EMBASSY'S USAID FSN RELEASED AFTER 15 MONTHS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 01 ASMARA 000131 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E AND DRL LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS USAID FOR GEORGIANNA PLATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2019 TAGS: PHUM PGOV EAID PINR ASEC ER SUBJECT: EMBASSY'S USAID FSN RELEASED AFTER 15 MONTHS ASMARA 00000131 001.3 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen for reason 1.4(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Embassy Asmara's sole USAID FSN was released on April 18 after 15 months in prison. The Eritrean government (GSE) arrested him in January 2008, holding him in a prison in downtown Asmara. He spent four months in solitary confinement in a 3x6 foot cell. The FSN, Mehreteab Araya, stated he was subjected to psychological abuse and knew of many prisoners who were tortured physically. He was accused of working for the CIA, commiserating with traitors, and trading U.S. development assistance for information. Mehreteab gave us the most detailed account to date on the reporting practices of senior FSNs to the GSE on embassy activities. This account was based on knowledge obtained from one of his interrogators, who himself was arrested during Mehreteab's incarceration. End Summary. 15 LONG MONTHS -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 26, GSE authorities halted the NasAir flight on the Asmara runway, boarded the plane, and arrested Mehreteab Araya who was en route to Embassy Nairobi for training. Authorities first took Mehreteab to Police Station NO. 5 in Asmara, holding him there for a week without explanation. From there, he was taken to a previously unknown prison in downtown Asmara near the market area and held incommunicado for 15 months. Mehreteab told EmbOffs that authorities held him in solitary confinement from February to June in a "2x1 meters" (6x3 ft) cell. From there, he was transferred to a larger cell with other cellmates transferring in and out. Mehreteab was interrogated intermittently, often being left alone to "get his story straight" for weeks, sometimes months, at a time. ¶3. (C) Authorities regularly questioned him on embassy operations, often insisting that USAID was a front for the CIA. They accused Mehreteab and his wife of receiving stipends in USD from the CIA. Interrogators also insisted the embassy planned to use the RSO residence as a military outpost for the eminent Ethiopian invasion. They also questioned Mehreteab on his knowledge of Post's two longest imprisoned employees, Ali Alimin and Kiflum Ghebremichael, the Pol/Econ FSNs imprisoned since October 2001 (Note: According to Mehrteab, the style of questioning on Ali and Kiflum led him to believe that they were still alive. End note). The "investigation" also injected psychological abuse into the routine; authorities told Mehreteab they had already arrested his wife and one of his two children. Mehreteab told us he fell into depression when he heard this, which led to chronic illness during his captivity. ¶4. (C) The GSE began tracking Mehreteab in 1996 when authorities associated his name with a visa mishap involving the USAID director at the time and a Pakistani national invited to conduct program work. The incident led to the USAID director being PNGed and Mehreteab being detained for one day. The interrogators regularly questioned Mehreteab during his 15 month imprisonment on this 1996 issue. A HODGEPODGE OF TORTURED SOULS -------------- ¶5. (C) Fortunately, Mehreteab stated no one physically tortured him during his 15 months. However, he told Emboffs he heard "screams every night" from prisoners undergoing physical punishment. He recounted one story of a prisoner whose feet were beaten until all of his toenails fell off. He was later shown the room with the bloodied floor as a warning. Prisoners included young military conscripts who attempted to flee national service, individuals accused of manufacturing counterfeit passports, black market dealers, members of non-approved religious groups, and mothers who could not pay the 50,000 nakfa ($3,333) fine for their children who successfully fled the country. Mehreteab stated that at one point he was bereft of an interrogator because the original one had been arrested on charges of corruption. When Mehreteab was transferred out of solitary confinement, one of his cellmates was another former interrogator caught exchanging money on the black market. ¶6. (C) Prisoners were fed between six to eight pieces of bread each day, along with tea and lentils. While prisoners had access to medical treatment, they were not taken to the Orotta hospital located in Asmara which is consistently frequented by American physicians. Instead, they were taken to the Halibet hospital on the outskirts of Asmara. The hospital staff included local nurses and foreign doctors from Cuba and China. Mehreteab told us the doctors did not speak English and did not question the nature of the patients brought to them. Prisoners were forbidden to communicate while en route to and from the hospital, and were only taken in small groups. THE WALLS HAVE EARS -------------- ¶7. (C) Mehreteab's interrogators expressed specific and detailed information about embassy operations, including a rough layout of the embassy compound (they knew of a building where FSNs had no access),State Department jargon such as SSH (Special Self Help),and knowledge of American employees' residences. The extent of the knowledge, as Mehreteab explained, could only come from FSNs regularly reporting to the GSE about embassy activities. Unclassified and innocuous activities were all reported and construed as being pieces of a CIA mastermind plot. For instance, recipients of the Ambassador's SSH grants were accused of being paid by the CIA to provide intelligence to the Americans. Mehreteab informed us that each of the SSH recipients were thoroughly investigated by authorities. Mehreteab mentioned several senior-level FSNs by name, as well as the embassy's Surveillance Detection detail, as reporting directly and regularly to GSE officials. SUDDEN RELEASE -------------- 8 (C) Authorities told Mehreteab one month beforehand that he might be released for "health reasons." Upon his release from prison, all his identification was confiscated. Mehreteab later found out that relatives handed over property deeds as bail for his release. Mehreteab believes that the confiscation of his papers is an indication that he should not return to work until they are returned. He expects them to be returned within the next few weeks. ¶9. (C) Mehreteab was never formally terminated from his USAID position and will be able to start working as soon as he feels that he can return. Since Mehreteab and his wife had their bank accounts frozen by the government during his captivity, the family is in desperate need of funds. He must have his identification returned for him to access the banking system, so the next couple of weeks will be challenging. Post anticipates being able to help Mehreteab through his financial difficulties once his bank account is unfrozen. ¶10. (C) COMMENT: While Post is relieved to finally have its USAID FSN released, Mehreteab's story provided Post with many disturbing facts. Post is aware that the majority of its 250 FSNs report to the GSE, either voluntarily or through coercement. Nonetheless, the extent of information passed to GSE officials and the suspected breadth of involvement among senior level FSNs served as a cold reminder of the difficult counterintelligence environment in which the Embassy operates. Post is also eager to re-employ Mehreteab in his role as the SSH Coordinator, but is aware of the bittersweet reality that he may be arrested again at any time for any reason, as is true for all of our staff, even those that report to the GSE. Since 2001, the GSE has arrested 43 of Post's FSNs. While most of the 43 have been released, at least three remain imprisoned. MCMULLEN ASMARA 00000131 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Prisoners were fed between six to eight pieces of bread each day, along with tea and lentils. While prisoners had access to medical treatment, they were not taken to the Orotta hospital located in Asmara which is consistently frequented by American physicians. Instead, they were taken to the Halibet hospital on the outskirts of Asmara. The hospital staff included local nurses and foreign doctors from Cuba and China. Mehreteab told us the doctors did not speak English and did not question the nature of the patients brought to them. Prisoners were forbidden to communicate while en route to and from the hospital, and were only taken in small groups. THE WALLS HAVE EARS -------------- ¶7. (C) Mehreteab's interrogators expressed specific and detailed information about embassy operations, including a rough layout of the embassy compound (they knew of a building where FSNs had no access),State Department jargon such as SSH (Special Self Help),and knowledge of American employees' residences. The extent of the knowledge, as Mehreteab explained, could only come from FSNs regularly reporting to the GSE about embassy activities. Unclassified and innocuous activities were all reported and construed as being pieces of a CIA mastermind plot. For instance, recipients of the Ambassador's SSH grants were accused of being paid by the CIA to provide intelligence to the Americans. Mehreteab informed us that each of the SSH recipients were thoroughly investigated by authorities. Mehreteab mentioned several senior-level FSNs by name, as well as the embassy's Surveillance Detection detail, as reporting directly and regularly to GSE officials. SUDDEN RELEASE -------------- 8 (C) Authorities told Mehreteab one month beforehand that he might be released for "health reasons." Upon his release from prison, all his identification was confiscated. Mehreteab later found out that relatives handed over property deeds as bail for his release. Mehreteab believes that the confiscation of his papers is an indication that he should not return to work until they are returned. He expects them to be returned within the next few weeks. ¶9. (C) Mehreteab was never formally terminated from his USAID position and will be able to start working as soon as he feels that he can return. Since Mehreteab and his wife had their bank accounts frozen by the government during his captivity, the family is in desperate need of funds. He must have his identification returned for him to access the banking system, so the next couple of weeks will be challenging. Post anticipates being able to help Mehreteab through his financial difficulties once his bank account is unfrozen. ¶10. (C) COMMENT: While Post is relieved to finally have its USAID FSN released, Mehreteab's story provided Post with many disturbing facts. Post is aware that the majority of its 250 FSNs report to the GSE, either voluntarily or through coercement. Nonetheless, the extent of information passed to GSE officials and the suspected breadth of involvement among senior level FSNs served as a cold reminder of the difficult counterintelligence environment in which the Embassy operates. Post is also eager to re-employ Mehreteab in his role as the SSH Coordinator, but is aware of the bittersweet reality that he may be arrested again at any time for any reason, as is true for all of our staff, even those that report to the GSE. Since 2001, the GSE has arrested 43 of Post's FSNs. While most of the 43 have been released, at least three remain imprisoned. MCMULLEN