MADAGASCAR: RAVALOMANANA SEEKING USG HELP HE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000476 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 TAGS: MA PGOV PREL PINR SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: RAVALOMANANA SEEKING USG HELP HE WON'T GET Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E ¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the ambassador in Johannesburg on June 22, former president Marc Ravalomanana requested USG help with his desired return to Madagascar and stressed the key role he must play as head of state in returning the country to "constitutional order". The ambassador responded that such assistance from the USG will not be forthcoming, and advised him instead not to return to Madagascar for now, and even to consider returning after the next election. Forcing the issue would endanger his security and risk inflaming the situation in Madagascar, the ambassador told him. Ravalomanana insisted that he remains very popular, including within the army, a view the ambassador questioned, and does not share. In separate meetings with his aides, the ambassador was more direct in stressing the need for Ravalomanana to stay away and not make trouble. His aides insist he is not/not on the verge of returning, contrary to continuing rumors and public statements. His aides are organizing separate activities, some trying to create an entente among Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy (and excluding Rajoelina),while another aide is pushing for a reconciliation speech on the June 26 National Day. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Marquardt traveled on June 22 to Johannesburg at the request of President Ravalomanana, meeting with him for one hour that evening in his suburban Sandton office suite. Also attending were Malagasy Ambassador to South Africa -- his anointed "Special Envoy" -- Denis Andriamandroso and Capetown Consul General Bary Rafatrolaza, a Malagasy parliamentarian-turned-diplomat. The other close aide working with Ravalomanana in Johannesburg is former SADC Secretary General Prega Ramsamy, who joined the conversation late. Ravalomanana's message to the ambassador was that he wishes to return to Madagascar to resume his previous role as head of state and seeks USG assistance in making this happen. He is concerned that failure to do so will send a message that "coups are OK", which in turn will encourage others to foment them in the future. Ravalomanana expressed surprise that the ambassador was, he had heard, opposed to his return. ¶3. (C) The ambassador responded that it would be nice if the political and security situation in Madagascar permitted Ravalomanana to resume his previous role, as that would be the quickest way to re-establish "constitutional order." However, the political situation remains highly charged, and his return, in the ambassador's view, would pose grave risks to his personal security while potentially re-igniting political passions. He should understand that the USG therefore will not provide such assistance. Furthermore, the ambassador advised that he should abandon his intention to return to Madagascar at this time, delaying his return until things settle -- and perhaps even waiting until after presidential elections while taking a longer-term view of his future in Madagascar. If Ravalomanana insists on running, this may induce Rajoelina to run as well (having first changed the constitution to make himself eligible),none of which would be desirable, the ambassador said. The ambassador continued that, after Ravalomanana's foreign minister recently proposed this idea to him in Antananarivo, he had explored with various other parties the notion of Ravalomanana playing a "Queen of England" role during the transition -- and found that no one (outside Ravalomanana's inner circle) at all interested. The ambassador said there is a continuing problem of trust toward Ravalomanana, with no one believing him capable of playing such a passive role. ¶4. (C) Ravalomanana was clearly disappointed with the ambassador's views, but he remained engaged, actually admitted making "many mistakes," and was mostly in listening mode -- a marked change from the past. He raised the recent SADC Summit, welcomed the entry of Chissano into the mediation, and opined that SADC is still behind him. The ambassador told him, based on word from SADC governments, that the military option was now entirely off the table, which is a good thing as force would never solve this problem. SADC's engagement -- now under South African not Swazi leadership -- is indeed a good thing, agreed the ambassador, but now the time has come for serious compromises on all sides, including his. The next step appears to be the convening of face-to-face talks somewhere in SADC by Chissano; Ravalomanana responded that he "had no problem" with meeting the others and is, in fact, in frequent touch with Ratsiraka and Zafy. He also admitted having recent contacts with TGV's Chief of Staff Zazah, who he said was considering a visit to Johannesburg on behalf of TGV. (Note: We subsequently learned that TGV sent former Prime Minister Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana to Jo'Burg on June 25 to see Ravalomanana.) ¶5. (C) Ravalomanana said he is deeply opposed to TGV running the transition, even if TGV will not be a candidate in the next election. "I should run it instead," he insisted. The ambassador asked how this could happen, to which there was no clear answer. Ravalomanana insisted that he remains popular in Madagascar, including within the army, and that "the people want me back." He went on at some length about deteriorating conditions in Madagascar since he left, complaining that programs like MCA had been lost and blaming TGV for human rights violations, intimidation, arrest, and other negative developments. He cited the CAPSAT mutineers and HAT member Alain Ramarason and his "militia" who are making the rounds terrorizing political opponents and stealing outright from wealthy Malagasy citizens. Ravalomanana also expressed deep concern about the possibility of recognition of the HAT. The ambassador reassured him that the USG will never recognize the HAT and that few other governments would consider doing so either. ¶6. (C) On June 23, the ambassador held separate meetings, first alone with Ramsamy, and later with Andriamandroso and Rafatrolaza, to reinforce his messages the night before to Ravalomanana. They all seemed genuinely interested in understanding current conditions in Madagascar that prevent Ravalomanana from returning. Ramsamy especially appeared to accept the ambassador's judgment that it would be very unwise to try to return, and said he would urge the president not to do so. Instead, he said he was drafting a "reconciliation speech" for Ravalomanana to give on or around the June 26 National Day holiday; this idea was presented to Ravalomanana over the weekend by UN mediator Tiebile Drame, who also visited him in Jo'Burg. ¶7. (C) Andriamandroso and Ratrafolaza spoke of a plan they are already engaged in to bring Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy together into some sort of reconciliation that would, at least initially, exclude Rajoelina. The ambassador cautioned against anything that would be exclusive as consensus will be required to resolve this crisis. In fact, the plan smacked much more of being a partisan political manoeuver than any real reconciliation. Andriamandroso also advocated including the CAPSAT mutineers in the political dialogue, an idea the ambassador strongly opposed. The ambassador stressed to the two diplomats that Ravalomanana, in fact, has become quite unpopular in Madagascar -- partly for having helped create the conditions for the coup; he should not overestimate popular enthusiam for his return, which is not shared even among some of his closest former loyalists, the ambassador said. Instead, many Malagasy want the former president to play a conciliatory "father of the nation" role, would urge him to back off his threatened return, expect him to negotiate to protect his safety and his family's and to seek to safeguard his extensive (and very vulnerable) business interests, He may well have a future political role to play in Madagascar, but not by returning and running for office now, the ambassador advised. ¶8. (C) Ambassador's Comment and Recommended Next Step: I was intentionally blunt and direct with Ravalomanana and his advisors in an effort to talk him off an unrealistic and potentially harmful set of objectives; as before, Ravalomanana is getting a narrow range of "soft" advice and needed to hear this message. I agree with UN mediator Drame that Ravalomanana is now a rather different, somewhat off-balance person than he was just three months ago when he left. SADC's new position and leadership role were still sinking in as he may still imagine support for him that is no longer there. Andriamandroso said Ravalomanana has been invited to Sirte by Qadhafi and that he definitely will attend the AU Summit. I recommend that Ambassador Carson meet him briefly there to make the USG position even clearer before Chissano convenes the next phase of the mediation (presumably shortly after Sirte). Should such a meeting occur Ambassador Carson should stress three points: that the United States does not believe that the return of Ravalomanana to Madagascar would be helpful any time before a consensual agreement is reached; that Ravalomanana should encourage reconciliation by ceasing his ongoing efforts to block progress with the international mediation effort; and that -- if by then he still has not done so -- he should make a conciliatory public statement supporting the mediation. MARQUARDT