MADAGASCAR: WILL TGV CHOOSE CONSENSUS OR CHAOS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000630 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV TREASURY FOR FBOYE PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV MA SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: WILL TGV CHOOSE CONSENSUS OR CHAOS? REF: ANTANANARIVO 618 Classified By: P/E CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) Summary: The Malagasy are anxiously awaiting the declaration by de facto transition leader, "TGV" Rajoelina, expected late Sept 4, as to whether his movement will accept a consensus candidate for prime minister, ceding their control of the post. AU mediator Ouedraogo continues to push the four main political factions towards agreement, but if Rajoelina refuses to free up the post, the difficult negotiations undertaken in Mozambique over who will fill important transition government posts could be back to square one. The international community is pessimistic about Rajoelina's planned announcement, but are holding out hope and expecting the unexpected. The U.S. Mission mirrored the UNSYG's office in putting out a local press staement earlier today pushing the parties back toward a consensual solution. End summary. Rajoelina Blocks Consensus -------------- ¶2. (C) Consensus on the posts of president, vice president, and prime minister for a consensual transition government was not reached during the second round of negotiations by Madagascar's four main political movements last week in Mozambique, and de facto transition leader Rajoelina requested an extension, which was granted until September 4, to confer with his supporters (reftel). According to AU mediator Ablasse Ouedraogo, speaking during a meeting of the local ICG-M this morning in 'Tana, the four movements had almost reached agreement on the division of president to the Rajoelina movement, vice president to that of Zafy, and prime minister to Ratsiraka's group. However, Rajoelina's hard-line delegation blocked him from agreeing to dump the current prime minister, Monja Roindefo, in favor of a Ratsiraka nominee. It is unclear if Ravalomanana would have accepted Rajoelina as president, but Ouedraogo was confident that the ousted president would have had no choice but to go along if Rajoelina had not stymied the agreement. All Sides Harden Public Posture -------------- ¶3. (C) Following their failure to agree in Maputo, the Ravalomanana and Rajoelina camps proceeded to take increasingly harder positions in the media, although they continued to indicate some level of flexibility in private conversations. Ravalomanana announced that he would never accept either "coup-plotter" (Rajoelina and Roindefo) at the head of the transition, while Rajoelina's camp vowed that they would not be pressured by the international community, whom he said they could do without. Zafy called all four movements to negotiate, but Rajoelina refused to participate. The other three movements (Zafy, Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka) declared Sept 3 that the military should appoint the top three posts, as the civilians could not decide, likely in an effort to pressure Rajoelina to cede, but the military leadership (not representative of the whole) adamantly rejected the idea of intervention in a public announcement early Sept 4. Their statement was possibly influenced by both Ouedraogo's and the Ambassador's counseling against such an idea when advice was sought by leaders of the military, including General Rabarisoa, in separate meetings Sept 3. But Are More Flexible in Private -------------- ¶4. (C) The leader of the Ravalomanana delegation, Fetison, told Emboff that Ravalomanana was willing to accept that the presidency go to any movement but Rajoelina's. He believed Rajoelina was afraid of dumping Roindefo as prime minister because he controlled the mutinous, CAPSAT military members who now lead the military. In Fetison's opinion, Rajoelina personally wanted to give up his post as transition president, but was forced to remain by his advisers, including militants Norbert Lala Ratsirihonana and Alain Ramaroson. Many other embassy contacts share the view that Rajoelina fears for his physical safety if he steps down -- and that he suffers from mood swings ranging from desperation lows to power highs. The leader of the Rajoelina movement, foreign minister Ny Hasina, told the Ambassador privately that he understood that Rajoelina had to cede one of the top ANTANANARI 00000630 002 OF 002 two posts, and said that he was encouraging him to remove Roindefo by offering him the prestigious slot of Senate President. He argued that the prime minister position should be a consensus candidate that did not come from the four movements, and suggested retired General Ismael Monibou (whom he preferred as the General would have sway over the military),Aristide Velompanahy (education minister under Ratsiraka and, like Roindefa, a native of Tulear),or the current Director General of the National Administration School (ENA) as possible candidates. International Pressure Builds -------------- ¶5. (C) Ouedraogo explained that the September 4 deadline had been set by Mediator Chissano in order to have closure prior to the Sept 6-7 SADC summit in Kinshasa. There Chissano is expected to give a report, which could generate sanctions (about which the French Charge expressed grave concern). According to the transition charter signed in Maputo, the four movements have until Sept 9 to put the transition government and other new institutions in place, but it is now clear that the deadline will not be met. The EU also plans to hold consultations with Madagascar in mid-Sept in the framework of the Cotonou Accords to assess progress, and the AU may consider sanctions once the 6-month mark following the March 17 coup is reached in mid-Sept. The four movements are all also aware of the upcoming AGOA decision. Meanwhile, the economic situation continues to deteriorate and the HAT is increasingly strapped for cash. The UN and the embassy both released press statements Sept 4 urging consensus. All of these points of pressure are building, and Ouedraogo plans to make a last-ditch effort to convince Rajoelina to compromise and get the four movements together Sept 4, prior to the anticipated announcement later in the day of Rajoelina's decision. Ouedraogo also proposed holding a high-level contact group meeting here during the first half of October, attended by representatives from member country capitals, to keep the pressure on the Malagasy political leaders. Various members of the contact group suggested that such a meeting be arranged instead in New York on the margins of the UNGA, both to facilitate the meeting and to accelerate the timetable for holding it. The U.S. Mission put out a press statement early this morning mirroring that of the UNSYG's office, pushing again for consensus under the Maputo process and accords. Comment: Outcome Uncertain -------------- ¶6. (C) It is clear that the military is increasingly divided, particularly between Rajoelina supporters and Ratsiraka supporters -- but also between those behind Rajoelina and those favoring Roindefa. However, it is not clear that those divisions will lead to any concrete action. The military's public announcement Sept 4 may have calmed fears of military intervention, et least for the moment. All bets are off as to what Rajoelina will announce today -- will he agree to give up the prime minister position, or will he stand pat and further isolate the HAT from the international community? If he refuses to reach agreement with the other three movements, how will they -- or elements of the military -- react? Do the other movements have sufficient backing in the military to react with force, or will they continue to rely on moral persuasion and the insistence of the international community on consensus to push their cause? Post believes the latter to be more likely. The consensus of today's ICG-M was pessimistic that Rajoelina will make the right decision later today, but some are hoping to be surprised. Given the importance of the pending decision, Ouedraogo agreed to hold another ICG-M meeting Saturday morning Sept 5 to take stock and possibly to coordinate a joint response to tonight's announcement. End comment. MARQUARDT