Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ASHGABAT1380
2009-10-29 11:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ashgabat
Cable title:  

TURKMENISTAN: A LOOK INSIDE A TURKMEN EMBASSY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR TX 
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1214
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 4028
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 001380 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: A LOOK INSIDE A TURKMEN EMBASSY

Classified By: Charge Sylvia Reed Curran for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ASHGABAT 001380

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR TX
SUBJECT: TURKMENISTAN: A LOOK INSIDE A TURKMEN EMBASSY

Classified By: Charge Sylvia Reed Curran for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: When Turkmen embassies produce reporting it
generally does not get transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs mainly because there is no advanced technology used
to convey the information between Turkmen missions and
Ashgabat, and reporting is considered secondary to attending
and organizing events. In addition, all Turkmen mission
interactions with headquarters are reportedly controlled by
ambassadors. The ambassadors are usually former government
officials and seldom career diplomats; their ambassadorships
are seen as a reward for previous, governmental work. The
Ministry of National Security has influence over
ambassadorial appointments to missions, especially posts in
countries that could export Islamic extremism to
Turkmenistan. Strict government control of overseas posts,
has left Turkmen embassies and ambassadors with little room
for thinking outside the box. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) A former Turkmen MFA employee, who worked in the
Turkmen EMBASSY in New Delhi, India for eight years, told us
that only junior officers produce reporting at Turkmen
embassies. According to the former employee, reporting is
considered "dull and unpleasant" by more senior Turkmen
diplomats and consists of writing news briefs, which are
generally translations of the most interesting newspaper
articles of the day. In addition, these junior officers are
also required to write "references," which are in-depth
analyses on a topic, and often draw on academic resources;
they can be up to 30 pages. There is no standardized format
for the news briefs or references.

3. (C) The former MFA employee added, Turkmen diplomats do
not learn whether the Foreign Ministry in Ashgabat used their
information and assume that their reports go into a "black
hole." Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov reportedly
relies on the Foreign Information Department of the MFA for
his news, instead of relying on Turkmen embassies. The
Foreign Information Department tends to gather news from the
Internet and newswires and puts together a morning brief for
the President, which is delivered daily at 8 am.
Furthermore, our contact added, Turkmen diplomats almost
never have access to the Internet or email, forcing
communication with Ashgabat to become more of "an exercise in
obedience rather than utility."

4. (SBU) Our contact stated that Turkmen EMBASSY interactions
with the host government are almost always held at the
ambassadorial level. He added that the Ambassador is also
the only one authorized to interact with MFA headquarters in
Ashgabat. The former MFA employee asserted that by limiting
the number of MFA employees overseas authorized to interact
with the host government, other foreign governments, and the
Turkmen MFA, Ashgabat retains great control over its
diplomats. He added that the most active Turkmen missions
abroad are in Russia, Turkey, the U.S., the UN, and Iran.
According to the former MFA employee, in other less critical
countries the senior diplomats mostly attend command
performances and other official events and receptions.

5. (SBU) The former MFA employee told us Turkmen ambassadors
are usually former, high-ranking officials from a ministry or
a security agency, but seldom career diplomats.
Ambassadorial positions are treated as rewards for obedient
service. Ambassadors may pick prospective candidates for
their missions from MFA headquarters to fill key positions at
an embassy, but all the candidates are first vetted by the
Ministry of National Security (MNS) to ensure the they do not
allow anyone to go abroad who has a criminal record or links
to the underground opposition. The MNS influences Foreign
Service appointments, as well as security and consular
functions, he added. However, they do not shape foreign
policy, except in the cases of Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey,
where they are worried about the export of Islamic extremism,
drug trafficking, and trafficking in persons.

6. (SBU) COMMENT: Turkmen diplomats are not provided the
tools or opportunity to hone diplomatic skills and affect

ASHGABAT 00001380 002 OF 002


policy. Instead, the Ambassador is the only person in direct
contact with the capital, and the Ministry of National
Security has tremendous influence over diplomatic
appointments and work overseas. Forbidding diplomats to have
email accounts or access to the Internet are archaic but
effective means of ensuring that the President maintain
control at home and overseas. END COMMENT.
CURRAN

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