SITUATION DIRE FOR ERITREAN REFUGEES IN SUDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASMARA 000196 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E, PRM, AND DRL LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS USAID FOR GEORGIANNA PLATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019 TAGS: PREF PHUM PREL SU ER SUBJECT: SITUATION DIRE FOR ERITREAN REFUGEES IN SUDAN Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for reason 1.4(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: There are more than 62,000 Eritreans registered in UNHCR refugee camps in eastern Sudan, and tens of thousands more living in Khartoum and in refugee camps in the east that have been officially closed over the years. Eritreans in Sudan face discrimination from the Sudanese government (GOS),possible deportation, and harassment by the Eritrean government (GSE). Nonetheless, these factors have not stemmed the tide of Eritreans fleeing into Sudan; UNHCR measured a 100% increase in Eritrean new arrivals in the year to April 2009 (UNHCR noted a 30% increase overall of new arrivals from the region). The demographic of new arrivals is also changing. According to UNHCR, the majority of new arrivals are young men and women fleeing forcible recruitment into the army or National Service. There is also a substantial population of Eritreans born in Sudan who face legal discrimination from the GOS and a much smaller group who claim statelessness due to mixed (Eritrean and Ethiopian) parentage. End Summary. ERITREANS IN SUDAN -------------- ¶2. (SBU) From May 18 ) 20 Embassy Asmara and Khartoum Poloffs and PRM Program officer met with UNHCR, UNMIS, and NGO representatives as well as the Government of National Unity (GNU) Commissioner for Refugees (COR) in Khartoum to discuss the situation of Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan. (A planned trip to refugee camps in eastern Sudan was not possible due to GNU denial of a travel permit.) According to UNHCR's latest registration exercise, there were 62,410 Eritrean refugees registered in the east as of December 2008, with an additional estimated 39,000 residing in former refugee camps and urban locations including Khartoum. UNHCR is currently verifying the former camp and urban caseloads. Roughly 60% of the Eritrean refugee population was born in Sudan to parents who had joined successive waves of refugees fleeing political upheaval, repression famine, and conflict, including the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. ¶3. (U) At the height of the refugee crisis in Sudan during the droughts of the mid-80s, UNHCR and COR administered 26 settlements, camps, and reception centers in five states ) Kassala, Gedaref, Sinnar, Gezira, and Red Sea ) for some 1.1 million refugees from what was then Ethiopia and later became Ethiopia and Eritrea. After a decline in refugee numbers through repatriation (primarily to Ethiopia) throughout the 90s, there was an uptick after the 1998-2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Support for the new arrivals and long-standing refugees was at times complicated by insecurity as eastern Sudan became a battlefield in the Sudanese civil war. UNHCR was able from 2003-2005 to consolidate the 26 sites into the current 12 camps. These camps have suffered from conditions that are below minimum standards in terms of access to water and sanitation, health services, and education. While efforts have been made to improve conditions in recent years, a UNHCR official noted in May 2009 that conditions were largely still "abysmal." The World Food Program conducted a Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) to eastern Sudan in April 2009. While the results are not yet available, UNHCR staff noted that the JAM found concerning rates of malnutrition in camps visited. ¶4. (SBU) In recent years, according to UNHCR, Eritrean arrivals have been mostly urban and educated individuals whose expectations in terms of education, employment, and self-fulfillment are not met in the camp environment. These individuals often move through the camp, simply stopping by to register and then traveling to Khartoum or beyond to seek employment. These secondary movements have increased the protection risks affecting new arrivals: physical abuse and intimidation by smugglers, arrest, detentions, summary trials, and sometimes deportation are reported and documented according to UNHCR. UNHCR has also noticed a sharp increase in unaccompanied minors (UAMs); over 1172 have been registered since 2008. Many of these are youth who flee from the Sawa Military Training camp, which replaces students' last year of high school. A delegation from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) that visited eastern Sudan in early 2009 noted a number of protection risks with ASMARA 00000196 002 OF 003 these UAMs, particularly concerning the girls. USCCB noted that due to limited protection mechanisms, there were reports that many of these children were "disappearing," and may be vulnerable to smuggling and trafficking. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING -------------- ¶5. (C) The Eritrean embassy in Khartoum monitors Eritreans in Sudan, according to UNHCR. High-profile Eritrean refugees, such as those who are politically involved, are allegedly tracked and targeted by Sudan's National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) in coordination with GSE counterparts. The targeted Eritreans are then detained in NISS holding cells where UNHCR does not have access. Some refugees have received letters from the GSE ordering them to report to the Eritrean embassy. Others have had surprise visits from Eritrean embassy officials in their houses. These visits usually include threats of deportation unless the refugee desists from whatever activities aroused the ire of the GSE. According to UNHCR, the GNU has deported 94 Eritreans in 2009 thus far, already surpassing the 87 deported in 2008. The GOS has also expressed a desire to be directly involved in the selection of any Eritreans to be resettled in third countries. BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE -------------- ¶6. (C) The refugee program in eastern Sudan is one of five pilot programs under the UNHCR High Commissioner's "Protracted Refugee Situation" initiative. The Eritrean situation in Sudan has been included in the initiative based on waning visibility and the need to invigorate the international community's interest in the refugee population's protection, assistance, and the search for durable solutions, and also because the voluntary repatriation program was halted first by the Ethiopia-Eritrea war and then by the increasingly repressive rule in Asmara. UNHCR seeks to employ one of three durable solutions for refugees: resettlement, voluntary repatriation, or permanent integration into local society. Each of these options is either blocked or hindered by realities on the ground. In 2008, only 800 Eritreans, out of an estimated caseload of 100,000, were resettled. Australia, Canada, Sweden, and Norway were the recipient countries. Although the GOS has stated it would like to increase resettlement options, it has not allowed USG resettlement officers to visit camps in the east. ¶7. (U) Given the political climate in Eritrea, UNHCR does not view repatriation as a viable durable solution, and is thus focused on local integration and self-reliance. In 2007, the GNU and UNHCR signed a "Joint Solutions Strategy for the Protracted Refugee Situation in Sudan" which seeks to improve asylum procedures, improve camp conditions, and move towards durable solutions. A key initiative under this document is the "Self-Reliance Strategy for Refugees in Eastern Sudan." Recognizing that UNHCR and its partners cannot engage 100% of the refugee population, and that a significant number are economically self-reliant to some degree, the UNHCR-drafted strategy targets a subset of "truly vulnerable and aid dependent" Eritrean refugees with economic livelihoods programming. UNHCR has identified funds to begin implementation of the multi-year strategy, but as of May 2009 had not identified staff necessary to begin program activities. ¶8. (C) While UNHCR would be able to provide micro-loans or other forms of economic assistance called for in the Strategy, the GOS continues to frustrate legal protection for Eritrean refugees. Below is a brief synopsis of legal status of Eritrean refugees: ¶9. (C) Labor: The GOS signed the Geneva Refugee Convention in 1972 and further defined the legal status through the Asylum Act of 1972. While this Act does not prohibit refugees from working in white collar jobs, in reality refugees have limited or no access to most professional work. Nor do refugees have access to public sector jobs, even those who served as health care workers and teachers in camps. In 2007, the GNU also issued a Ministerial Decree ASMARA 00000196 003 OF 003 that newly limits refugees working with international NGOs to menial jobs. The GNU has drafted a new Asylum Bill to which UNHCR has provided comments. ¶10. (C) Education: In theory refugees have similar access as Sudanese nationals. However, school fees and overcrowding in urban areas also lead to de facto denial of access for refugees. ¶11. (C) Naturalization: No law prohibits refugees from obtaining nationality if they meet criteria established in the Sudanese Nationality Act, which permits an alien (without prohibition to "legal stay") to naturalize after being domiciled in Sudan for five continuous years. Thus, as the Self-Reliance Strategy notes, "it can be argued that a large percentage of refugees in Sudan are eligible for naturalization." But in practice the GOS prevents the naturalization of refugees by issuing them a refugee card instead of the residence permit necessary to prove their five-year domicile in Sudan. Sudan has consistently said that its refugee policy is to allow economic, but not social, integration. ¶12. (C) Freedom of Movement: Through the Asylum Act, the GNU has reserved the right of Freedom of Movement and established refugee sites accordingly to keep refugees in the East. However, refugees live across the East and Central Sudan in both rural and urban settings with large numbers in Port Sudan, Kassala, Wad Medeni, and Gedaref towns and Khartoum. The current practice in the East is to allow refugees to move within eastern Sudan without travel permits as long as they are not traveling to Khartoum. However, refugees who are working in Khartoum must return to the East to renew travel permits. New arrivals and asylum seekers are usually denied travel permits, and other refugees have noted long delays in issuance. Refugees are also reportedly subject to ad hoc decrees issued by various government authorities. Over 3,300 Eritrean refugees were detained during 2008 for illegal entry and lack of documentation. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: Eritreans will continue to flee into Sudan in increasing numbers as economic and political conditions deteriorate in Eritrea, joining the long-term refugee caseload. Even with onward movement, the new arrivals will add pressure to UNHCR to find solutions for the old caseload, increase the need for a functioning self-reliance strategy, and demand UNHCR attention at a time when Darfur and southern Sudan repatriation and reintegration efforts are also taxing the agency. While COR officials are seeking more international funding for the Eritrean refugee response and increased resettlement opportunities, the GNU continues to restrict access to the East, preventing necessary donor assessments. UNHCR's comments that the GOS and the GSE seek to control any resettlement likewise have troubling implications for any future USG effort. Continued reports of detentions and deportations of Eritrean refugees warrant further pressure on the GNU. End Comment. ¶14. (U) This cable has been coordinated with Embassy Khartoum and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). MCMULLEN