PRESIDENT MAY BE OPEN TO MEETING -- BUT NOT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000069 E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 TAGS: MA PGOV PINR PREL SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MAY BE OPEN TO MEETING -- BUT NOT TO REAL DIALOGUE REF: ANTAN 68 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.4b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: President Ravalomanana told ambassadors Thursday that he is open to meeting the Mayor, but not to any broad dialogue with him, or anyone else. A meeting may or may not occur Friday at 1500 at the German residence. Prospects for the meeting have dimmed as the Mayor publicly stated that the meeting would be to discuss a transition government, after the President had insisted on meeting without conditions. The situation is therefore not yet ripe here for any message from Washington to the President. End summary. ¶2. (C) The chiefs of mission from US, France, Germany, EU, and the UN system met President Ravalomanana Thursday at 1700 for about 30 minutes. Our intent was to stress the dire sitution now prevailing in Madagascar and to push the President to accept the need for a wide-ranging dialogue, intially with the Mayor but eventually with a broader spectrum of political actors, about the future of the country and its governance. In the event, we took turns raising the same issues and each time the President cut us off crisply but politely with reassurances that there is no need to change the government, to change any ministers, to hold any conferences, or to include other actors in the dialogue. He agreed in principle to meet the Mayor alone, saying "we can take this little by little." He complained of the Mayor's duplicitous nature and therefore of the difficulty in negotiating with him. He stressed confidence-building measures he has already approved, like restoring Viva radio and TV and a public denial of the "ridiculous rumor" of the presence in Madagascar of foreign mercenaries. He confirmed his commitment to avoiding further bloodshed and said that the restraint of the military earlier this week had been intentional. The President mentioned the change in leadership of the National Gendarmerie approved that day, saying that it will help to have a Cotier in charge as they deal with problems on the coasts.He also listed various political actors from both the coast and the plateau "with whom I will deal with separately and individually". He named the price that each of these actors would require in exchange for acquiescence to Ravalomanana's continuing rule: some want money, others want a place in the government, others (Zafy) want coastal interest to be emphasized. He said he would not deal with the ex-Arema leadership at all, including Roland Ratsiraka. He also requested our help in rebuilding his country after this week's destruction. ¶3. (C) I relayed the President's openness to a meeting to the Mayor afterward. He readily accepted and proposed 1500 Friday. By Friday morning the word back from the Presidency on that proposal was that the President was extremely annoyed that the Mayor had said publicly by radio that he would be meeting the President "to discuss a transition government," and that he was only willing to meet without pre-conditions. Foreign Minister Ranjeva came to see me mid-morning on Friday to discuss ways to get the President back on track for the meeting this afternoon. He agreed that the status quo ante is not possible and asked us to keep pushing the President to accept the meeting and, over time, to agree to make concessions. He left to see the Prime Minister to discuss the situation, and then hoped to see the President directly to encourage him to keep the 1500 appointment. I and the German Ambassador have a 1200 appointment with the Mayor to encourage him to tone down his public rhetoric and to prepare him for a first encounter with the President that clearly will fall short of his expectations. Our objective is to dissuade him from any inflammatory statements after the meeting, including at tomorrow's demonstration on the Place du 13. Mai. ¶4. (C) Comment: Notwithstanding assurances from both sides of their willingness to meet, this week's several failed meetings highlight the difficulty of actually bringing the two parties together. Culturally, it is important for Malagasy leaders to appear open to dialogue, and indeed the public is hanging here on this meeting taking place, if only as a modest first step toward eventual real dialogue. The President probably perceives the balance of power shifting in his favor, as he has restored order, notes the fractious nature of the Mayor's coalition and his difficulties in holding it together, sees the public getting tired of confrontation, perhaps thinks the Mayor's popularity is falling (evidenced by yesterday's failed "ville morte," and reinforced if a smaller crowd show up tomorrow),and -- given his statements to us about the "price" of various opposition camps -- intends to do whatever it takes to peel them off one by one. As such, the President probably sees time as being on his side and is in no hurry to accept negotiations or offer concessions. The quixotic Mayor's calculations are harder to perceive, but if he also senses his coalition weakening or his popularity falling, he might be more inclined to double-down with more extreme statements that worsen the situation. Concerning the President, it is clear from conversations with Ranjeva and others that he remains overly confident, unpredictable, isolated, and is not listening to much advice from anyone (nor is anyone inclined to give him any hard messages). For now, we recommend keeping a line open to Paris on their plans and perceptions. It is clearly premature to make any call to Ravalomanana now or soon, as he is in not open to hearing any hard messages at this time. End comment. MARQUARDT