TURKMENISTAN'S PERSPECTIVE ON CASPIAN DELIMITATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ASHGABAT 000947 SIPDIS SCA/CEN; EEB ENERGY FOR EKIMOFF/THOMPSON COMMERCE FOR HUEPER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV EPET PBTS EINV AZ TX SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN'S PERSPECTIVE ON CASPIAN DELIMITATION WITH AZERBAIJAN Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sylvia Curran, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During the July 24 Cabinet of Ministers session, President Berdimuhamedov made a strong statement that Azerbaijan's position on delimitation of the Caspian boundary hampers the negotiation process. He criticized Azerbaijan for its unilateral decision to start development of the Omar (Azeri) and Osman (Chirag) oil fields and for Azerbaijan's claims to the Serdar (Kapaz) oil field. Berdimuhamedov pointed out that resolving the delimitation soon is a priority for the Turkmen government and instructed Foreign Minister Meredov to engage foreign lawyers in reviewing this issue and taking this case to an international court of arbitration. The president's statement came a week after a Turkmen delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Komekov conducted unsuccessful negotiations on the Caspian delimitation issue in Baku. Azeri proposals to resolve the dispute over Serdar have been rejected outright by the Turkmen, who view the field unquestionably as their own. Azeri reluctance to finalize the maritime boundary with Turkmenistan may be related to its possible effect on maritime claims involving Iran. If Turkmenistan pursues international arbitration, it would face significant hurdles and no prospect of a quick solution. However, the Turkmen strategy may be to raise the international profile of the dispute in the hope of bringing pressure to bear on Azerbaijan to reach a resolution acceptable to both sides. END SUMMARY. SOME BACKGROUND ON THE DISPUTE ¶2. (SBU) The Turkmen-Azeri row over the disputed fields has been an issue since 1994 when the Azeri government signed a contract with a consortium of international companies to develop the Omar, Osman, and Guneshli fields with recoverable reserves of 5.4 billion barrels. Azerbaijan subsequently signed an agreement with the Russian Lukoil and Rosneft companies to develop the Serdar field (estimated recoverable reserves 700 million barrels). The Turkmen government reacted strongly, announcing it would block any attempts at development of the Serdar field, and put pressure on the oil companies through the Russian government. Tensions between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan reached a peak in 2002 when former President Niyazov stated that "the Caspian Sea smells of blood" during the Ashgabat summit of the Caspian littoral states. During the summit, Niyazov also mentioned the possibility of resolving the issue in an international court of arbitration. Since Berdimuhamedov's presidency, Turkmen-Azeri relations have improved considerably and the governments resumed a dialogue on the delimitation issue. The Turkmen State Service for Caspian Sea Issues was moved from the government's energy portfolio to the Foreign Ministry and the Chairman of the Service holds the position of Deputy Foreign Minister. TALKS YIELDED NO PROGRESS ¶3. (C) According to an expatriate energy company representative with extensive contacts within the Turkmen government hydrocarbon sector, Berdimuhamedov's recent announcement that Turkmenistan would pursue international arbitration was the result of the lack of progress evident at the latest round of negotiations July 15-17. Until February 2009, former Deputy Foreign Minister Hoshgeldi Babayev was the Turkmen official in charge of negotiations. He was dismissed in February and is currently sitting at home without work. Our contact, personally acquainted with Babayev, said the former deputy minister had a typical "Soviet mindset" and would not have reported negative results to the president following the various rounds of negotiations. Babayev was replaced by Toyly Komekov, a ASHGABAT 00000947 002 OF 003 younger and reportedly more forthcoming official. The July negotiations were the third round that Komekov had attended. Following the negotiations, he was reportedly frank to Berdimuhamedov about the lack of progress. ¶4. (C) According to the British Embassy, Foreign Minister Meredov told Prince Andrew, during his recent visit to Ashgabat, that Berdimuhamedov's announcement was sparked by Azeri President Aliyev's July 13 speech at Chatham House in London. Meredov asserted that Aliyev had asserted that the entire disputed territory was Azeri. This had angered Berdimuhamedov to such an extent that he "ordered" Meredov to seek international arbitration. Meredov also complained to Prince Andrew that BP was stealing Turkmen gas in the disputed zone. He later sent a letter to BP headquarters in London, via the British Embassy, warning the company that if they did not compensate the Turkmen they would also be taken to international arbitration. TURKMEN UNYIELDING ON SERDAR CLAIM ¶5. (C) The Turkmen government has not released information about its position regarding the location of the maritime boundary and its conditions for resolving the issue. According to our energy company contact, the Turkmen position about the appropriate boundary line was reinforced in 2007 when Canadian firm Buried Hill Energy was given a production sharing agreement (PSA) for Turkmenistan's offshore Block III, which includes the Serdar field. Foreign energy companies, with the exception of Buried Hill, were not interested in Block III because of the uncertainty posed by the unresolved boundary issue. In its negotiations for a PSA, Buried Hill provided the Turkmen government with a legal opinion from an English law firm specializing in maritime law that included a map showing the location of the boundary line. In arranging for the analysis, Buried Hill reportedly instructed the law firm to conside a line drawn across the base of the Apsheron peninsula, on which Baku is located, as the Azeri land boundary. This condition produced a boundary that included not only the Serdar field, but also most of Azerbaijan's ACG Block, thereby supporting the Turkmen claim for the Omar and Osman fields. ¶6. (C) According to our contact, the Azeris have in the past acknowledged privately that the Serdar field is in fact Turkmen territory. At the Turkmenistan International Oil and Gas Exhibition in November 2008, an Azeri delegation reportedly proposed that Turkmenistan could own 100 percent of the production in the Serdar field, provided that the oil was shipped westward to allow the Azeris to capture transit revenue and to show that there had been a compromise. Our contact said the Turkmen side rejected the offer, saying they would not accept any restrictions on the delivery of Turkmen oil and gas. At the latest round of talks, the Azeris reportedly proposed a 90-10 split of the Serdar field's production, with the Turkmen receiving the lion's share and no restrictions on where production would be delivered. The Turkmen rejected this proposal as well. Our contact explained that the Azeri reluctance to delimiting the boundary with Turkmenistan relates to Azeri boundary claims with Iran farther to the south. There are highly prospective fields blocks lying adjacent to the disputed Azeri-Iranian boundary and the location of the Turkmen-Azeri boundary could have an impact on an eventual Azeri-Iranian delimitation. ARBITRATION OFFERS NO QUICK RESOLUTION ¶7. (C) No details have been released regarding to which international arbitration court Turkmenistan would apply. An independent Turkmen legal expert opined in a meeting with Embassy staff that Turkmenistan would most likely take its ASHGABAT 00000947 003 OF 003 case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ),which can look into territorial disputes between states (although its statute requires that both sides agree to recognize the court's jurisdiction). He also mentioned that it would take a long time for Turkmenistan to field a case, because the country has no experts in maritime and international law. The Turkmen lawyer also suggested that either the UN Convention on Maritime Law or Soviet documents identifying the borders of the former Soviet republics would be applied by the ICJ when considering this case. He stated that it would take years before the case would be resolved in court. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: The Turkmen government's decision to take the Caspian issue to arbitration might indicate that the Turkmen want to attract the attention of the international community to this issue and take it to a higher level than the bilateral or littoral format, since the Turkmen government seems to have no ability to influence Azerbaijan. The Turkmen may well hope for international, and particularly Western, involvement to influence the Azeri government's decision. If so, we may soon see further attempts by the Turkmen government to improve its relations with Western governments. END COMMENT. CURRAN