MAPUTO II: NO AGREEMENT ON TRANSITION LEADERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000618 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV USDOC FOR BECKY ERKUL - DESK OFFICER TREASURY FOR FBOYE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019 TAGS: PGOV MA MZ SUBJECT: MAPUTO II: NO AGREEMENT ON TRANSITION LEADERS REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 589 ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 604 ¶C. MAPUTO 965 Classified By: P/E CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) Summary: After three days of tense negotiations aimed at dividing up posts in a consensus transition government, Madagascar's four main political rivals failed to reach agreement on who would fill the top posts of transition president, vice president, and prime minister. However, they did reaffirm their commitment to the August 9 Maputo I accords, and allocated the majority of lower-level positions. They gave themselves until September 4 to reach agreement on the top three jobs, although their current positions will be hard to finesse: the HAT camp is unwilling to accept that Rajoelina give up his position as president, while the Ravalomanana camp has taken a firm "anyone but Rajoelina" position. As Rajoelina and his delegation return to Madagascar, it is unclear what the immediate fallout will be, and whether he even has the political capital left to continue negotiating at all. End summary. No Agreement on Top Posts -------------- ¶2. (SBU) After three days of tense negotiations aimed at dividing up posts in a consensus transition government, Madagascar's four main political rivals failed to reach agreement on who would fill the top posts of transition president, vice president, and prime minister. De facto president and coup leader Rajoelina, ousted President Ravalomanana, and former Presidents Ratsiraka and Zafy met in Maputo, Mozambique under the auspices of the AU-SADC-OIF-UN mediation led by former Mozambican President Chissano August 25 through 27. This second meeting in Maputo followed up on transition charter agreements signed on August 9 (ref A) which require the four parties to form a unity government by September 8. Rajoelina and his delegation insisted on maintaining the presidency, as well as the prime minister position currently held by Monja. Zafy supported this proposition, but Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana were opposed. While Ratsiraka reportedly showed more flexibility towards the end of negotiations, Ravalomanana remained firm that a coup-leader should not be rewarded by being allowed to lead the transition -- thus "legitimizing the coup". The four �00A;movements gave themselves until September 4 to reach agreement on these top three positions; Rajoelina stated that he needed this time to confer with his supporters on the possibility of ceding the prime minister job to the Ratsiraka camp. Although the Ravalomanana delegation stated that they were opposed to the transition president coming from the HAT camp, their opposition is mainly focused on Rajoelina himself. It was rumored in the Malagasy press that Ravalomanana was even willing to accept Monja as president with a prime minister from the Ratsiraka camp, which, if true, suggests that Ravalomanana's personal enmity towards Rajoelina, and fear of competing with him in the eventual presidential elections, are the main stumbling blocks to a Rajoelina presidency. This mentality was confirmed by Rajoelina's close adviser Prega Ramsamy, who told Maputo Pol Off that Ravalomanana was willing to accept anyone but Rajoelina as transition president (ref C). But Lower Level Positions Allocated -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Although the leadership question was unresolved, several key posts were allocated. The leaders of the high transition council (analogous to the senate) will be appointed by the Rajoelina movement, those of the transition congress by Ravalomanana's group, those of the national reconciliation council by Zafy's delegation, and the leaders of the economic and social council by civil society (although the specific elements representing Madagascar's fractious "civil society" have not been elaborated). The Ravalomanana, Zafy, and Rajoelina movements will also each designate one vice prime minister and his/her related ministerial posts. This allocation suggests that perhaps Ratsiraka's group will eventually be given the prime minister role, with Rajoelina's movement retaining the presidency, IF they can reach consensus. What Went Wrong? ANTANANARI 00000618 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶4. (C) The fatal flaw from Maputo I was the failure to bar the transition president from eventually running in the presidential election, due to Rajoelina's firm objection to such a provision. Agreement was reached during Maputo I that no one involved in the transition government would be able to run for president, with the exception of the transition president. If the transition president had also been excluded, it would have been significantly easier at Maputo II to reach consensus on the presidency, as it would have been a far less attractive prize. Military Response -------------- ¶5. (C) As the status quo remains in place for now, the mutinous "CAPSAT" mid-level military officers who took charge of the military during the coup will likely be placated as they will retain their positions. They were rumored to have held secret meetings prior to Maputo II to discuss possible actions if negotiations did not meet their expectations, i.e., enable them to retain their current roles. With both Rajoelina and Monja out of the country, CAPSAT leader Colonel Noel (currently serving as Minister of Defense) was ominously left in charge as acting PM. However, having given away nothing at Maputo, the civilian leaders should have no trouble taking back the reins on their return, and other elements of the military are apathetic and unlikely to react at this time. Comment: Fallout -- What Happens Next? -------------- ¶6. (C) The HAT delegation is scheduled to return to Madagascar on August 28, where they will be confronted with a series of difficult decisions. There is a large, and loud, faction of HAT politicians and their supporters who didn't want Rajoelina to participate in Maputo II at all - and will be loath to see dialogue stretch out any further. Political detainees who were recently released after Maputo I will now be faced with uncertainty about their continued eligibility for "conditional release", which was done only grudgingly despite their Maputo I commitments. Finally, the question of international engagement will only be further complicated if the Contact Group's mediation effort has failed (which may only be apparent after the deadlines on September 4th and 9th have passed). France has made no secret of its concern for stability and desire to move quickly past the current impasse, while most other members of the diplomatic community remain focused on finding a consensual, inclusive transition government. The accords signed at Maputo I may still provide a path forward, but it is up to the HAT to ensure that the process doesn't stop with today's bad news. END COMMENT. STROMAYER