IRAN/TURKMENISTAN: MORE ON BERDIMUHAMEDOV'S TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 000294 SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/IR AND SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2019 TAGS: EPET IR PGOV PREL TX SUBJECT: IRAN/TURKMENISTAN: MORE ON BERDIMUHAMEDOV'S TEHRAN VISIT REF: ASHGABAT 284 Classified By: DCM SYLVIA R. CURRAN. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) The Charge met March 3 with Polish Ambassador Maciej Lang, who offered further insight on the implications of President Berdimuhamedov's recent visit to Tehran (reftel). (NOTE: Ambassador Lang is a fluent Farsi speaker who has spent time in both Iran and Afghanistan and wrote a doctoral thesis in Poland on Iran's post-revolution foreign policy. He meets frequently with Iran's ambassador to Ashgabat, Mohammad-Reza Forqani. END NOTE) In his view, Iran has an image problem in Central Asia that it hopes to improve by enhancing its role in Turkmenistan's energy sector. IRAN DOESN'T NEED MORE GAS 2, (C) According to Ambassador Lang, Iran does not need more gas to meet its own consumption needs. However, it likely intends to use this second pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran, running from Yolotan down through the border town of Serahs, in order to "swap" Turkmen gas for Iranian liquid natural gas in the future. He also conjectured that Iran may be planning in the future to supply gas to western Afghanistan via a pipeline to Herat, with the aim of increasing its influence in that country. As for how Iran plans to single-handedly undertake development of the massive Yolotan gas field. Lang believes the Iranians will look for a partner, such as a South Korean company, to carry out the actual development and production. This would in turn allow the South Koreans to obtain some of the gas as well. He said that Iran seeks to be "interconnected," and that collaboration with other countries in the field of energy offers a perfect opportunity for this. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S.-IRANIAN REENGAGEMENT ¶3. (C) Ambassador Lang said he is "not so optimistic" about the likelihood of success should the United States seek to reengage with Iran, citing what he termed a "lack of common ground." What Iran wants above all, he said, is for the United States to acknowledge it as the region's main power. He also dismissed Iran's repeated assertions that it needs nuclear power to generate electricity for domestic consumption. If that were the case, he said, Iran could much more easily develop its own gas fields rather than insist on developing nuclear power stations. He called the Iranians "obsessed with their neighborhood," and said they feel driven to assert themselves vis-a-vis the Arabs, Turks, Afghans and Azeris who inhabit the (mostly) Sunni Muslim countries that surround them. AFGHAN CONFLICT SUITS IRAN ¶4. (C) According to Lang, Iran benefits from the continued conflict in Iran, the timing of which has allowed it to focus on their quest to develop a nuclear weapon. As long as the United States and NATO are tied down in Afghanistan, he said, they cannot devote their full attention and resources to confronting Iran. In that sense, Iran views the Taliban as a "useful irritant," but would not want them to seize power in Afghanistan. ISLAM AND SHI'ISM MERELY A TOOL ¶5. (C) Lang recounted an experience he had during the recent visit to Poland of an Iranian academic who is one of that country's main Holocaust deniers. EU officials took the Iranian delegation to Auschwitz so that they could see it first-hand. He said that the group was "very moved" by what they saw there and "utterly speechless" in the car on the ride back to Warsaw. Nevertheless, the same academic reiterated his anti-Holocaust rhetoric the minute he returned to Tehran. In Lang's view, this exemplifies the way that Iran's leadership uses symbols, including denial of the Holocaust, Shi'ism, and ultimately, Islam, "merely as a tool." He said, "they would abandon it all tomorrow if it suited their goals to do so." ASHGABAT 00000294 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Ambassador Lang, a skeptic by nature, is our only recent interlocutor to express pessimism about the possibility of reengagement between the United States and Iran. While we may not agree with all of his assessments, we find his views interesting. END COMMENT. MILES