TURKMENISTAN: OSCE CENTER CHIEF DESCRIBES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 001487

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN; DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2019
TAGS: PHUM PGOV OSCE TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: OSCE CENTER CHIEF DESCRIBES
CHALLENGES; SOME PROGRESS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Sylvia Reed Curran, Reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The head of the Ashgabat OSCE Center
briefed DAS George Krol about OSCE programs and prospects in
Turkmenistan. The number of projects i expanding, including
several new fields, but it seems the Turkmen are merely
checking a box by holding the events, with no tangible
results. The recent government restrictions on study abroad
for some students was an indication of how far the Turkmen
are from complying with their OSCE commitments. Within the
government, the bureaucracy remains an obstacle to reform.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On November 18, Head of Ashgabat OSCE Center Arsim
Zekolli briefed SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary George Krol
about the activities of the Center and his view of the path
ahead for its work in Turkmenistan. He began by describing
several important positives and negatives about the OSCE's
work in Turkmenistan. On the positive side, the OSCE has
increased the number of projects in the political, human, and
economic dimensions, including "ground-breaking" projects on
trafficking in persons, media, and border security training.
The Turkmen government has shown interest in working in the
political and economic dimensions, less so in the human
dimension. Negative developments have been the government's
refusal to allow some students to study abroad, including
those headed to the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, and the
continued rigidity of channels of communication in working
with the government.


3. (C) Regarding the Turkmen government's restrictions on
some students' study abroad, Zekolli said it came as a
surprise and the real motives are still unknown. He
speculated that it was a Turkmen government reaction to the
unrest in Iran following its presidential election and that
it clearly "came from the top." He also commented about the
growing tendency during the past six months for human rights
advocacy involving Turkmenistan to be directed at Russia. He
viewed the recent trial of environmentalist Andrey Zatoka as
the culmination of this trend, noting that the Zatoka case
generated criticism of the Center from outside Turkmenistan
-- that it was not able to do anything positive to resolve
the case. Zekolli warned against the danger of going from
the extreme of always being critical of the Turkmen
government to the other extreme of viewing its record and
actions too favorably. He said even the Turkmen government
expects criticism from the OSCE, but the organization is not
an independent NGO like Human Rights Watch or Reporters
without Borders.


4. (C) Zekolli said he was satisfied with the government-run
Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, and its director
Shirin Akhmedova. But while he respects her and is happy
with how she works, he noted that he would not pay her a
public compliment, only criticize, in order to avoid
jeopardizing her position within the government. In general,
Zekolli said the government needed to be able to accept
criticism not as "mud in the face," but as "red lines not to
be crossed." While diplomats in Turkmenistan will generally
say the government cadres are well-trained, the problem lies
in a lack of political will. Instead, the "mantra" prevails
that everything is ideal and perfect. At the same time,
older cadres trained during the Soviet era work to block
change. Zekolli suggested that, if one ministry could open
up and reform, perhaps others would follow suit. He
mentioned that the Ministry of Education is impenetrable, in
no small part because of its strategic significance in the
sense that every community throughout the country has a
school. Young people are directed to pursue technical
studies such as oil and gas, but not encouraged to become
lawyers, journalists and the like. (NOTE: While the Turkmen
leadership has no interest in young people studying liberal
arts, they have mentioned several times that they supported
more students entering law. END NOTE.)

ASHGABAT 00001487 002 OF 002




5. (C) Despite all the projects completed, Zekolli noted
that the Turkmen seem to be "checking a box" with their
participation. He saw no results that affected the person on
the street. When the OSCE organized trainings for customs
officials, law faculty, and media representatives, for
example, suggestions for practical exercises to complement
the theoretical lectures were ignored. Among the lessons
learned in implementing projects, Zekolli suggested that one
training trip abroad does more good than three months of
training in Turkmenistan. In proposing training projects for
consideration, the initial Turkmen reaction is consistently
distrust and suspicion until the OSCE is able to show how the
training will be carried out on the ground, at which point
the Turkmen become supportive.

6. (C) Since the Turkmen government refuses to provide
information about conditions in the country, the void is
filled by rumor and exaggeration within the international
community, which can be more negative than the reality.
Zekolli felt that, while Berdimuhamedov may want to see
reforms, the impetus for change stops in the bureaucracy.
Zekolli asked rhetorically why Berdimuhamedov takes on the
sins of Niyazov by continuing to detain those who were
political prisoners under the former president. Zekolli
opined that Berdimuhamedov could release them and lessen the
criticism by the international community. Zekolli recounted
a meeting with Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov where Zekolli
said that the relations between the OSCE Center and the
government were moving in a favorable direction and that the
OSCE wanted to cooperate with the government. A small
gesture by the government every month would help, for example
to start a student newspaper for youth issues. But
currently, according to Zekolli, no one knows how to address
the division of responsibility between the president and the
government and who should take action. Even "liberal"
Turkmen politicians think unanimously that the prisoners
should remain in prison.


7. (C) Zekolli observed that, during the opening ceremony of
an international conference on energy security in Ashgabat in
the spring, Berdimuhamedov was visibly angered when foreign
attendees turned their backs on him to look at the crowd of
students in the balcony cheering loudly for the president.
In Zekolli's view, the incident must have reminded the
president that while he may be able to command adulation and
respect at home, foreigners do not view him in the same way.
Zekolli's colleagues at neighboring OSCE centers have
remarked that the Turkmen are ridiculed and viewed as
insignificant and "weird" in their respective countries. He
suggested Turkmenistan's massive building projects are a
Turkmen play for respect.


8. (C) COMMENT: Alternating between positives and negatives,
Zekolli was essentially being realistic about the challenges
faced by the OSCE Center in performing its mission of
advancing Turkmenistan's compliance with OSCE commitments.
He also drew frequent parallels with his experience of
governments in the Balkans, but generally with the way things
were fifteen years ago. It remains to be seen if and when
the Turkmen will get beyond simply participating in OSCE
seminars and similar events, and muster the political will to
apply what is taught and make a noticeable difference in the
lives of average people. In the street outside his office
Zekoli confided to Krol that he has heard many rumors that
Foreign Minister Meredov may be ousted. If that happened, he
feared many associated with Meredov such as Democracy and
Human rights Center Director Akhmedova would also be relieved
of their duties. END COMMENT.


9. (U) DAS Krol cleared this cable.
CURRAN