KAZAKHSTAN: LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN PEACE CORPS CASE OVER,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ASTANA 001029 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, CA/OCS FRANKFURT FOR REGIONAL CONSULAR OFFICER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2034 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR CASC KZ SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN PEACE CORPS CASE OVER, VOLUNTEER DEPARTS COUNTRY REF: (A) ASTANA 0983 (B) ASTANA 0592 (C) ASTANA 0547 (NOTAL) (D) ASTANA 0443 (E) ASTANA 0381 (F) ASTANA 0373 (G) ASTANA 0175 (H) ASTANA 0135 (I) ASTANA 0055 (J) 08 ASTANA 2576 (K) 08 ASTANA 2410 (NOTAL) Classified by: Ambassador Richard E. Hoagland, 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Peace Corps Volunteer Anthony Sharp departed Kazakhstan on June 13, after an appellate court vacated his two-year probation at the Prosecutor General's request. Sharp's departure ends an affair that began on November 26, when he was arrested in what appeared to be a classic Soviet-style set-up, likely orchestrated by the pro-Russian old-guard at the Committee for National Security (KNB) and aimed at discrediting the Peace Corps and damaging bilateral relations. Over the course of more than six months, the Ambassador repeatedly raised Sharp's case with senior government officials, including with President Nazarbayev on March ¶30. Though there were a number of bureaucratic hurdles to overcome, the case moved slowly toward resolution following the Nazarbayev meeting. Keeping everything out of the media was critical to the successful outcome. END SUMMARY. PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER DEPARTS KAZAKHSTAN ¶2. (C) Peace Corps Volunteer Anthony Sharp left Kazakhstan on June 13, following the completion of all legal proceedings against him, and official confirmation from the Kazakhstani government that it had no objections to his departure. ¶3. (C) On April 3, an Ust-Kamenogorsk appeals court upheld the criminal conviction against Sharp on explosives charges, but suspended his two-year prison sentence, putting him on probation for two years (ref B). Following that ruling, we worked with Sharp's attorneys and the government to identify a legal avenue for him to depart Kazakhstan immediately, rather than at the end of the probation period. On the advice of Talgat Kaliyev, advisor to Foreign Minister Tazhin and the MFA's point-person on the Sharp case, we sent the MFA a diplomatic note on April 13 requesting the government confirm it had no objections to Sharp's departure. Kaliyev subsequently told us that the MFA was on board with the departure, but working-level officials at other agencies, including the Prosecutor General's Office, were reluctant to make any decision on the issue. On May 21, the Charge raised Sharp's case with Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Kairat Sarybay, who had been involved from the beginning. He expressed surprise that Sharp was still in Kazakhstan, but apparently intervened to get the bureaucracy to resolve the case within the limitations of Kazakhstani law. Sarybay reaffirmed the government's "political will" to bring about a final resolution during a June 5 meeting with the Ambassador (ref A). FINAL RESOLUTION ¶4. (C) On June 3, a prosecutor filed a motion with the Ust-Kamenogorsk appeals court recommending Sharp's sentence be reduced to time served -- i.e., one night in jail. The court granted the motion, vacating Sharp's two-year probation. Sharp's attorneys then obtained the necessary documentation confirming that there were no further restriction's on Sharp's travel, and on June 12, the MFA called us in to hand us their response diplomatic note to our April 13 note, confirming that there were no impediments to Sharp's departure. Sharp left Kazakhstan on June 13. The Ambassador sent a letter to Foreign Minister Tazhin on June 16 thanking him for his assistance on the case. A SOVIET-STYLE PROVOCATION ¶5. (S) As reported in reftels, on November 26, just days before the end of his Peace Corps tour, Sharp accepted an invitation from two ASTANA 00001029 002 OF 002 Kazakhstani citizens, including his local counterpart, to take a late-night tour of a gold mine near the town of Ridder. Upon exiting the mine, one of the locals gave Sharp his bag to hold while he climbed back over the security fence. Local authorities were waiting, and promptly arrested Sharp, claiming that the bag contained industrial explosives. The incident had all the makings of a Soviet-style set-up, engineered by the pro-Moscow old guard in the Committee for National Security (the KNB, successor to the KGB),and aimed at discrediting the Peace Corps in Kazakhstan and at damaging U.S.-Kazakhstan relations at a time when Kazakhstan's leadership saw the election of President Obama as an opportunity to enhance its relationship with the United States. ¶6. (S) The Ambassador raised Sharp's case in December and January with State Secretary Kanat Saudabayev (refs H and I) and with Sarybay (ref G),stressing that we believed it was a provocation, and urging that the government intervene at the highest levels to have it dismissed and to have Sharp deported from the country. The police concluded their investigation on January 14, and charges were brought against Sharp for illegal possession of explosives. Kaliyev informed us on January 21 that he had worked out an arrangement with the relevant government agencies: If Sharp agreed to a closed trial and we all kept the case out of the media, Sharp would be convicted, but given a suspended sentence and immediately deported. Sharp accepted the deal, but the government failed to live up to its bargain. After a month long-trial which ended on February 26, a judge convicted Sharp on the explosives charges and sentenced him to two years in prison. He was immediately taken off to jail, but was released the following day after the Ambassador got Foreign Minister Tazhin to intervene. ¶7. (S) Tazhin made clear that the KNB and Ministry of Internal Affairs had pushed back and were pressing their view that Sharp was an "American spy." He nevertheless promised that on appeal, the case would be resolved in accordance with the earlier agreement. It appeared, however, that President Nazarbayev would himself make the final decision. Sarybay arranged a meeting for the Ambassador with Nazarbayev on March 30, where the Ambassador expressed regret that Sharp had trespassed at the mine, but conveyed our hope we could put the case behind us and move forward on enhancing the bilateral relationship (ref C). Though there were a number of bureaucratic hurdles to overcome, the case moved slowly toward resolution following the Nazarbayev meeting. ¶8. (S) COMMENT: Though the case took months to resolve, our confidence that Nazarbayev would do the right thing in end was not misplaced. He was likely the decider, siding with his more progressive advisors, like Tazhin and Sarybay, and against the KNB, to protect the bilateral relationship and thus maintain his long-standing policy of balancing Kazakhstan's relations with Russia, China, and the United States. Key to the successful resolution of the case was keeping it out of the media -- enabling the Kazakhstanis to avoid the political embarrassment of trying to explain the provocation publicly and allowing them to back down and let Sharp go free. END COMMENT. HOAGLAND