a year ago, Kazakhstan was leery of
Chinese investment. With the onset of the economic crisis, China
became a more attractive partner, because it brought ready capital.
Nonetheless, Kazakhstani businessmen and government officials are
frank in their criticism of the practices described above to Embassy
officers. For instance, a Deputy Minister of Finance, referring to
amendments to the subsoil law which could allow abrogation of
contracts for national security reasons, pointedly told the DCM,
"Don't worry. The Law is not aimed at you. It is for the Chinese."
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, EAP/CM, EEB
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PINR ECON EPET EINV ELAB SMIG CH KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA
REF: (A) ASTANA 0678
(B) ASTANA 0982
ASTANA 00001035 001.3 OF 003
1. (U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public Internet.
2. (SBU) SUMMARY: On June 11, Energy Officer met separately with a Western manager from the U.S. oil services company Baker Hughes and an American partner with the consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, both of whom shared experiences and insights about doing business with Chinese companies in Kazakhstan. In particular, they noted that once Chinese companies sign a contract, they "close the circle," bring in their own personnel and equipment -- often illegally -- and control the project tightly, under close supervision from Beijing. A Chinese Embassy official confirmed
China's strategic interest in Kazakhstan's energy resources and
acknowledged that Chinese companies sometimes violate Kazakhstan's immigration and customs laws. END SUMMARY.
MAKING PROMISES THEY CANNOT KEEP
3. (SBU) On June 11, Energy Officer met with XXXXXXXXXXXX
(protect throughout),Caspian Sales Manager for Baker Hughes.
XXXXXXXXXXXX. He said that Baker Hughes currently employs Chinese nationals in Kazakhstan and has oil services contracts with AktobeMunaiGas, in which China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has an 85 percent stake, and PetroKazakhstan, in which CNPC owns 67 percent. XXXXXXXXXXXXsaid that American companies bidding against Chinese companies are
often at a disadvantage, because "the Chinese companies make
promises they know they cannot keep. They make these impossible
commitments on time and cost that they admit in private they will
not be able to meet. But that's what goes in the bid, and they win
the work."
CHINA'S INTEGRATED ENERGY STRATEGY
4. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX said he understands the logic behind CNPC's acquisition of 50 percent of MangistauMunaiGas (MMG, reftel A),its construction of oil and gas pipelines to China, its ownership of the Shymkent oil refinery, and its plans to build a new oil refinery in
eastern Kazakhstan. "They are building an integrated production,
processing, and delivery system. And for China, Kazakhstan has the
cheapest oil in the world. It's close and it's convenient. This is
a very strategic move on their part," he said. XXXXXXXXXXXX predicted that China will increase its oil imports from Kazakhstan by 40 percent over the next three to five years and will begin to sell
refined oil products to Kazakhstan in the near future. He said that
CNPC is immune from rising oil prices because they own a diverse
portfolio of upstream and downstream assets around the world and can balance and swap reserves as necessary. "CNPC is in a position now where they can manipulate the market," XXXXXXXXXXXX said. (NOTE: Even with CNPC's recent acquisition of MMG, China controls no more than 18 percent of Kazakhstan's current oil production. U.S. companies Chevron and ExxonMobil combined to produce approximately 22 percent of Kazakhstan's oil in 2008. END NOTE).
DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINESE COMPANIES
5. (SBU) When asked to describe how the Chinese operate in
Kazakhstan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that they typically buy a medium-sized oil field, something productive and valuable, but "under the radar." According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the Chinese then bring in their own workers, their own suppliers, and their own equipment. They do not hire very many local staff or subcontractors and show no interest in developing the professional skills or capacity of local staff. They also do not share information about operations, even with their own staff and subcontractors. XXXXXXXXXXXX said CNPC's projects are tightly controlled by Chinese management and are run "almost like military operations. There is a checklist for everything and all decisions follow a clear chain of command that goes straight to Beijing." When told that CNPC twice declined to meet Energy Officer in Almaty,
ASTANA 00001035 002.2 OF 003
XXXXXXXXXXXX said he was not surprised. "They won't talk to you. They won't talk to anybody," he said.
CLOSING THE CIRCLE
6. (SBU) On June 11, Energy Officer met with XXXXXXXXXXXX
(protect),XXXXXXXXXXXX PricewaterhouseCoopers. XXXXXXXXXXXX has been resident in Almaty provides tax and legal advice to a wide range of foreign investors in Kazakhstan, including Chinese companies active in the oil and gas and mining sectors. XXXXXXXXXXXXindependently confirmed the Chinese modus operandi described by XXXXXXXXXXXX. She said that before a transaction, Chinese clients "deal above board and play by the rules." They pay promptly, hire top talent, and conduct thorough due diligence to understand the risks and costs of acquiring property, registering as a legal entity, hiring local and expatriate staff, and purchasing subsoil licenses. However, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, after the transaction is over, "they close the circle tight." XXXXXXXXXXXX said her Chinese clients then bring
in their own people, systems, procedures, and equipment. She said
that she does not have much information about what happens
operationally at this stage, because her Chinese clients are more
closed and opaque after closing a deal.
CASH IS KING
7. (SBU) Commenting on CNPC's labor and immigration practices,
XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is common knowledge that Chinese workers entering Kazakhstan always wait at the end of the line and carry plenty of cash. He said that is because most of them enter the country
illegally, without required work permits, and must pay bribes in
order to pass through immigration, labor, and customs controls.
XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that CNPC and its subsidiaries have paid fines for past violations of labor and environmental regulations, but he said this has had no effect on their business practices. "They have plenty of money and have no problem resolving these issues by paying cash." When asked about CNPC's relationship with national oil company KazMunaiGas (KMG) -- which has insisted on a more prominent role in the development of the Kashagan oil field -- XXXXXXXXXXXX said simply, "KMG carries weight, but CNPC controls the cash, so they make the calls."
CHINESE EMBASSY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES ENERGY, LABOR ISSUES
8. (SBU) On May 25, Energy Officer met with XXXXXXXXXXXX of the Chinese embassy. XXXXXXXXXXXX the Chinese Embassy,
acknowledged China's long-term, strategic interest in securing
access to Kazakhstan's energy resources. He said CNPC aggressively pursued the MangistauMunaiGas acquisition, but insisted the company competed fairly for the asset. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Kazakhstan selected CNPC because it balances the presence of U.S., European, and Russian oil companies in western Kazakhstan. He noted that Chinese companies have also lost out on lucrative projects, such as the Balkhash coal-fired power plant, which he said was first promised to a Chinese company, but was eventually awarded to Korea's KEPCO Samsung.
9. (SBU) Anticipating questions about the labor practices of
Chinese companies in Kazakhstan, XXXXXXXXXXXX said it is very difficult to obtain work permits for Chinese expatriates with the necessary skills and experience to produce oil in Kazakhstan's challenging environment. He said Chinese companies would prefer to use cheaper local labor, but he complained that there are not enough qualified Kazakhstani specialists to staff ongoing projects. He also said that Chinese oil companies work under extreme deadlines and have no time to train local labor on projects that must be finished this year. He admitted that Chinese companies often bring expatriate
employees into Kazakhstan without visas and work permits, but
quickly added, "Of course, the Chinese Embassy requires the
companies to comply with local legislation."
ASTANA 00001035 003.2 OF 003
10. (SBU) COMMENT: Until a year ago, Kazakhstan was leery of
Chinese investment. With the onset of the economic crisis, China
became a more attractive partner, because it brought ready capital.
Nonetheless, Kazakhstani businessmen and government officials are
frank in their criticism of the practices described above to Embassy
officers. For instance, a Deputy Minister of Finance, referring to
amendments to the subsoil law which could allow abrogation of
contracts for national security reasons, pointedly told the DCM,
"Don't worry. The Law is not aimed at you. It is for the Chinese."
END COMMENT.
HOAGLAND