COMOROS STILL VERY FRAGILE AS ELECTIONS APPROACH

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000811 E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2014 TAGS: PREL PINR PGOV KPIR MA IR SUBJECT: COMOROS STILL VERY FRAGILE AS ELECTIONS APPROACH Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.5 D and E. ¶1. (C) Summary. During a three-day visit to Grande Comore, only my second visit to the country in 2009, I found the country busily if somewhat tensely preparing for December legislative elections. President Sambi was typically upbeat in his assessment and asked again for the USG to increase its presence and engagement in the Comoros. The French Ambassador predicts trouble ahead whatever the outcome of the upcoming elections, as Sambi continues his manoeuvering to extend his mandate beyond its normal end in 2010. If he wins a legislative majority which then votes to extend him beyond 2010, that is likely to provoke separatist tendencies, especially in Moheli, whose people will resent the delay in getting (and fear eventually losing altogether) "their turn" at the rotating presidency; if he fails to get that majority, Sambi may resort to other means to accomplish his goals, with unpredicatable but surely negative repercussions for island stability. The French envoy also sees an increasingly heavy Iranian hand at play there, including as a surreptitious, illegal weapons provider. An unseemly confrontation between Sambi and CHOD BG Salimou is generating coup jitters, most likely unfounded -- a greater worry is that Sambi will misstep and fire Salimou for perceived insubordination; Salimou, for his part, claims to be protecting the military from attempts at politization by Sambi. The first major incidence of maritime piracy in Comoros waters -- a recent but unsuccessful attack twenty miles off Moroni against an Italian vessel -- has added another challenge to the Comoros' already daunting list. The inauguration of a major CJTF-HOA-funded primary school south of Moroni, attended by Sambi and his entire government, provided a wonderfully hopeful bilateral focal point to the visit. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU). I visited Grande Comore island (Ngazidja) November 21-23, primarily to inaugurate with President Sambi the new, CJTF-HOA-funded primary school at Nioumamilima 90 minutes south of Moroni on the slopes of the Karthala volcano. Given the press of events in Madagascar, this was only my second visit to the Comoros in 2009 (as against six or seven visits there in 2008),and the first time I had seen Sambi since last December. (He travels abroad more than he stays at home, and was absent when I last visited in July. He had been abroad for the past two weeks -- in Egypt for the China-Africa Summit, in Rome for the FAO food security summit, and in Turkey for a bilateral visit -- when he returned to Moroni late on November 21.) During the visit I also had contact with both Vice Presidents, several other members of the Union government, CHOD BG Mohamed Salimou, the French, AU, and South African ambassadors, and the UNDP representative. With political campaigning already under way in preparation for legislative elections on December 6 and 20, I found Moroni atypically animated with large crowds meeting to hear candidates, convoys of cars circling the city and island blasting campaign messages, many political billboards and posters visible, and a general atmosphere of heightened civic engagement. Sambi marked the first-ever visit to the Comoros of the World Cup (i.e. the trophy itself),en route eventually to South Africa, with a festive buffet on Sunday night at his palace which seemed to be attended by everyone but the increasingly estranged Ngazidja opposition. Clearly in campaign mode, Sambi again made an appearance at a soccer game organized on Monday at which he again was widely photographed with the Cup hoisted high above his head. ¶3. (C) Before driving up to the school event together, I met for 30 minutes with Sambi on Monday morning, first introducing to him the Mission's relatively new Comoros officer, who I said was on his fourth trip to Comoros since September. Sambi's advisor Nakchami was also present. Sambi pled for more US engagement, thanking us for the various school projects being realized by CJTF/HOA teams throughout the archipelago. Sambi noted that he has no investment budget at all and thus needs such assistance if he is to build any new schools. With reference to a recent piracy attempt in Comoran waters, he inquired about the delivery date of the Arch Angel patrol boat purchased with FMF; I said delivery now is expected in February, 2010. Sambi explained that there even had been a recent attempt by Congolese migrants to traverse Comoron waters en route to Mayotte -- another mission for the new vessel will be interdiction of such clandestine efforts, Sambi said. He asked about the embassy office project in Moroni and the proposal to bring back the Peace Corps; I told him that we are discussing these proposals with the new teams at State and PC. ¶4. (C) Turning to the upcoming legislative elections, I informed him that although the USG is not providing funding, we will have a seven-person embassy observer team, covering each of the three islands, for each of the two rounds. I observed that the situation in Comoros remains fragile and expressed our concern for free and fair elections as a necessary part of the way forward. He welcomed this engagement and said he is working on creating a "culture of democracy" in his country. He said that (unnamed) "others have not kept their promises, but we are pushing ahead. I, personally, am a democrat," he asserted. I explained briefly our shock and dismay at how a supposed democracy in Madagascar had come part so quickly and suddenly, and suggested that it offers a cautionary example for his country to consider. I stressed the importance of strengthening democratic institutions, and of listening carefully to what the people say. He agreed and noted the existence of freedom of speech in Comoros. I asked what had recently happened with opposition leader Larifou, briefly detained last week for insulting Sambi. Sambi described Larifou as a lawer from Reunion who only comes to Comoros around elections; "I am not even a candidate and still he insults me!" I explained that democratic leaders must develop a tolerance for such speech. Sambi closed the meeting by quickly recounting with obvious, deep pride his recent encounters in New York with President Obama. ¶5. (C) At the school inauguration, I was seated on the dias between Sambi and BG Salimou, who had not seen one another since Sambi's return from abroad. Their body language was tense because Salimou had sent, during Sambi's absence and with multiple cc addressees, a very blunt letter to the Moheli commander who had just been appointed directly by Sambi, apparently without Salimou's prior knowledge, let alone assent. The letter directed the commander to ignore the appointment by Sambi, which Salimou said, obviously correctly, was not in conformity with the usual command structure. Sambi leaned over me to crisply direct Salimou to report to his office at 1900 that evening (Nov. 23). Later, while Sambi was speaking, Salimou confided to me that he is concerned that Sambi may dismiss him because of the letter and his resistance to the appointment. He explained that his intent was to protect the military from politicization by Sambi, of which this improper appointment was not the only example. I asked him to remain in touch with us as this saga unfolds. ¶6. (C) Over lunch later on Monday, French Ambassador Luc Hallade, now at post well over one year, freely shared his concerns with me and Comoros Officer about the elections and particularly about what will follow them. He noted that funds are in short supply for candidates to run, which gives the advantage to Sambi's supporters. Promised payments by the EU and AU are delayed, although he does not expect the elections to be compromised as a result. He is frustrated by the EU's inefficiencies in running programs in the Comoros, including electoral support, from distant Mauritius. He also described a recent fiasco in Brussels where opposition leaders had asked the EU not to finance the elections -- after having delivered the opposite message in Moroni; that snafu was worked out, not without difficulty, after Sambi convened a meeting with opposition resulting in a written request for EU funding. An elections oversight committee composed of local diplomats was to meet for the first time on November 24. Hallade predicts trouble ahead whatever the outcome of those elections, as Sambi continues his manoeuvering to extend his mandate beyond its normal end in ¶2010. If he wins a legislative majority that then extends him beyond 2010, that is likely again to provoke separatist tendencies, especially in Moheli, whose people will resent the delay in getting (and fear eventually losing altogether) "their turn" at the rotating presidency. If he fails to get that majority, Sambi may resort to other means to accomplish his goal, with unpredicatable but surely negative repercussions for Union stability and cohesion. Hallade noted that Vice President Ikililou, the senior-most Mohelian in the GOUC, had turned out to be a strong performer since taking over the finance portfolio several months ago. Hallade said the French had not yet done much analysis of which Mohelian candidates might be strongest if and when Moheli gets "its turn" at the rotating presidency, but saw Ikililou as a bit of a rising star. The problem, he said, is that he doesn't have much popularity on Moheli -- a problem for any candidate as the first round will be a vote only among Mohelians to select the three strongest candidates to be voted on across the Union in the second round. ¶7. (C) The French envoy also sees an increasingly heavy Iranian hand at play there, including as a surreptitious, illegal weapons provider to the Presidential Guard and to the army (AND) as well. He said he has informed Paris but cannot prove it. He also blamed the local Iranian intelligence service for spreading false rumors of an impending coup attempt by Salimou against Sambi. (Those rumors were much in evidence across Moroni during the short visit.) Obviously, Hallade said, if Salimou intended to unseat Sambi by force, he would not have sent that letter around to everyone in town! The Iranians, he suggested, are trying to discredit Salimou to make it easier for Sambi to replace him with a new CHOD from Sambi's home island of Anjouan. The recent return from training in Morocco of a certain Anjouanese colonel as the new presidential military advisor, and the recent reinstatement in the AND of the former (and also Anjouanese) Comoran Ambassador to Madagascar -- and former foreign minister -- are both suspiciously indicative of Sambi's possible intentions to replace Salimou with an Anjouanese, he said. Firing Salimou, in Hallade's view, would be a major error on Sambi's part, but is not to be excluded as a possibility. 8 (C) Hallade, like Sambi, expresssed concern about the recent, failed piracy attempt just off Moroni against an Italian freighter (septel to follow with more detail). This marked the not-unexpected arrival of Indian Ocean piracy in Comoran waters. The GOUC was sufficiently alarmed by the event to have convened three ministerial meetings since it occurred, to discuss their response options. Hallade said they really have no response capability, other than calling France. When the Arch Angel arrives, they may become more capable. For their part, the French have deployed the majority of their maritime assets in Reunion, east of Madagascar and thus too far away to be much use, in real time, in the Mozambique Channel. He said there are several patrol boats in nearby Mayotte, but nothing of the size available in Reunion. He was unaware of any internal GOF discussion about possibly moving assets to Mayotte from either Reunion or the Seychelles. Clearly, he said, the alarm has been sounded on the piracy issue. Noting the extreme porosity of Comoran borders, Hallade said he would not be surprised if foreign pirates even set up land bases on Comoran islands to support their operations at sea. "Nothing here will stop them," he concluded. ¶9. (C) Bio note on Luc Hallade: Hallade arrived here in July 2008 with a background in development across Africa. He is an AFD (French USAID-equivalent) official with prior senior embassy experience in DROC, Cameroon, and elsewhere in Africa. With a young Cameroonian wife and small children, he cuts a distinctly different -- and much more welcome -- profile from his unapologetically neo-colonialist predecessor, Christian Job. Job's linen suits, public rantings, and haughty prescriptions to the Comorans were little appreciated and helped fuel an enduring and unhelpful image of the French as unchanged since before independence. Hallade, for his part, is out and about the island of Ngazidja visiting development projects and dialoging with village notables. Without overt reference to Job, he admits that the task of improving and modernizing France's image in a country where they are blamed for everything that goes wrong will require as much of this approach as he can find time for. He regrets, at the same time, that here is no time for him to engage in much such personal outreach on the other two islands. MARQUARDT