ASMARA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

S E C R E T ASMARA 000070 NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/AF, DS/TIA/ITA, AND AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2029 TAGS: ASEC PTER ER SUBJECT: ASMARA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE - SPRING 2009 REF: STATE 13023 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for Reason 1.4 (d) ¶1. (SBU) On 02/25/2009, EAC met to discuss Post's response to the Security Environment Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ). the following responses are keyed to Reftel. -------------- - POLITICAL VIOLENCE -------------- - ¶1. (S/NF) DEMONSTRATIONS ¶A. No. There is little evidence of Islamic extremism in Eritrea, a country in which 50% of the population is Muslim. Most Muslims live on the coastal regions, not in Asmara. The Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunama (DMLEK) and some Afar ethnic groups are believed to be anti-President Isaias, but it is unclear if they are anti-American or not. The Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement (EIRM) is anti-Isaias and believed to be anti-American as well. The Eritrean Democratic Alliance (EDA) is an Addis Ababa-based opposition group comprising over 13 POLITICAL opposition groups. It has made recent announcements threatening to topple the Isaias regime by force. Post is unable to ascertain how much support the EDA has in Eritrea, especially since it is based in Ethiopia. Post does not believe the Government of the State of Eritrea (GSE) would allow any demonstrations by any groups to take place (anti-American or not) for fear the demonstration could turn anti-Isaias, anti-GSE, or jeopardize the stability in Eritrea. i. No. ii. N/A. iii. N/A. iv. N/A. ¶B. N/A. There have been no demonstrations in recent history. The GSE is an authoritarian, police state that does not allow any type of dissent or demonstrations to take place without GSE consent. Any form of unauthorized dissent would be met with an immediate, violent reaction by the GSE with the involved person(s) thrown in jail. i. N/A. ii. N/A. ¶C. No. i. No. ii. N/A. iii. N/A. iv. N/A. (S/NF) EAC NOTES ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ERITREA The GSE is the primary antagonist to the U.S. Mission. The GSE typically runs anti-U.S. propaganda in its state-controlled media, though this has virtually stopped as of January 20, 2009. Post does not expect the cessation to be permanent. The GSE generally views U.S. diplomatic operations in Eritrea with hostility and paranoia, and the bilateral relationship has been poor for many years. The GSE has constrained U.S. diplomatic operations and access to the country (in flagrant disregard for its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations) by: 1) placing travel restrictions on all foreigners, including diplomats, largely confining U.S. Mission personnel to Asmara; 2) demanding the right to inspect Post's diplomatic pouch shipments; and 3) refusing visas to most official temporary (TDY) personnel. In response to these restrictions, the State Department ordered the closure of the Eritrean Consulate in Oakland, CA in August 2007. The GSE has a history of detaining/expelling diplomatic and other foreign personnel for little or no reason. In February 2009, the GSE arrested a UK Voluntary Service Organization Volunteer during a raid on a government-sanctioned English-speaking radio station. The GSE detained a UN diplomat overnight in December 2006 for taking tourist photos in downtown Asmara despite the fact he showed his diplomatic ID card and digital camera to the Eritrean authorities. He was never charged. The head of the UN demining program was declared persona non grata in February 2007 on trumped up charges and ordered to leave Eritrea within several days. A TDY UK Embassy technician traveling on a diplomatic passport was prevented from leaving Eritrea for 10 days in June 2007 after being seen on the roof of the British Council adjusting their satellite dish. He was never charged or questioned by Eritrean security officials; however, the GSE-owned press implied he was carrying out espionage activities. UNMEE forces were forced to depart Eritrea in spring 2008 due to the GSE refusal to provide UNMEE forces with fuel. The UNMEE mandate expired on 07/31/08 and the remaining UNMEE personnel will depart Eritrea in late February 2009. The GSE maintains checkpoints, military patrols, and frequent roundups throughout Asmara to check the documents of Eritrean citizens. The GSE raids bars, church services, residences, restaurants, buses, and taxis, arresting Eritreans at will. Males and females of draft age who cannot prove they have completed their mandatory military service are immediately arrested and conscripted into the Eritrean military for indefinite periods of time. In early 2008, the GSE raised the minimum age for Eritreans to leave the country to 54 years old for males and 47 years old for females. All others are refused. The GSE's internal repression has resulted in thousands of its citizens, mainly its youth, attempting to flee to either Ethiopia or Sudan. In summer 2007, the GSE reportedly issued a "shoot-to-kill" policy on the borders, authorizing Eritrean police/military to kill Eritreans attempting to flee Eritrea. Street demonstrations are not customary in Eritrea. Eritrean law prevents any ad hoc or impromptu gatherings of people and any unsanctioned demonstration would be met with force. The tensions inside Eritrea continue to increase as its economy deteriorates due to poor GSE policies. In June 2008, there was visible discontent and increased vocal dissatisfaction with the GSE's announcement that electrical power would be shut off to the majority of the country in the evening for 11 hrs each day. Increased prices and shortages of food, kerosene, and other staples have increased the tension among Eritreans. The GSE's practice of blaming outsiders for its problems could result in anti-American or anti-Western violence. ¶2. (S/NF) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS ¶A. Yes. Eritrea is engaged in both intrastate and interstate conflicts. For years, there has been intrastate conflicts between the GSE and the EIRM (also known as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement, EIJM) and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). These groups have been active along the Eritrean/Sudanese border. There have been communiqus released by the DMLEK claming attacks it has conducted against GSE forces in SW Eritrea and by Afar groups in central and SE Eritrea. The GSE blamed two bomb attacks in Barentu and Tessenei in February 2008 and one in November 2008 near Barentu on the Government of Ethiopia. The EDA announced it would attempt to overthrow the GSE/Isaias regime by force if the GSE refused to implement transitional democracy. Anti-government broadcasts are transmitted into Eritrea from Ethiopia as well. Numerous Post sources have reported the GSE is extremely concerned about the EDA. ¶B. Thus far, the intrastate conflicts have has been limited to specific regions (ethnic areas or border areas with Sudan and Ethiopia) and have been limited in nature. Interstate Conflict: Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are still high and could erupt into renewed conflict. Post received reports of military exchanges between Eritrean and Ethiopian forces in January and February 2008. With UNMEE forces no longer on along the Ethiopian/Eritrean border, Post has difficulties finding out about any skirmishes. In May 2008, the GSE moved some of its military units along the shared border with Djibouti near the area of Ras Doumeira. In mid-June, there were two days of military skirmishes between Eritrea and Djibouti after Eritrean forces opened fire on Eritreans attempting to defect to Djibouti. The Eritrean government has refused so far to comply with a UNSC resolution mandating they withdraw from Djiboutian territory by mid-Feburary 2009. ¶C. No. ¶D. No, but the EIRM/EIJ are believed to anti-American. ¶3. (S/NF) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES ¶A. No. The Eritrean police is plagued by a lack of professionalism, resources, training, equipment, and motivation. Only high ranking officers have vehicles or radios and the police are unable to quickly respond to emergencies. The police walk around in clusters in the major downtown areas. The Eritrean police comprises national service conscripts who receive minimal training. They are paid approximately $4 per month, are plagued by low morale, and have little incentive to risk their lives to stop crime. The Eritrean police can perform basic police functions, but lack any investigative capability. Thus far, the Eritrean police have refused to meet with the RSO to discuss the security situation in Eritrea or about host country support to Post in the event of an emergency. The Eritrean police have also been unresponsive to Post requests for investigative assistance. ¶B. No. ¶C. There are increasing reports of corruption in the government as a whole, including the confiscation of private assets deemed "excessive wealth," which are then redistributed to party cronies and military officers to buy loyalty. ¶D. The GSE has a huge network of informers who rQ"iROQ entry. However, the GSE does not have the resources or capabilities to monitor the full length of its porous land and sea borders. ¶E. Uncooperative and unsupportive. RSO and previous RSO have attempted to meet with host nation intelligence personnel, but they do not respond to these requests. ¶F. N/A. ¶G. The GSE has been responsive to requests for security at embassy functions such as the 4th of July celebrations. However, they have been uncooperative in granting requests for the RSO to meet with other low ranking police personnel or for other low ranking requests such as to allow Eritrean police assigned at the Embassy to carry police radios for instant communications with their HQ in the event of an emergency. ¶H. Average: Previous RSO reported the security screeners routinely missed prohibited items. RSO has witnessed and received reports of diplomatic and non-diplomatic personnel and their baggage being scrutinized for electronic items such as laptop computers and unreported hard currency. ¶I. Average. ¶J. Ineffective given the lack of resources and training. Post receives reports of thousands of Eritreans fleeing Eritrea each month with reports of border forces accepting bribes to allow smugglers and their passengers to leave Eritrea. -------------- -- INDIGENOUS TERRORISM -------------- -- ¶1. (S/NF) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. Yes, the EIRM/EIJ is believed to be anti-American. Due to the porous Red Sea and Sudanese borders as well as the GSE's anti-American attitude and affiliation with countries opposed to the USG such as Iran, and terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab, other groups could be present in Eritrea without Post's knowledge. ¶B. No. ¶C. No. ¶D. No. ¶E. No. ¶F. They have attacked along specific regions, usually traditional ethnic areas or along the Sudanese and Ethiopian borders. ¶G. No. ¶2. (S/NF) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS ¶A. Yes. The DMLEK and Afar ethnic groups. Based in Addis Ababa, the EDA is a loose coalition of over 13 Eritrean opposition groups. It is unknown to what extent they are present in Eritrea or how much support they have among Eritreans. ¶B. No. ¶C. N/A. ¶D. No. -------------- -- TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM -------------- -- ¶1. (S/NF) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS ¶A. Yes. Insurgent groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF),the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF),and the Aweys faction of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) are provided logistical support and safehaven by the GSE. Al-Shabaab was listed as a foreign terrorist organization by the USG in February 2008 and it is believed that Eritrea is providing support to Al-Shabaab. Sheikh Aweys, leader of the hardline ARS faction, and listed by the UN as a terrorist-affiliated person, has been resident in Eritrea since summer 2007 with the GSE consent and assistance. In spring 2008, the Department of State designated Eritrea as a country not fully cooperative on counter-terrorism issues with the United States in a report to Congress. Due to Eritrea's proximity to the Red Sea and a long, porous land border with Sudan and Ethiopia, Post assumes other individuals could surreptitiously enter and transit Eritrea without the knowledge of the GSE. ¶B. Propaganda and support cells. ¶C. Yes. The GSE reportedly provides safehaven and support to the OLF, ONLF, and the Aweys faction of the ARS. In some instances it has also provided them with residence permits and Eritrean passports. The GSE provides space for military training for these groups. The Eritreans historically have been supportive of groups with anti-Ethiopian agendas. ¶D. No. ¶E. Unknown. ¶F. Limited. Sudan has a diplomatic presence in Eritrea. Due to the mutually suspicious relationship between Eritrea and Sudan, the GSE is likely closely monitoring Sudanese personnel in Eritrea, even though relations between the two countries are improving. Post has reported on the frequent monitoring of American personnel by the GSE. The Iranians and Syrians are represented in Asmara through their embassies in Sudan. In May 2007, the Iranian Ambassador presented his credentials to President Isaias following government to government interaction over the last year. In late 2007, the Eritrean Foreign Minister visited Tehran. In September 2007, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister visited Asmara and in spring 2008, Isaias visited Tehran. Both countries have stated they want closer economic RELATIONS and increased exchanges. Iranian officers, including members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, have served in UNMEE. In the last year, the Libyan Embassy increased in size from 7 to 28 full time employees in agreement with the GSE. ¶G. Due to porous land and sea borders, weapons could be easily smuggled into Eritrea. Weapons are not freely available and the Eritrean government closely monitors weapons. Due to GSE's totalitarian nature and extreme paranoia, terrorist elements or foreign organizations not specifically sponsored by the GSE would find Eritrea a difficult place from which to operate. MCMULLEN