MULTIPLE ROAD MAPS TOWARDS THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000264 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV MA SUBJECT: MULTIPLE ROAD MAPS TOWARDS THE FOURTH REPUBLIC REF: ANTANANARIVO 261 Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The government of Andry "TGV" Rajoelina's High Transition Authority (HAT) presided over a two-day "National Meeting" on April 2-3, in a bid to bolster their legitimacy, develop a transition road map, and defuse opposition (and international community) concerns about their opaque and non-inclusive style since the March 17 coup. The event was boycotted by former President Ravalomanana's party (TIM) and a major civil society alliance (the CCOC),Their road map envisions a lengthy 19-month transition leading to presidential elections in October 2010. There was no discussion on the key elements of the transition government or some of its hastier policy choices in the previous two weeks; in short, it was a victory for TGV and the HAT that will do little to promote reconciliation with the opposition. The anti-HAT opposition held a "counter-meeting" on April 3 in protest, delivering a very different vision for the coming months: they seek a return to constitutional order (by reinstating Ravalomanana and the parliament) before attempting national reconciliation, and are willing to invite in foreign soldiers to advance their cause. Mediators from the African Union and United Nations continue to push for a return to constitutional order and elections sooner rather than later, but coordination among the international community remains elusive as the European Union gears up for a political dialogue starting on April 16 that may show further splits between the French/EU positions and those of SADC, the AU, the UN, and other states represented here. END SUMMARY. A NATIONAL MEETING, INCLUSIVE OR NOT -------------- ¶2. (C) Although the international community, opposition parties, and civil society organizations all agreed that a national dialogue was necessary in some form, the "Assises Nationales" held on April 2-3 was not what they envisioned. Political and civil society leaders not affiliated with the HAT assert that they were held too soon, without time to prepare or include provincial perspectives; the agenda was too restrictive, as many still hoped to discuss the structure of the transition government and the policy decisions already taken; and the very fact that it was organized and hosted by the HAT removed any semblance of neutrality. Much of the opposition boycotted the event, as did most diplomats, with the exception of the AU mediator and several African bilateral missions. However, some 1,000 people did attend, with representation (per the organizers) from civil society, political parties, security forces, and leaders from all 22 regions. After two days, the organizers released two key statements: one outlining general priorities, and the other a timeline taking the transition government from planning stages through a presidential election in October 2010. ¶3. (C) Aside from the timeline, the main priorities consisted of creating numerous comittees charged with reviewing policy, redesigning the country's laws, organizing regional conferences, relaunching the economy, and monitoring social policy. They announced the creation of a council tasked with "examining the fundamental principles of the constitution", and of an independent electoral commission (although it will not come into being until after the constitutional referendum). Commenting after the timeline had been released, Rajoelina stated that "no one wants to remain president of the transition authority for too long, but it is a responsibility" that he's prepared to undertake. The time for the transition is as follows: 2009 - April: Drafting of preliminary legislation - May: Regional conferences in all 22 regions - By June 26 (Malagasy Independence Day): National conference in Antananarivo - July: Adoption of new electoral code and other laws - September: Referendum on constitutional changes - October: Creation of an independent national electoral commission - December: Election of presidents of Fokontany (local districts) 2010 - March: National Assembly elections - October: Presidential elections ANTANANARI 00000264 002 OF 003 2011 - February: Communal and regional elections - March: Senate elections SPOILERS: OPPOSITION PARTIES BOYCOTT THE HAT -------------- ¶4. (C) On April 3, the anti-HAT opposition held a one-day "National Conference", which drew around 600 people including members of civil society organizations, pro-Ravalomanana "legalists", and TIM party senators and deputies of the now-suspended parliament. They too released a series of recommendations, which neatly outlined their complete disagreement with the HAT. Their focus is on an immediate return to "constitutional order", which generally means permitting Ravalomanana to resume his position as legitimate president, reopening parliament, restoring the High Constitutional Court (HCC) to its original nine members, and dissolving the HAT. They have called for the international community to clarify its position, and support the return to constitutional order (implying that foreign governments should not only condemn that HAT government, but explicitly recognize that Ravalomanana and his government remain the legitimate leaders of Madagascar),and for the military to restore its code of ethics and cease support for the coup leaders. Should this fail, they support the intervention of foreign armed forces to "re-establish constitutional order", and to permit dialogue between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina. Any further moves towards national reconciliation, in their view, come second to these goals. In the meantime, the suspended parliament plans to launch their spring session soon as scheduled, and to keep protesting daily after the Easter holidays. HAT Prime Minister Roindefo Monja has made it clear that he had no intention of permitting a "pretend" session of parliament, but neither city or national authorities have pronounced on the daily protests that continue to grab headlines in Antananarivo. ¶5. (C) Former President Albert Zafy, who still commands widespread support among coastal ethnic groups, has denounced both the pro- and anti-HAT camps. Instead, this week he declared himself the leader of six new autonomous provinces (which already existed before the 2007 creation of 22 regions, although without true autonomy),without clarifying the extent of his support or the practical details of his candidacy. Several former members of pre-Ravalomanana governments have declared that they are simply "waiting for President Zafy's order to take our responsibilities". While this is likely just a bargaining exercise with Rajoelina designed to demonstrate his support in the provinces and perhaps win a seat in the HAT (there are still three slots open out of 44),it does raise the specter of a split with coastal ethnic groups that were already suspicious of Rajoelina and his highland-centric cabinet. ¶6. (C) Zafy's agenda, beyond creating autonomous provinces, is based on his view that Ravalomanana's departure was the result of four combined forces: his Council for National Reconciliation (CRN),the "opposition" (parties such as LEADER-Fanilo, RPSD, MTS, and AREMA),TGV and his movement over the last 4 months, and the armed forces. Any transition government, in his view, must thus represent all of these groups; he would rectify this by adding a military reconciliation council to the existing HAT and the Council for Economic and Social Recovery (CRES),along with a separate body designed to promote the interests of women and young people. Zafy has fewer supporters than the HAT or its block of opponents, but he remains the single largest opposition force independent of TIM, with ideas that will gain traction in coastal areas despite Rajoelina's apparent success so far. COMMENT: HOPING WE'LL CONCEDE -------------- ¶7. (C) Rajoelina's National Meeting played well in the local media, and likely resulted in a net gain of supporters and legitimacy as the Malagasy people, both in Antananarivo and elsewhere, are beginning to grudgingly accept that he may be here a while. He continued touring the coastal regions over the weekend, stopping in Majunga, Nosy Be, Diego Suarez, and Sambava to thank his supporters and announce cheap rice and fuel for his economically troubled people. The HAT, and supportive media outlets in Antananarivo, are promoting the "successful" National Meeting as yet another reason (on top of the March 18 HCC decision on the transfer of power from Ravalomanana) why the international community should recognize their legitimacy. The majority of the ANTANANARI 00000264 003 OF 003 international community remains skeptical, however, and is lined up behind UN and AU moves towards forming a contact group and pushing for an accelerated election calendar. The UN may bring in a group of experts to determine how soon elections could occur, based on the state of the electoral list and other technical factors. The French, on the other hand, appear to be buying into Rajoelina's message; contacts in their embassy view the National Meeting as evidence that the HAT is listening to the international community. ¶8. (C) Ravalomanana, meanwhile, continues traveling around Africa to secure SADC and AU support (he's currently in Libya, after visiting Swaziland, South Africa, and Ethiopia), although his most virulent anti-HAT supporters in Madagascar are not winning much favor with their calls for foreign military intervention. With the opposition plans hinging on the HAT's unlikely dissolution, Rajoelina will likely press ahead with his agenda: he still has the support of the loudest minority, the National Meeting has "validated" his agenda, and none of those in opposition have presented a reasonable alternative. ¶9. (C) Finally, the AU and UN Envoys succeeded today in bringing members of the HAT, Arema, TIM, and Zafy's CRN into a secret meeting at the Senegalese embassy, with civil society witnesses also present. The morning session was inconclusive, mainly because the TIM delegation lacked a clear mandate and were demanding additional seats for Senators and Deputies. (Each group was allotted only four seats.) The discussion was to continue later on Thursday afternoon. MARQUARDT