MADAGASCAR: POLITICAL PROCESS MOVING HALTINGLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000261 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MA UN SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: POLITICAL PROCESS MOVING HALTINGLY FORWARD, AS FAULT LINES EMERGE AMONG PARTNERS REF: A. ANTAN 258 ¶B. PARIS 505 ANTANANARI 00000261 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E ¶1. (C) Summary: Malagasy political and civil society actors are moving haltingly forward toward a grand national dialogue, using separate but somewhat parallel processes that all attempt to address the same major questions before Madagascar: political reconciliation, constitutional reform, electoral reform, a new political parties law, a statute for former heads of state, resolution of the status of exilees from the 2001-2002 crisis, and -- most importantly -- a timetable for new elections, on every level, to bring Madagascar back to constitutional order. The UN and AU special envoys are leading separate but -- so far -- poorly coordinated efforts to bring the various Malagasy processes into some harmony; this disconnect, due primarily to free-lancing on the AU Envoy's part, is an increasing source of concern both to the Malagasy and to partners. Menawhile, the French are leading their own effort -- bilaterally, in their acting role here as rotating EU President, and through their two proxies, the Francophonie (OIF) and the Commission on the Indian Ocean (COI) -- which is a second source of confusion and concern, both to the Malagasy and partners. Nonetheless, this nascent internationally-led process --- which may soon feature a formal contact group led by the AU -- is the best way forward, and the USG should continue to support and shape it. End Summary 2, (C) The idea of a "national dialogue" of some sort as a way out of the political crisis here has been on the table here since early February. It is still seen by both most Malagasy and most partners as the best and only way forward. With that in mind, the HAT transition government held a national meeting ("assise nationale") April 2 - 3 at the International Conference Center in Ivato to lauch this process. They organized and held this meeting in direct defiance of a letter dated March 27 from U/UNSYG Lynn Pascoe to HAT "foreign Minister" Ny Hasina Andrianamanjato, in which the UN called for all actions to be undertaken not in a unilateral manner and only by a neutral party (i.e. not the HAT),and for all actions to be consensual among the various Malagasy parties. As the meeting was organized by the HAT with no input from the opposition, UN Senior Mediator Tiebile Drame boycotted it, as well as most local embassies. However, AU Envoy Ablasse Ouedraogo attended the HAT meeting, as well as most resident AU ambassadors and the Moroccan ambassador; reportedly Ouedraogo strongly encouraged AU embassies to be represented. In total, some 800 persons attended, including a number of serious political players with no attachment to the HAT. (Septel will report its main conclusions/recommendations). The TIM party organized its own "assise" at the Carlton Hotel on April 3, attended mostly by TIM partisans, as well as Ouedraogo and the Senegalese ambassador. A number of significant political actors, such as former president Albert Zafy and his CRN group, attended neither meeting, and are involved in their own parallel processes of refelctions, meetings and draft-writing. ¶3. (C) The ambassadors from the US, EU, France, Germany, and South Africa, plus the local UN rep, met with Drame for three hours on April 2 to discuss the way forward. Drame, who had just returned from two weeks in New York, proposed formalizing the de facto "contact group" that already exists here. This group would include the aforementioned, plus Russia, China, the local Dean (Vatican) and Vice-Dean (Algeria),Japan and Libya (as current non-permanent UNSC members),and representatives of the AU, COI, SADC, and OIF. There was general agreement that this formulation made sense and would be a useful coordination mechanism going forward. The absence of AU Envoy Ouedraogo from this meeting (who regretted at the last minute) -- as well as his much-noted presence at the HAT assises and his encouragement of AU members to attend as well -- raised concerns about the current AU role and the increasing appearance of divisions within the international community. ¶4. (C) On April 7, these actors met again, this time with Ouedraogo present (as well as the Libyan, Russian, and Chinese ambassadors),to discuss coordination going forward, and the contact group proposal. There was clear tension ANTANANARI 00000261 002.2 OF 003 visible between Ouedraogo and Drame as they took turns describing their separate efforts over recent days to bring the Malagasy parties together. Ouedraogo seemed to describe a process intended to bring only the TIM and HAT together, and Ouedraogo said both parties are prepared to meet and work together (albeit initially only secretly). For his part, Drame described a much broader process, and a far greater range of political actors who need to be included. Drame reported progress in getting five or six different political parties engaged (including TIM),noting also that he had met in Paris on April 1 with former president Ratsiraka to obtain his -- and Arema political party -- buy-in; other participants would be civil society, private sector, the churches, and the military. He noted an increasing (though still grudging) acceptance among political opponents of the HAT and of Rajoelina's role as its president -- conditioned, however, on a credible process leading to free and fair elections in which the HAT and Rajeolina, as guarantors of the transition and organizors of the elections, would have to agree not to participate as candidates. Neither the HAT nor Rajoelina have yet agreed to this restriction. The French ambassador stressed the importance of this point, and Drame read aloud from an AU "charter" document describing this separation between organizer of and participant in elections as an important principle within the AU. There was no clear understanding on when the presidential election could occur, only agreement that 19 months is too long. The U.S. ambassador proposed six months as our shared talking point going forward, but there was no agreement reached. ¶5. (C) During the April 7 meeting, Ouedraogo announced the presence of Ravalomanana in Addis and circulated a "hot-off-the-presses" copy of the AU's April 7 Communique in which the formation of a contact group was announced. There was agreement among those present that the Communique was generally helpful. Ouedraogo said that "Addis will decide" on the membership of the contact group, which it now appears the AU will lead. Drame endorsed this idea, saying it was appropriate for the regional organization, rather than the UN, to lead such a group. The Libyan ambassador said he would have to wait for instructions. The French proposed that the formulation described in para 3 be sent to the AU as a proposal. As of this writing, there has been no further word from Addis on its composition. ¶6. (C) Finally, there remains concern and confusion about the evolving French role, on many levels, among partners as well as the Malagasy themselves. The new French ambassador and DCM are engaged in many direct ways with a government which France does not (yet) recognize -- and to which he is not yet formally accredited. He called formally on Prime Minister Roindefa on Friday, generating much press attention and the appearance of normal relations, and met today with "FM" Andriamanjato. Apparently he is not operating under any restriction vis-a-vis contact with the HAT. In group discussions in which we or others call for solidarity vis-a-vis the HAT on such issues as protesting the ongoing intimidation or persecution of former government officials or the unjustified and disquieting release of some of the most notorious criminals (described by the HAT as "political prisoners", to be subject of septel) in Malagasy prisons, the French here have been openly skeptical, or simply silent; he did, however, raise the issue of former officials' travel restrictions with Andriamanjato today, who told him the list was no longer valid. The French assistance posture (ref A) is complacent, and they clearly will try to use their influence within the EU to extend their policy to the broader EU after the initial 120-day reflection period. Their ongoing local leadership of the EU presidency gives them one more opportunity to engage directly with the HAT; they promise that the "political dialogue" that the EU will launch next week with the HAT will be consistent with "contact group" approach and principles, but it is unlikely to be perceived that way in public opinion. Additionally, the likely presence in the contact group of both the COI (which just decided to send another fact-finding mission here) and the OIF -- both French proxy organizations -- may give France no less than three -- four, if you count the EU -- separate seats at that table. ¶7. (C) The open question here is: What are the French trying to do? In the historically anti-French atmosphere of ANTANANARI 00000261 003.2 OF 003 Madagascar, there are always conspiracy theories and rumors of dastardly French intentions; they are, indeed, the norm here. Separating that ambient background noise from what is really afoot here is therefore not simple. Added to that is the fact that Ravlalomanana was often strongly anti-French, as evidenced by his expulsion of their previous ambassador and his refusal to grant agrement to his proposed successor. Ravalomanana's famous embrace of the English language, the U.S. and Germany, and his general opening-up of Madagascar to the world, as evidenced by his joining SADC and contracts he assured went anywhere but to France, were seen by many here as anti-French moves, when in fact they probably were much more pro-Malagasy, pro-globalization, pro-balance, and pro-free-market initiatives. (Note that they were also offset by his continuing interest in the OIF, including lobbying hard -- and successfully -- to get the 2010 Francophonie Summit to take place here.) Nonetheless, tongues are wagging that Rajoelina and the HAT have been financed by French interests from the start, that the announced departure from SADC is intended to benefit historical French economic interests with a return to historic monopolies and autarky, that the Education Minister's abrupt cancellation of Ravalomanana's education reform initiative was motivated by a desire to return to French-language instruction (rather than Malagasy),etc, etc. So, while much of this perception surely goes too far, it does seem clear that France is quite prepared to resume business-as-usual with the new authorities as soon as possible, if indeed they are not already doing so. It is also likely that many French economic interests will be pleased to see their historic advantages and access restored, and that many of them are reaching into thQr pockets to support this outcome. (Note: local Karana -- Indo-Qtani -- economic interests are clearly doing the same.) With over 20,000 citizens on the ground here, the French can say with truth that they have important interests to protect here and thus have to be "pragmatic." The danger for the French -- and for any who follow their lead -- is that the HAT and its president will probably prove exceedingly ephemeral, and that whatever regime follows will have a very long memory about how easily and quickly France abandoned basic principles in the name of that pragmatism. Comment on the way forward -------------- ¶8. (C) For the U.S., sticking to our principles, keeping our distance from the unrecognized, illegitimate HAT, and supporting an international process leading to early elections (even one led -- peferably more steadily, once the contact group is in place -- by the AU) is the only real way forward toward elections. Unlike the French, we are unencumbered by a multiplicity of conflicting interests that might compromise our basic principles. When we have opportunities to speak to the French, such as next week when Bruno Joubert reportly will call in Washington, we should be frank about where our approaches and analysis differ, and why. Here in Tana, we are very skeptical about the HAT and Rajoelina having any staying power, or significant prospects for success; therefore putting too many eggs in the basket of HAT success would seem to us an enormous longer-term risk for any partner to be taking, let alone one with so much to lose. (And helping the HAT too much, and thereby contributing -- deliberately or not -- to their future political success, also strikes us as wrong-headed and improper.) The French here argue that partners need to "help the Malagasy people," and that cutting aid programs will only contribute to instability and disorder. From our perspective, it is important to maintain as much as possible of our assistance, in order not to contribute to instability, while sending a clear mesage to the HAT that we can have no direct involvement with or through them on the programs we will continue until there are free and fair presidential elections, as soon as possible. We should continue to insist on six months for this to occur, recognizing among ourselves that it might take until the end of 2009 for all the practical steps prior to elections to be completed. The French are already strong partners in sending that message, even as they fail to imply any consequences whatsoever for not complying. End comment. MARQUARDT