UPDATE ON TURKMENISTAN'S INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING

UNCLAS ASHGABAT 000542 STATE FOR S/CT BATJER JOHNSON, SCHULTZ SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC KVPR KHLS TX SUBJECT: UPDATE ON TURKMENISTAN'S INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING PRACTICES REF: (A) 07 ASHGABAT 1059, (B) STATE 032287 ¶1. (U) Post presents the following updates to the survey on Turkmenistan's immigration control and watchlist systems for terrorist screening. Responses are keyed to lettered subheadings in ref B. ¶2. (SBU) A: Immigration Databases and Traveler Information Collection: No updates to report. ¶3. (SBU) B: Watchlisting: No substantive updates. The State Migration Service (SMS) has replaced the Agency for Registration of Foreign Citizens. ¶4. (SBU) C: Biometrics: No updates to report. ¶5. (SBU) D: Border Control and Screening: The Government of Turkmenistan uses computer software to screen all travelers. In order to obtain a visa, foreigners must first obtain a letter of invitation from the State Migration Service, which gives ample opportunity to prescreen incoming visitors and deny permission to any the government deems undesirable. If someone of interest did make it to the airport or a border crossing, the Immigration Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of National Security would take the charge in questioning, depending on the issue. There is no general law enforcement database, and information sharing within the Government of Turkmenistan is unreliable at best. ¶6. (SBU) E: Passports: Turkmenistan began issuing new passports with an embedded data-carrying chip in July, 2008. The passports were designed by a German company and feature more advanced security features. The chip includes fingerprint scans of the bearer's index fingers as well as the photograph and signature. It is unknown if the government shares the key to read the biometric information with any other governments. Replacement passports are generally identical to regular passports: they are issued for the full validity of 10 years and do not have a specific series. Post is unaware of specific methods of dealing with "habitual" passport losers, beyond the onerous documentation requirements to receive a passport in the first place, which must be completely replicated in order to receive a replacement. Post has not seen an increase in suspiciously "clean" passports, as many visa applicants still have their old passport (which functions as an internal identification document). ¶7. (SBU) F: Fraud Detection: No updates to report. ¶8. (SBU) G: Privacy and Data Security: Turkmenistan remains a tightly-controlled, autocratic, secretive government. Post believes that all information collected during the lengthy letter of invitation process (to obtain a visa) and any case files developed would be considered state secrets. The government is not specifically concerned about the privacy of personal information, either of its own citizens or foreigners, but rather protecting these "state secrets." There seem to be no laws permitting an individual to petition for access to data that security agencies hold on them. ¶9. (SBU) H: Identifying Appropriate Partners: Turkmenistan continues to be an unlikely partner for data sharing. MILES