Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO399
2009-06-04 07:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

MADAGASCAR: HOW LONG CAN THE HAT GOVERNMENT

Tags:  ECON EAID ENRG EFIN PGOV MA 
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P 040740Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2489
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000399 

SIPDIS


STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV
USDOC FOR BECKY ERKUL - DESK OFFICER
TREASURY FOR FBOYE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019
TAGS: ECON EAID ENRG EFIN PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: HOW LONG CAN THE HAT GOVERNMENT
SUSTAIN ITSELF?

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 356

B. ANTANANARIVO 366

ANTANANARI 00000399 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: ECONOFF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000399 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV USDOC FOR BECKY ERKUL - DESK OFFICER TREASURY FOR FBOYE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019 TAGS: ECON EAID ENRG EFIN PGOV MA SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: HOW LONG CAN THE HAT GOVERNMENT SUSTAIN ITSELF? REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 356 ¶B. ANTANANARIVO 366 ANTANANARI 00000399 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: ECONOFF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) Summary: The IMF predicts that Madagascar's transition government (HAT) will likely be able to make payroll for its workers and soldiers through July using normal fiscal revenues. However, during the latter half of 2009, the HAT will probably receive less tax and customs revenue, and cannot rely on foreign borrowing to help it fill the gap. Thus, it will be forced to issue high interest rate treasury bonds, borrow directly from the Central Bank, seek rents by granting monopolies, or profit from illicit trafficking of all sorts. French funding continues to play a role in sustaining the HAT. Madagascar's PRGF agreement with the IMF will end on July 19, 2009. End summary. Can the Government Pay Workers and Soldiers? -------------- ¶2. (C) At a meeting on June 2, IMF Resident Representative Pierre van den Boogaerde explained to Emboff that the GOM typically receives two-thirds of its annual income taxes during the first half of the year, with a large chunk coming in April and May when taxes are due. In addition, value added tax (VAT) receipts were "not too shabby" in April, although they were lower than usual, and the HAT forced the national social security fund (CNAPS) to buy 50 billion ariary (USD 25.6 million) of treasury bills. Thus, the HAT was able to pay salaries in April and May. They will likely be able to make all payments in June and probably in July. For the second half of the year, they will be relying mostly on VAT (rather than VAT and income taxes) so will be facing a more difficult situation, especially given the downward trend of VAT revenue. ¶3. (C) Total salary expenses run 39 billion ariary (USD 20 million) per month. If the HAT did not have any other expenses, they should be able to pay salaries through year-end, but they do have other expenses and have had to pay a few extraordinary ones recently. For example, Ambatovy mining companies were threatening to pull out if not given their VAT reimbursements, so they, as well as several oil companies, received VAT rebates. &
#x000A;¶4. (C) Salaries, including military ones, are being paid via an automated system. However, promised "extras" -- for supporting a coup -- are likely not all being paid; this potentially explains the recurring rumors that Emboffs have heard that certain segments of the military, particularly the mutinous CAPSAT soldiers that supported the coup, are not getting paid. Van den Boogaerde asserted that France has footed the bill for CAPSAT "extras". Although he cannot prove a direct link to the French government, there were multitudinous transfers from citizens in France to the HAT. Previously, remittances were next to nothing, and the Malagasy expats in France are not believed to have large sums of money. Many transfers were done by WesternQion, and many were made by exiled president Ratsiraka,s son-in-law, although other sources and means were used as well. The Indo-Pakistani "Karana" business community also provided significant funding to the HAT in the early stages of demonstrations, according to various sources, in order to throw off the yolk of Ravalomanana's economic monopolies. What are the HAT's Options after July? -------------- ¶5. (C) Some have placed their hopes on foreign saviors, but these are unlikely to appear. The Saudi investors that came recently and promised to deliver mountains of cheap goods were not affiliated with the Saudi government (ref A). They are a gang, likely affiliated with terrorist organizations, that want to launder money through building hotels in Nosy Be, according to Van den Boogaerde. The promised boatload of cheap goods was merely a bribe, which has not, to date, materialized. SAMIFIN, the financial intelligence unit launched in 2008 which is still operating on seed money that it got previously this year from Norway, is investigating the case. (Note: Post's understanding of the identity and ANTANANARI 00000399 002.2 OF 003 background of the "Saudi investors" has been reported in other channels.) ¶6. (C) If the HAT cannot make payroll, their borrowing options will be extremely limited -- issuing treasury bonds, which would drive up interest rates and crowd out private borrowing, or borrowing directly from the Central Bank, which would increase the money supply and cause inflation (a la Zimbabwe). The HAT predicts that they will only increase domestic borrowing specifically to cover the deficit by 14 percent (ref B),but their projections seem overly optimistic. There are legal limits on the amount they can borrow from the Bank, but there are many other laws, limits and paramaters that have not been respeced by the HAT either, he noted. ¶7. (C) There is one other cash cow that can be milked -- gemstones. The raw stone export ban imposeQy Ravalomanana in 2008 is still in place (while the black market flourishes),but the HAT is seeking ways to exploit this sector for its benefit. According to Van den Boogaerde, they have contacted a gem dealer in Houston and offered to give him a monopoly on the sector if he'll give Rajoelina USD 150 million (that would cover 7 months of payroll). Van den Boogaerde has also heard anecdotal reports of an increase in all sorts of illicit activities in the past few months as well. Future Engagement with the IMF -------------- ¶8. (C) Madagascar's poverty reduction and growth facility agreement (PRGF) with the IMF ends July 19, 2009. It is too late already to negotiate a new one to replace it. A PRGF is based on the government having a development plan in place with donors in sectors including energy, infrastructure, health, and education. The acting World Bank director pointed out May 29 that in a few months, 30 percent of primary school teachers will not receive their salaries because they were to be paid by the World Bank, which has placed its programs on hold. Although health and education activities will be relatively easy to restart, energy and infrastructure require large up-front investments and will be significantly delayed. ¶9. (C) The energy plan that had been agreed upon by the GOM and donors was that large hydroelectric investments would be made in 2012, reducing the reliance on antiquated thermal generators, 80 percent of which are already past their useful life. Given the current freeze in donor funding, this project will already be delayed for at least a year, perhaps several. The HAT will only aggravate an already dire situation at the state company Jirama if/when it reduces electricity and water tariffs by 10 percent, as announced in early June. Jirama's cash flow situation has been momentarily improved by the reduction in global oil prices and by a 30 percent reduction in production. (Because the company loses money for each unit of electricity it produces, it saves, in relative terms anyway, by producing less.) Thus, in the short term, Jirama can continue to operate (at reduced capacity) with the cuts, but production is likely to continue to diminish as the budget crunch worsens. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Van den Boogaerde is not alone in making allegations that the French backed the March coup. Such claims were publicly made the last week of May by ousted President Ravalomanana, are believed by many Malagasy people including many of our local staff, and are given credence by other diplomats as well, including the Norwegians who participated in the recent EU dialogue with the HAT. Worker discontent is growing, illustrated by short-lived strikes by Air Madagascar, national social security fund, customs, and paramedic staff this week alone. The HAT will face increasing pressure as revenues diminish during the latter half of 2009. They may buy some time by divvying up rents, such as by granting a monopoly over the gemstone sector, but the licit options, at least those that would not wreak havoc ANTANANARI 00000399 003.2 OF 003 on the economy, are getting thin. End comment. MARQUARDT

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