AFTER MAPUTO III: A FOOLISH RAJOELINA ON THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000846 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV PARIS FOR WALLACE BAIN LONDON FOR PETER LORD E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV MA MZ SUBJECT: AFTER MAPUTO III: A FOOLISH RAJOELINA ON THE OFFENSIVE REF: A. 09 ANTANANARIVO 831 ¶B. 09 ANTANANARIVO 833 Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Relations between Madagascar's four main political movements have taken a sharp turn for the worse following the latest "partial" summit in Maputo (ref A). Under the direction of President Chissano, former presidents Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy agreed on a compromise to unblock the formation of a transition government, rebalance the contentious "Presidential Council", and provide for the rapid implementation of the other "Maputo institutions" (septel). Transition President Andry "TGV" Rajoelina refused to participate except by telephone, however, and is now alleging "high treason" against what he sees as an attempt to sideline him. He has even closed the air space from Mozambique to prevent the alleged "traitors" from returning to Antananarivo. UN contacts present in Maputo have indicated that the latest declaration does indeed represent progress, and that Rajoelina was kept informed during the summit. Rajoelina may simply be appealing to his fractious support base, but this time he may have overplayed his hand, and has left himself little room to compromise. The ambassador demarched his foreign minister and secretary-general on December 9 to appeal for calm and ask that no more fuel be thrown on the fire. French Minister Joyandet reportedly passed the same message to Rajoelina by phone. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) "Maputo III", the fourth international "summit" of Malagasy political movements, took place from December 3 to 8 in Maputo, Mozambique, and ended with the signature of a declaration and a series of brief "resolutions" tweaking the August 9 Charter of the Transition and the November 7 Addendum (full text in septel). Despite yesterday's immediate, vitriolic response from Rajoelina, who chose to participate over the weekend only by phone rather than travel himself, the deal takes some sensible steps forward in resolving the current impasse, notably over cabinet assignments and the immediate constitution of the other Maputo institutions (Congress, CNR, and Senate/CST). After dividing up the bulk of the ministerial nominations among the four movements (and giving five to "other forces" from outside the four),the document outlines a more neutral procedure for the contentious justice, communications, and internal security portfolios, involving nominations by one party, and selection by another. While imperfect, it is the first time that specific ministerial portfolios have been assigned to specific movements in writing; previous documents stopped short of such details. ¶3. (C) Despite his telephonic participation over the weekend, however, Rajoelina was swift in denouncing moves to weaken the presidency in Resolution number one. In the November 7 Addis Addendum, the movements devised an executive with a President (Head of State) and a "Presidential Council" composed of two co-presidents - one each from the Zafy and Ravalomanana movements. Resolution 1 from Maputo III, however, subtly states that the Presidential Council is "composed of the President and the two Co-Presidents". This addresses the Co-Presidents' concerns that they had been sidelined and unfunded since November 7, but it amounted to "treason" for Rajoelina, as an attempt to eviscerate his powers as Head of State. In a communique issued December 8, however, Rajoelina denounced the effort entirely, stating that the summit participants had "unilaterally modified the dispositions concerning the President of the Transition and the Presidential Council by including the President in the Presidential Council", and that this modification is "null and void as it is contrary to the principles of consensus and inclusivity(...)". The communique states that "the formation of a government...is an attack on national sovereignty", and that the changes to the Presidential Council is an expression of the three movements' wish to "eliminate Andry Rajoelina as head of state". ¶4. (C) The December 8 communique ends by stating that Rajoelina "will consider the will of the three movements to part from the Charter of the Transition...and will take necessary measures". By that evening, these measure began taking form: the delegations' return flight from Mozambique was blocked before taking off, and official sources in Madagascar Civil Aviation (ACM) have confirmed to EmbOff that an order has been issued blocking flights from Mozambique; ANTANANARI 00000846 002 OF 002 media sources indicate that the ban extends to March 2010. In addition, sources within the MOJ have confirmed that arrest warrants have been issued for members of the delegations that participated in Maputo, although specifics are not yet available. French Ambassador Chataigner stated to Ambassador Marquardt that the de facto Vice-Minister of Interior told him she was unaware of any such warrants. He also reported that Cooperation Minister Joyandet had called Rajoelina directly to call for calm and restraint in the current situation ¶5. (C) In response to this sudden deterioration, Ambassador Marquardt initiated a demarche this afternoon on Foreign Minister Andriamanjato and Rajoelina's Secretary-General Resampa, both of whom also denied the existence of arrest warrants (although they argued that a case could be made for issuing them). However, their alleged existence has been widely reported in the press and is taking on a life of its own. In that meeting with ambassador and DCM, Andriamanjato called the situation "alarming" and walked through a typically lengthy chronology of how they got to this new low point. In reply, the ambassador agreed the situation was alarming and bluntly called on the Rajoelina faction and especially on Rajoelina himself to refrain from any further escalation of tensions through any more ill-considered press statements. Andriamanjato said they would like the ICG to be convened in Antananarivo as soon as possible to put the process back on track. While neither endorsing nor rejecting this proposal, the ambassador cautioned that time was very short before AGOA and other consequences start to bite. He argued that the Maputo participants should be permitted to return safely from Maputo as soon as possible for a collegial discussion of their proposals with Rajoelina in order to form a government immediately. The ambassador placed the blame for the failures of Maputo with Rajoelina for refusing to go there in the first place, knowing as he did that there could be no discussion on Malagasy soil with Ravalomanana or Ratsiraka present. That said, he advised them to look forward, not backwards, and to elect simply not to react to incendiary statements or actions that might come from the other side. He said that the outside world would hold Rajoelina individually responsible for whatever happens here: as he took power and is now the sole president, the onus of providing the necessary leadership is primarily on him now. They took note and expressed thanks for American interest and engagement in solving Madagascar's problems, stating that they would meet Rajoelina immediately after the meeting and make sure he learned of our views and concerns. ¶6. (SBU) The ambassador also precipitated an urgent meeting of the local ICG on Thursday morning to take stock and consider joint actions that might help put the derailed government formation process back on track. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: There is now a sense that Rajoelina has overplayed his hand to appease domestic supporters. The flight cancellation is an ominous sign that Rajoelina may have given up on compromise, due to perceptions that the pre-Maputo III cabinet impasse is intractable, or that the Maputo III resolutions themselves are another compromise too far. A December 3 letter to the Danish Prime Minister (which hit the papers on December 8),in which the other movements request that Rajoelina not be seated at the Copenhagen climate summit or be issued a visa, no doubt caused anger within hsi camp, but they do not fully explain the abrupt shift in it - particularly as Chissano kept him in the loop by phone during the talks. The recent "assassination attempt" provides further grist for the mill among Rajoelina's more virulent supporters, but there is no doubt that key players in his camp are fully aware of the negative impact that a full "rupture" will have on international engagement, AGOA, and any progress towards holding elections in the near future. In an interview published today, Rajoelina called the Maputo III resolutions "a coup d'etat" and stated that he "is no longer solely responsably" if the political impasse results in sanctions. He also asserted that "it is the three former presidents who want to destroy the country." It remains unclear what possible gymnastics would allow him to move from that extreme position to forming a government with the traitors, if and when they are allowed to return to Madagascar. END COMMENT. MARQUARDT